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Résumé  
Depuis les années 1990, le partage du pouvoir est l’option favorisée pour la consolidation de la 
paix dans les sociétés multi-ethniques. Or, une importante littérature a remis en cause sa capacité à 
consolider la paix sur le long terme. Ce mémoire questionne l’approche de l’ethnicité, des 
institutions et des relations peuple-élites dans la théorie du partage du pouvoir. Il propose de la ré-
approcher en se basant sur la théorie constructiviste de l’ethnicité, qui reconnaît la multiplicité et la 
relative fluidité des identités ethniques, sur une approche néo-institutionnaliste, qui étudie les 
interactions des institutions avec leur environnement, et en accordant une attention particulière au 
lien entre peuple et élites. Ce mémoire développe trois arguments principaux. 1–La politisation du 
clivage ethnique nuit au bon fonctionnement d’un système démocratique, menace la durabilité de 
la paix et transforme la nature de la violence. Le « succès » du partage du pouvoir peut donc être 
défini comme la dépolitisation de ce clivage. 2–La politisation du clivage ethnique n’est pas 
naturelle, mais résulte d’un processus dans lequel les institutions formelles et informelles ainsi que 
la violence jouent des rôles clés. 3–La dépolitisation du clivage ethnique est possible si des 
garanties pour représentation politique et la sécurité des catégories ethniques sont mises en place, 
et si des incitatifs pour la mobilisation d’identités non-ethniques sont apportés. Ces principes 
peuvent guider l’élaboration d’accords de partage du pouvoir. Ce mémoire théorique est 




Since the 1990s, power-sharing has become the favoured option for peacebuilding in multi-ethnic 
societies. An important literature has however shed light on the limits of this approach and put into 
question its capacity to establish sustainable peace. This thesis questions three elements of power-
sharing theory: its approach of ethnicity, institutions and its elite-bias. It proposes to approach 
power-sharing theory through the lenses of a constructivist theory of ethnicity, which 
acknowledges the multiplicity and limited fluidity of ethnic identities; a neo-institutionalist 
approach of institutions, which pays attention to the interaction of institutions with their 
environment; and in paying attention to citizen-elite linkages. Three main arguments are 
developed: 1-The politicization of the ethnic cleavage is problematic since it hinders the good 
functioning of a democratic system, threaten the sustainability of peace, and transform the nature 
of violence. “Success” of power-sharing is thus defined as the depoliticization of ethnicity. 2-The 
politicization of ethnicity is not natural but results from a process in which formal and informal 
institutions as well as violence pay a key-role. 3-The depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage is, at 
least theoretically, possible if sufficient guarantees for the political representation and the security 
of the groups are established, and incentives are provided for the mobilization of non-ethnic 
identities. These principles may guide the design of power-sharing systems. This “theory-
proposing” thesis is complemented by a plausibility probe which focuses on the crucial case of 
Burundi.  
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“The very detachment of sociological Machiavellianism is a not 
inconsiderable contribution in situations where men are torn by conflicting 
fanaticisms that have one important thing in common–their ideological 
befuddlement about the nature of society. […] In this way, sociology can 
attain to the dignity of political relevance as well, not because it has a 
particular political ideology of its own to offer, but just because it has not.” 
 Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology, 1963: 170-171
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Introduction 
 “Parmi les lois qui régissent les sociétés humaines, il y en a une qui semble plus 
précise et plus claire que toutes les autres. Pour que les hommes restent civilisés 
ou le deviennent, il faut que parmi eux l’art de s’associer se développe et se 
perfectionne dans le même rapport que l’égalité de conditions s’accroit.”  
Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, 1840/1981: 141 
 
A Constructivist Approach to Power-sharing 
“While everyone now pays lip service to constructivism, constructivist assumptions remain 
comprehensively unincorporated into our theories linking ethnic groups to outcomes,” Chandra 
wrote on the occasion of a symposium on “Cumulative Finding in the Study of Ethnic Politics” 
(2001: 8). This observation is both disappointing and challenging: while the constructivist 
approach has become dominant in the study of ethnicity, it remains largely ignored in the research 
concerning the outcomes of ethnic politics, including ethnic conflict and the way out of ethnic civil 
war, power-sharing (Chandra, 2001: 7). This thesis attempts to overcome this problem. 
Since 2001, some constructivists insights have been integrated in the power-sharing literature, but 
this has been done in great part in a piecemeal fashion. On the one hand, constructivist insights 
have been used to criticize some aspects of power-sharing theory (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). On 
the other hand, consociationalists have made room for constructivist elements in their existing 
theory (Lijphart, 2001; McGarry and O’Leary, 2006a, 2006b). This thesis aims at going a step 
further. Instead of grafting some constructivists findings in the existing theory of power-sharing, I 
propose to re-approach power-sharing from a fully constructivist point of view. The aim is not 
only to criticize the existing models, but mostly to re-root power-sharing in a “constructivist 
world” (Chandra, 2012: 22).  
The constructivist literature on ethnicity has indeed proposed a significant shift in our 
understanding of important concepts including ethnicity itself, change in ethnic identities, ethnic 
conflict and ethnic violence. While the previous primordialist approach tended to assume that 
individuals had a single, fixed and “natural” ethnic identity, constructivists have demonstrated that 
individual ethnic identities are multiple, relatively fluid, and are the result of a process of social 
construction (Chandra, 2012: 19). This thesis proposes a way to found power-sharing theory in this 
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constructivist theory of ethnicity. The constructivist approach, however, is much broader than the 
study of ethnicity.  
In the most fundamental sense, “the term ‘constructivist’ refers simply to the position that facts 
that we take to be ‘natural’ are in fact the products of some human attempt at creation and 
interpretation” (Chandra, 2012: 18). More precisely, I follow Berger and Luckman (1966) in 
considering that reality is not a given but the fruit of a social construction process in which 
institutionalization plays a major role. The institutionalization process can be understood in three 
phases: in the exteriorisation phase, repeated human activities are habitualized and typified 
(groups of people or actions are categorized) which make them follow recurrent patterns. 
Institutionalization results from this first phase. In the words of the authors, “institutionalization 
occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors” (1966: 
72). The second step is the objectivation phase in which institutions are “crystalized” and become 
“autonomous”, or “objective”, which means they “are experienced as existing over and beyond the 
individuals who ‘happen to’ embody them at the moment” (1966: 76). In this second phase, 
institutions come to appear external and coercive to individuals. In the third phase, internalization, 
these institutions are internalized by individuals through socialization processes. For Berger and 
Luckmann, it is through this institutionalization process that everyday life reality is both socially 
constructed and “taken for granted as the reality” by individuals (1966:37).  
As for most of the power-sharing literature, the focus of this thesis is on formal institutions, which 
can be broadly defined as state institutions. More specifically, a particular attention is granted to 
constitutional and electoral-system design (Reilly, 2001). In opposition to most of the power-
sharing literature, however, I also integrate informal institutions in the analysis. These can be 
defined, in contrast to formal institutions, as institutions which are “created, communicated and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004: 725).  
Following Berger and Luckmann (1966), I acknowledge the fact that institutions have a coercive 
power on individuals, but are also created and modified by these same individuals. “The 
relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remain a 
dialectical one. That is, man (not of course in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social 
world interact with each other. The product act back upon the producer” (1966: 78). As it will be 
argued in chapter 1, this understanding of institutions constitutes a break with a part of the existing 
power-sharing literature. While this literature has in great part followed a classical 
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“institutionalist” point of view, which presupposes that the same institutions have the same effects 
in varying contexts, I follow the “neo-institutionalist” literature, which attributes more attention to 
the various meanings that actors invest in institutions, and the variations in actor’s behaviour in the 
same institutional frameworks (Peters, 2005; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). As demonstrated by the 
this literature, historical legacies and the context in which institutions are implemented impacts on 
their performance (Putnam, 1993). This thesis therefore aims at understanding power-sharing 
institutions in context. In addition to constructivist, the approach adopted in this thesis is therefore 
also neo-institutionalist.  
A Tocquevillian Definition of Success 
Approaching power-sharing from a constructivist point of view is not merely a matter of 
intellectual curiosity. Rather, it arguably has important consequences on the theory itself, as well 
as on its normative implications. This re-thinking of power-sharing appears necessary because 
power-sharing has followed a paradoxical destiny in the last few years. While “power sharing 
[has] become the international community’s preferred remedy for building peace and democracy 
after civil wars” since the 1990s (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005: 5), the capacity of power-sharing to 
establish sustainable peace after civil conflicts has been increasingly questioned in parallel 
(Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Jarstad, 2008). A constructivist approach arguably allows for the 
filling of some theoretical gaps in power-sharing theory, which may guide the design of power-
sharing systems, and may help imagine new solutions to some of the practical problems of power-
sharing. 
Perhaps the most important consequence of approaching power-sharing from a constructivist 
perspective is that it allows for a redefinition of the goal of power-sharing. The question is indeed 
crucial but often unanswered in studies of power-sharing. Horowitz notes that this “inadequate 
specification of consequences” of power-sharing is the source of major difficulties in the use of 
power-sharing as a policy prescription (1985: 570).1 Specifying my definition of the success of 
power-sharing is therefore necessary.  
																																																								
1  Horowitz justifies his affirmation as follows: “Lijphart is aiming at stable democracy: his consistently 
employed criterion for evaluation is whether something proved ‘workable’ or ‘successful’ or whether the 
arrangement ‘broke down’ or ‘fell apart.’ Nordlinger defines conflict regulation as the ‘absence of widespread 
violence and government repression’; he judges degrees of ‘success’ in achieving this. Esman describes the ‘main 
purposes’ of conflict management as ‘the authoritative allocation of scarce resources and opportunities among 
competing communal actors’–which may unnecessarily import a potential technique or conflict management into 
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In this thesis “success” is defined as the depoliticization of ethnicity. In other words, the 
substitution of the dominant political cleavage in a society by a non-ethnic cleavage. To put it in 
another way, Rabushka and Shepsle’s 1972 classical definition of a divided society is: “a society 
which is both ethnically diverse and where ethnicity is the politically salient cleavage around 
which interests are organized for political purposes such as elections” (quoted by Reilly, 2001: 4). 
This thesis argues that it is (at least theoretically) possible to establish a society which is ethnically 
diverse, and where ethnicity is not politically salient, and interests are not organized around the 
ethnic cleavage. It further argues that this depoliticization of ethnicity is necessary since the 
politicization of the ethnic cleavage hinders both the establishment of democracy and sustainable 
peace. The “art of associating together” referred to by Alexis de Tocqueville in the epigraph of this 
introduction might thus also flourish in multi-ethnic societies and lay a necessary basis for the 
consolidation of peace and democracy (also see Huntington, 1968: 5; Putnam, 1993: 89). This 
definition of success might appear quite conjectural at this stage of our analysis, but it is an 
outcome of my analysis more than a preliminary assumption. While its justification will be done in 
chapter 2 and 4, I believe it its statement here is necessary for clarity purpose. 
For now, suffice it to note that this definition breaks with three different traditions in the literature 
on democracy in multi-ethnic societies. The first one is general pessimism about democracy in 
multi-ethnic societies. Following John Stuart Mill who considered that “it is in general a necessary 
condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with 
nationalities” (quoted by Welsh, 1993: 45), some authors are pessimistic about the prospects for 
democracy in multi-ethnic societies. The position adopted in this thesis partly agrees with this 
pessimism, since it argues that democracy and sustainable peace in ethnically divided societies are 
almost impossible to establish. However, this thesis is more optimistic than this theory since it 
considers democracy and peace as possible in ethnically diverse societies, when ethnicity is not 
politicized. 
The second tradition is power-sharing literature, which emerged as a reaction to the pessimistic 
assessments for democracy in multi-ethnic societies. In the 1960s, Lijphart (1977) and Lehmbruch 
(1974) rose attention to small multi-ethnic democracies in which societies where divided in 
																																																																																																																																																																														
its definition–as well as ‘the prevention of control of overt hostility and violence. A secondary purpose may be to 
reduce the long-range political salience of communal solidarities’. He, too, then makes a broad judgement about 
‘effective’ or ‘successful’ control or management. A given device, then, may make things better, worse, or the 
same” (1985: 570-571).   
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segments but bargaining and accommodation between segmental elites allowed for a stable 
political system (see chapter 1), and recommended this model of democracy building in divided 
societies. This consociational solution is also rooted in a form of pessimism: the idea that national 
unity cannot possibly be created in multi-ethnic societies. Lijphart indeed writes: 
Although the replacement of segmental loyalties by a common national allegiance appears 
to be a logical answer to the problems posed by a plural society, it is extremely dangerous to 
attempt it. Because of the tenacity of primordial loyalties, any effort to eradicate them not 
only is quite unlikely to succeed, especially in the short run, but may well be 
counterproductive and may stimulate segmental cohesion and intersegmental violence rather 
than national cohesion. The consociational alternative avoids this danger and offers a more 
promising method for achieving both democracy and a considerable degree of political 
unity” (1977: 24) 
This view is also a central in the centripetialist literature. For example, Horowitz notes that 
classical power-sharing assume that “it is necessary for ethnically divided states to live with 
cleavages rather than wish them away” (Horowitz, 1985: 568-9). This thesis breaks with these 
conceptions in two ways. First, the analysis leads to pessimistic prospects for peace and 
democracy as long as ethnic cleavages are politicized. Second, the constructivist approach of 
ethnicity allows for a brighter prospect for the depoliticization of ethnic identities in diverse 
societies.  
Third, I also break with the, sometimes over-optimistic, constructivist assessments of the prospects 
of state-building in multi-ethnic societies, namely, with those who considered that “because 
[ethnicity] is imagined, it can also be unimagined” (Esman, 2004: 34). This thesis considers that 
the claim that the reality is socially constructed does not mean that it is easily modifiable. Rather, 
reality is “solid” because it has been socially constructed and is thereby deeply internalized by 
actors, taken for granted and reproduced unconsciously. Surely, a constructivist approach lets 
more room for fluidity and change than essentialist approaches, but it acknowledges that change 
results from collective processes which are most of the time unintended. The fact that the social 
world changes, does not mean that it is easy to induce or direct this change (see Varshney, 2009: 
288). Accordingly, this thesis argues that there are serious obstacles for change and incentives for 
individuals to refuse this change. These must be carefully identified and if possible removed, to 
enable the depoliticization of ethnicity, and incentives should be provided to foster it.  
The objective of depoliticizing ethnicity, is therefore both ambitious and modest. It is ambitious 
given the pervasiveness of ethnic identities, and the widespread impact that “race-thinking” has 
	6	
had on the development of institutions for the last centuries. Succeeding in it, however, might well 
help preventing some of the most horrible massacres humanity has known. On the other hand, this 
objective is modest: it does not pretend to make ethnic identities disappear, only to depoliticize 
them. Neither does it aim at eradicating conflict. Rather, it recognizes that conflict is an inherent 
characteristic of human societies. Changing the cleavage is a first step, especially in contexts 
marked by the absence of democracy, clientelism, and poverty. Other sources of violence, and 
other motives for war may still exist, but prospects for democratization and the consolidation of a 
sustainable peace may dramatically increase if ethnicity is not the dominant cleavage. 
Depoliticizing ethnicity after an ethnic conflict, thus, is only a first step, but probably a necessary 
one; certainly a big one and surely a difficult one; the question which remains to be investigated is 
whether it is a possible or an impossible one.  
Research Questions 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis attempts to root power-sharing theory in a “constructivist world”. 
To do so, it soon appeared insufficient to study institutional design exclusively. Rather, three 
preliminary questions needed to be clarified.   
1. What is the specificity of ethnic as compared to non-ethnic cleavages? 
2. How can one explain the politicization of ethnic identities in diverse societies?  
3. How can one explain the depoliticization of ethnic identities in diverse societies?  
The answers to these questions serve as a basis for the answer to the central question of this thesis: 
4. How can institutional design generally, and power-sharing more specifically, foster the 
depoliticization of ethnic identities in diverse societies? 
Arguments 
To answer these questions, I develop four main arguments. First, I argue that the ethnic cleavage 
acts as a “transformative cleavage” which changes both the nature of politics and violence. 
Because ethnic identities have a limited fluidity, their politicization transforms politics in a zero-
sum game between members of different ethnic categories, which hinders the good functioning of 
a democracy and threatens the sustainability of peace. Moreover, as chapter 4 argues, when 
violence is exerted across ethnic lines it tends to be indiscriminate, dispossessive and linked to a 
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high occurrence of atrocities. Both specificities of the ethnic cleavage make its depoliticization a 
legitimate normative goal for power-sharing. 
Second, I develop a theory of the politicization of ethnic identities. Building on Chandra (2012), I 
argue that the politicization of ethnic cleavages is not a natural given. I observe that ethnic 
identities have a limited fluidity but are multiple. Individuals have “repertoires of identities” which 
include both ethnic and non-ethnic identities. The politicization of ethnic identities results from 
constraints on this repertoire, which makes the political mobilization of non-ethnic identities 
impossible. I argue that these constraints come principally from formal and informal institutions, 
as well as from violence and its legacies.  
Third, I argue that the depoliticization of ethnic identities results from the removal of the 
constraints on repertoires of identities, which enables the mobilization of non-ethnic identities, and 
the provision of incentives for the politicization of non-ethnic identities, which fosters the 
depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage. 
Fourth, and based on the previous arguments, I argue that general principles of institutional design 
for the depoliticization of ethnicity might include 1) the provision of strong guarantees for political 
representation and security for members of all ethnic categories, and 2) the provision of 
institutional incentives for the creation of multi-ethnic networks, most important among which are 
multi-ethnic political parties. However, I argue that each power-sharing system must thus be 
designed with an eye on the local context, because individuals’ behaviour in power-sharing 
institutions also depends on the incentives provided by pre-existing informal institutions. A study 
of these contextual incentives might provide guidance for contextualized institutional design. 
Focus 
This fourth argument means that a general model of power-sharing can hardly be formulated. 
Rather, different power-sharing models could be designed for different contexts. Accordingly, 
while the theory of the politicization of ethnicity proposed in this thesis aims to be generalizable, 
the institutional model of the depoliticization of ethnic identities proposed in chapter 5 focuses on 
a specific context: post-conflict neo-patrimonial electoral systems.  
I focus on post-conflict neo-patrimonial electoral systems because this type of political system is 
the most likely in post-war settings for two reasons. First, most ongoing civil and ethnic conflicts 
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take place in neo-patrimonial societies2, be it in Africa (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997), the 
Middle East (Bank & Richter, 2010), post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (Radnitz, 2010), or South-America (Helmke and Levitzky, 2006; Bechle, 2010). The logic of 
neo-patrimonialism is unlikely to disappear during a war; rather, the increased uncertainties 
created by civil conflict might reinforce clientelist ties through the formation of vertical alliances 
that substitute state services. Second, third parties involved in peace-making processes are likely to 
advocate for the establishment of a multi-party democracy for the post-war order, since 
democratization is one of the mains goals of liberal peacebuilding (Paris, 2004). But substantial 
obstacles to democratization are also likely to exist in most post-war societies, including the 
unwillingness of politicians to follow the rules of a democratic political game (Zahar & Sriram, 
2009). Post-war societies are thus likely to have a multi-party democratic system on paper, but in 
practice, its status is at best uncertain. A period of democratic consolidation, understood as “a 
process in which all major political actors come to accept the democratic rules of the game” 
(Sandbrook, 1996: 70) is necessary for the establishment of a functioning democracy. This 
process, however, is anything but easy. Post-war multi-party electoral systems are thus at a 
crossroad between democracy and authoritarianism (Zahar, 2003: 3). Elections can continue to be 
held even if democracy is a mirage (Morgenbesser, 2014). I thus use the term “electoral system” to 
underline the existence of regular elections without making assumptions about the state of 
democracy in this system. 
The fact that the logic of neo-patrimonialism can infuse electoral systems has been acknowledged 
by various authors. Chandra (2004) studies “patronage democracies3”; Beck (2008) focuses on 
“clientelist democracies4”. In this thesis, neo-patrimonial electoral systems refer to a subset of neo-
patrimonial systems in which politics is organized formally around the regular holding of 
elections. Neo-patrimonial electoral systems include a large set of cases where many variations 
can be observed. Focusing on this type of societies does not mean that I neglect these variations. I 
only argue that these societies have enough in common to develop a theory of the depoliticization 
of ethnicity in post-war settings, while the depoliticization of ethnicity in other contexts might take 
																																																								
2  IRIN, Mapped: a world at war : Today's wars on one map., April 26th 2016. Online : 
https://www.irinnews.org/maps-and-graphics/2016/04/26/mapped-world-war  
3 Defined as “a democracy in which the state monopolizes access to jobs and services, and in which elected 
officials have discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state 
(Chandra, 2004: 6) 
4 “A democratic regime infused with clientelist relationships that serve as the basis for political mobilization and 
accountability” (Beck, 2008: 4) 
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different forms. One of the main elements of commonality in neo-patrimonial regimes is the pre-
eminence of the state as the main source of resources. In neo-patrimonal contexts, inequalities in 
access to resources are thus tightly linked to state politics and to access to the state whereas they 
may have much more diffuse origins in, say, western democracies (Chandra, 2004; Beck, 2008). 
Methodology 
This thesis is a “theory-proposing” exercise, in the sense given by Van Evera: “[it] advances new 
hypotheses. A deductive argument for these hypotheses is advanced. Examples may be offered to 
illustrate these hypotheses and to demonstrate their plausibility, but strong empirical tests are not 
performed” (1997: 89). The focus of chapters one to five is on theory synthesis and development. I 
however complement this theoretical focus by a plausibility probe in chapter six.  
The method of the plausibility probe aims at determining whether the hypotheses suggested by this 
theory are sufficiently plausible to be worth investing time and energy in a rigorous test. As 
Eckstein writes, “plausibility here means something more than a belief in a potential validity plain 
and simple, for hypotheses are unlikely ever to be formulated unless considered potentially valid; 
it also means something less than actual validity, for which rigorous testing is required” (2000: 
140). The case study provided in chapter 6 can however be considered an “especially powerful 
‘plausibility prove’” (Eckstein, 2000: 156) since it focuses on a “crucial case”. The crucial case 
method, first proposed by Eckstein in 1975, focuses on a case which is particular in regard to a 
theory. This case represents  “a most difficult test for an argument and hence provides what is, 
arguably, the strongest sort of evidence possible in a non-experimental, single-case setting” 
(Gerring, 2007: 232). In Eckstein’s words, “the essential abstract characteristic of a crucial case 
can be deduced from its function as a test of a theory. It is a case that must closely fit a theory if 
one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule 
contrary to that proposed” (Eckstein, 2000: 148). One of the methods of identifying a crucial case 
is “to focus inquiry on ‘most-likely’ or ‘least-likely’ cases – cases that ought, or ought not, to 
invalidate or confirm theories, if any cases can be expected to do so” (Eckstein, 2000: 149).  
The case of Burundi arguably fits these conditions well. The depoliticization of ethnic identities in 
Burundi could have been considered very improbable given its long history of ethnic domination 
and massacres (Samii, 2013: 560). However, both the political and the social salience of ethnicity 
decreased quickly after the adoption of a power-sharing agreement in Arusha in 2000 (Berckmoes, 
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2014; Alfieri, 2016b; Schraml, 2011; Reyntjens, 2005). Not only is this phenomenon surprising in 
light of the literature on ethnicity, it is also difficult to explain with the existing power-sharing 
literature. Burundi is thus a “crucial case” for this theory because it is a “least-likely” case for the 
depoliticization of ethnicity and the success of power-sharing.  
This method has the advantage of providing a solution to “the principal problem facing the 
comparative method [which] can be succinctly stated as: many variables, small number of cases.” 
(Lijphart 1971: 685). This method also has the advantage of corresponding to the time and 
resource limits of this research project. However, it could be criticized for according too much 
importance to a single case that confirmed the theory (Lijphart, 1971: 686). For this reason, I 
prefer to talk about a plausibility probe. The plausibility of the argument is suggested both by the 
wide theoretical basis of the hypotheses and by the crucial case of Burundi–its full validity, if 
possible, should however be demonstrated rigorously in a further study.  
Chapter Overview 
The thesis is roughly divided into three parts. In the first part, I develop the theoretical and 
conceptual framework which will underpin the analysis. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on power-
sharing and its critiques. From the discussion of three important debates in power-sharing theory, 
it lays out the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 develops a constructivist theory of ethnicity and pays 
careful attention to the definition and the conceptualization of important notions such as ethnic 
identities, the modalities of change in ethnic identities, ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. 
Building on this conceptual basis, the second part develops a theory of the politicization of 
ethnicity. Chapter 3 focuses on the role of formal institutions and informal networks. It argues that 
political parties are central in the process of politicization of ethnic identities. Chapter 4 focuses on 
the role of violence in the politicization of ethnicity. It also elaborates on the specificity of ethnic 
violence as compared to other types of violence. Finally, the third part is concerned with the 
depoliticization of ethnic identities. Chapter 5 draws the general principles for the depoliticization 
of ethnic identities. It then details the specificities of actors’ behaviour in neo-patrimonial 
contexts. On this basis, I propose an institutional model for the depoliticization of ethnic identities 
in neo-patrimonial systems. Chapter 6 is the plausibility case study of Burundi.  
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Chapter 1: Power-Sharing Theory and its Critics 
 
“In the total absence of social conflict, political institutions are unnecessary; in 
the total absence of harmony, they are impossible”.  
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968: 9. 
 
When it comes to power-sharing, theory is never far from practice. Power sharing systems existed 
long before they were analysed by political scientists, and this object of study quickly fed into 
practice as a normative prescription for democratic consolidation and conflict management in 
multi-ethnic societies. This chapter lays the theoretical foundations of the thesis’s approach to 
power-sharing. In the first part, I review the literature on power-sharing. I start by tracing the 
history of the field, including its emergence, the major debate between consociationalism and 
centripetalism, and the evolutions of its normative goals from democracy building to conflict 
management and peacebuilding. I then review the criticisms it has been subjected to as a tool for 
peacebuilding after civil wars. In the second part, I argue that these limitations are linked to 
theoretical weaknesses. I review three major debates in power-sharing theory: the underlying 
conception of ethnicity, the theorisation of the performance of institutions, and the citizen-elite 
linkage. The theoretical framework adopted in this thesis will be based on the constructivist theory 
of ethnicity, a neo-institutional point of view on institutions, and a close attention to the role of 
citizens in power-sharing agreements.   
Consensus and Debates 
In the 1960s, the stability of democracy in heterogeneous societies was being debated against a 
dominant view, formulated by John Stuart Mill, that the stability of a political system requires 
minimal cultural homogeneity in a society. At a time when decolonization was creating a wide 
range of multi-ethnic states, the emphasis was put on nation-building, with the aim of erasing 
“primordial” loyalties to ethnic groups (McRae, 1990: 93). In 1967, Arendt Lijphart and Gerhard 
Lehmbruch5 simultaneously pointed to the existence of “a type of political systems which [had] 
																																																								
5 Both of these articles were presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association 
(McRae, 1990: 94) and later published: Lijphart (1968), Lehmbruch (1974). 
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hitherto been rather neglected in comparative research: […] systems in which political groups like 
to settle their conflicts by negotiated agreements among all the relevant actors, the majority 
principle being applicable in fairly limited domains only” (Lehmbruch, 1974: 91). Their main 
cases were Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Lebanon. The very existence of 
this type of political system allowed for relative optimism about the prospects for democratization 
in plural societies. Lijphart therefore argued that “it may be difficult, but it is not at all impossible 
to achieve and maintain a stable democracy in plural society” (Lijphart, 1977: 1; McRae, 1990: 
93-94; Mafakheri & Ahmad: 2015).  
Lijphart coined the term consociationalism6 to describe this new model of democracy, but power-
sharing theory covers a wider range of institutional arrangements. A general definition of power-
sharing could therefore be: “any set of arrangements that prevent one agent, or organized 
collective agency, from being the ‘winner who holds all critical power’, whether temporarily or 
permanently” (McEvoy & O’Leary, 2013: 3). The importance of this “discovery” can be measured 
by the debates it engendered amongst political scientists.7 
Despite many lines of divisions which will be discussed subsequently, power-sharing scholars 
share certain common assumptions, summarized by Reilly: “there is consensus on the capacity of 
political institutions to change political outcomes, and hence the utility of political engineering. 
Common ground is also found in the central role ascribed to political parties and electoral systems 
as key institutional variables influencing the reduction – or escalation–of communal tensions in 
ethnically divided societies” (2012: 63-64). For the power-sharing scholars, “the vision of a 
massive shift from the ascriptive group to the state” aims too high. Instead, “they are far more 
modest about goals. They assume that it is necessary for ethnically divided states to live with 
cleavages rather than wish them away” (Horowitz, 1985: 568-9). Following Sartori (1968) who 
“urged political scientists to take up the challenge of becoming participants in the building of 
political institutions via constitutional engineering” (quoted by Reilly, 2001: 12), they advocate for 
																																																								
6 The term is derived from the Latin word consociatio, which means « to associate in an alliance » (Sisk, 1996: 
5). In Lijphart’s own words, it should be noted that « neither this term nor the general concept were entirely new. 
[Lijphart] borrowed the term « consociational » from David Apter’s 1962 study of Uganda, and it can actually be 
traced as far back as Johannes Althusius’ writings in the early seventeenth centrury ». (2007: 3).  
7 A selection of the literature on these debates includes: Bogaards, 2008, 2014; Daadler, 1971; Hartzell & 
Hoddie, 2003a, 2003b; Horowitz, 1985, 1991, 2014; Jarstad, 2008b; Lehmbrucht, 1974; Lijpart, 1977, 2001, 
2007; McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013; McGarry & O’Leary B, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008; McRae, 1974; Nordlinger & 
Huntington, 1972; O'Flynn & Russell, 2005, Reilly, 2000, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2012; Reynolds, 2002; Rothchild & 
Roeder, 2005; Sisk, 1996; Spears, 2013; Sriram & Zahar, 2009; Wolff, 2012. 
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political leaders and political scientists to think in terms of institutional engineering to promote the 
establishment of stable democracies in the “third world” (Lijphart, 1977: 223).  
Despite these shared assumptions, the power-sharing literature has been characterized by a divide 
between consociationalist approaches which follow Lijphart, and centripetalist approaches, first 
formulated by Donald Horowitz.  
Consociationalism 
Consociational theory, as developed by Lijphart, “holds that democracy is possible in deeply 
divided societies but only if their type of democracy is […] characterized by (1) grand coalition 
governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural 
autonomy of these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation and civil service 
appointments, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy” (Lijphart, 
2007: 42). These four elements can take various institutional forms, both formal and informal 
(Lijphart, 1977: chapter 2).  
For Lijphart, plural societies are characterized by the division of the population in segments that 
can be defined as follow: “[segments] exists where political divisions follow very closely, and 
especially concern lines of objective social differentiation, especially those particularly salient in a 
society. Segmental cleavages may be of religious, ideological linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, 
or ethnic nature. A further characteristic, […] is that political parties, interest groups, media of 
communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organized along ethnic lines of 
segmental cleavages” (Lijphart, 1977: 3-4). The fundamental idea of consociationalism is that 
although a society is segmented, accommodation and cooperation can happen at the top, among 
elites, in a grand coalition government. Cultural autonomy then permits groups to define their own 
rules in areas where they have specific cultural practices such as marriage or education. 
Proportionality allows for an equitable representation of groups in the parliament and in the 
allocation of state resources. Mutual veto points provide a sense of security during the elaboration 
of state policy, since they can be used by the minority groups to block decisions that would be to 
their disadvantage.  
This model, elaborated from empirical observations and then formulated as a normative 
prescription by Lijphart, was later refined by others, including McGarry and O’Leary (2006a, 
2006b) or Wolff (2012). They integrated some of the criticisms formulated against Lijphart to 
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create a “liberal” model of consociation which will be discussed in more details below. There was 
also a proliferation of areas of application of power-sharing. From an initial focus on political 
institutions, it was extended to territorial, military or economic domains (Hartzell & Hoddie, 
2003a; McEvoy & O’Leary 2013: 4). 
Centripetalism 
The harshest criticisms of consociationalism came from “centripetal” approaches, first developed 
by Donald Horowitz (1985). Horowitz’s fundamental disagreement with Lijphart concerns the 
ability of leaders to compromise in divided societies. Lijphart argued that leaders would participate 
in grand coalitions for they understand that they have a common interest in maintaining stability, 
Horowitz argues that this is not always the case (1990: 116). Leaders may be averse to 
cooperation, either because of their own convictions, their followers’ pressures against 
accommodation, or because of other groups’ intent to enter in conflict (Horowitz, 1985: 564). 
“Although some form of regularized interethnic bargaining may be essential, it may require 
precisely the kind of pragmatism that is lacking among ethnic groups that see their vital interests 
threatened by other groups” (Horowitz, 1985: 565). Centripetalism’s fundamental idea is to fill 
this gap by providing institutional incentives for leaders to favour cooperation over conflict.  
Centripetalism has thus been defined by Reilly as “a political system or strategy designed to focus 
competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes – primarily by presenting rational, 
office-seeking politicians with incentives to seek electoral support from groups beyond their own 
ethnic community” (2001: 11).  
The design of the electoral system is at the center of centripetalits’ interest since “the electoral 
principle (such as proportional representation or first-past-the-post), the number of members per 
constituency, and the structure of the ballot all have a potential impact on ethnic alignments, ethnic 
electoral appeals, multiethnic coalitions, the growth of extremist parties, and policy outcomes.” 
(Horowitz, 1985: 628). Further refinements (Horowitz, 1991; Reilly, 2001) have emphasized three 
elements: 
1–The presentation of electoral incentives for campaigning politicians to reach out to and to 
attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own, thus encouraging candidates 
to moderate their political rhetoric on potentially divisive issues and forcing them to broaden 
their policy positions ; 2–The presence of multi ethnic areas of bargaining such as 
parliamentary and executive forums, in which political actors representing different identity 
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groups have an incentive to come together and cut deals on reciprocal electoral support, and 
hence perhaps on other more substantial policy issues as well ; and 3–the development of 
centrist aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties or coalitions of parties which are 
capable of making cross-ethnic appeals and presenting a complex and diverse range of 
policy options to the electorate (Reilly, 2012: 58).  
Institutionally, centripetalism focuses on various methods. The main one is the design of electoral 
systems that require cross-territorial or cross-ethnic support for candidates to be elected. 
Campaigning politicians therefore have incentives to moderate their discourse, so that they can 
gain votes from other regions or groups, as well as to cooperate and build agreements of vote 
pooling or coalition building. Reilly (2001) has thus advocated for the implementation of 
preferential voting systems, which allow citizen to indicate their second and third (or more) 
preferences while voting. Since secondary preferences have a strong effect on the result of the 
election, this rewards centrist parties, and provides powerful incentives for discourse moderation, 
and coalition building during the campaign. Another approach is to require parties to be multi-
ethnic, thereby transforming them into arenas of cross ethnic bargaining (Reilly, 2012: 58; Reilly, 
2001; Bogaards, 2014; Bogaards & al., 2013).  
The main criticisms of centripetalism have focused on the fact that there were few empirical tests 
of its theoretical assumptions, and that it might well prove inapplicable. A careful examination of 
the cases of Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Northern Ireland however allowed Reilly 
(2001) to address these critiques and demonstrate that some empirical examples tend to confirm 
centripetalist conclusions.  
The debate between consociationalism and centripetalis, is frontal, and sometimes surprisingly 
heated for scholars working on consensual politics. This is especially true since–although based on 
different theoretical foundations–the two models are rarely–if ever–separated in practice, with 
political systems generally combining elements of the two (Reilly, 2012: 63). Take for example 
Switzerland, which is one of the paradigmatic cases studied by Lijphart. Although it fits quite well 
with the four pillars of consociationalism (grand coalitions, cultural autonomy, proportionality, 
minority veto), direct democracy and more particularly referenda, as well as federalism and multi-
ethnic parties, could be considered centripetalist mechanisms since they had the indirect effect of 
fostering consensual decision making in the Swiss parliament (Linder, 1994: 118). As we shall see 
in chapter 6, the power-sharing system adopted in Burundi also includes elements recommended 
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by both consociationalists and centripetalists. On the one hand, it institutionalized ethnic quotas in 
parliament; on the other, it made multi-ethnic parties compulsory (Lothe, 2007).  
Power-sharing as a Tool for Peacebuilding 
As noted in the introduction, Lijphart’s main aim was the development of stable democracies; with 
the work of Donald Horowitz (1985) and Eric Nordlinger (1972) a new goal for power-sharing 
emerged: ethnic conflict management. These two normative goals have divided the entire literature 
on power-sharing. Both objectives, however, fitted well with the post-cold-war international 
agenda which sought solutions to civil wars and the establishment of stability and democracy in 
post-conflict settings (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005: 5). In the 1990’s, power-sharing had become 
key in international efforts for peacebuilding in divided societies (Reynolds, 2002: 1). Power-
sharing was believed to be a useful tool for negotiators since it enabled them to present an 
acceptable compromise to the belligerents and provided a solution to the credible commitments 
problems experienced by peace agreements (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005: 5).  
Theoreticians of power-sharing have thus put varying emphasis on one of these three dimensions. 
While some authors continue to focus mainly on democratization in heterogeneous societies 
(Lijphart, 2007; Reilly, 2001; Reynold, 2002), other focus on ethnic conflict management for 
divided societies (Horowitz, 1985; Nordlinger, 1972; Esman, 1973; Rothchild, 1997; McGarry & 
O’Leary, 2006a), and some concentrate specifically on peacemaking and peacebuilding after civil 
wars (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). As noted in the introduction, this thesis 
falls in the third stream of research, but with a specific definition of the success of power-sharing. 
Indeed, I define success as the depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage. By doing so, this research 
indirectly touches upon the two other objectives, since the depoliticization of ethnicity arguably 
renders possible and facilitates both peacebuilding and democratization, although it does not 
guarantee them. 
The main theoretical debate in this “peacebuilding” subfield has been whether power-sharing is a 
good solution for peacebuilding after civil conflicts. The “unintended consequences” (O’Flynn & 
Russell, 2005: 3) of power-sharing have received growing scholarly attention. Roeder and 
Rothchild have formulated the intriguing hypothesis that “the very same institutions that provide 
an attractive basis to end a conflict in an ethnically divided country are likely to hinder that 
consolidation of peace and democracy over the longer term” (2005: 6). Consociationalism has thus 
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been criticised as a tool for the establishment of stability and democracy after civil wars for 
various reasons. 
First, consociationalism has been criticised for entrenching divisions and perpetuating ethnic 
conflict over time, instead of resolving it (O’Flynn & Russell, 2005). It does so because it is based 
on too static and pessimistic a view of ethnic groups, which does not take into consideration the 
complexity of inter-individual relationships in multi-ethnic societies and the possibility for groups 
to change over time (Dixon, 2012: 99). Moreover, it tends to place ethnicity in the center of the 
political game and thus keep it politically salient on the long run (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 
37). Finally, consociational institutions, and more precisely proportionality and veto points, may 
be used by belligerents as “institutional weapons” for perpetuating ethnic conflict and thus 
constitute a threat to peace (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 37).  
A second problem is that consociational agreements freeze a certain balance of power between 
former enemies. This equilibrium may provide peace as long as the power balance does not 
change, but if it does (for example as a result of demographic or alliance changes) the whole 
power-sharing system may be destabilized (Jarstad, 2008: 120). A related problem is that the 
structure of incentives may differ between the moment the agreement is signed and that when it is 
implemented. Consequently, elites which had incentives to sign the agreement may have 
incentives not to commit to it afterward (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005: 38).  
A third problem identified by critiques of power-sharing is that external support might well be 
necessary for the agreement’s adoption, implementation and sustainability (McGarry and O’Leary, 
2006a: 48). The problem is that long-term commitment of third parties to enforce this agreement is 
at best uncertain, and the departure of a “foreign protector” might well mean the return to inter-
ethnic violence (Zahar, 2005; Jarstad, 2008: 119).  
The inclusion of civil war belligerents also poses various problems. First, the question of who to 
include in the agreement is not always easy to resolve (Jarstad, 2008: 115). Second, the inclusion 
of dominant factions in the agreement may well be perceived as a reward for violence and would 
put in power extremists who are not committed to state and democracy building (Sriram & Zahar, 
2009). The dynamic of politics might also tend to the exclusion of moderates, because of an effect 
often referred to as “ethnic outbidding”, according to which the ethnic cleavage, once politicized, 
tends to eliminate other cleavages from the political game and give incentives to politicians to 
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polarize their discourse rather than moderate it (Horowitz, 1985: 306-31; Jarstad, 2008: 124; 
O’Flynn & Russell, 2005).  
Finally, some reservations have been formulated about the democratic nature of power-sharing 
systems. Lijphart himself addressed the criticisms arguing that consociational systems provide in 
fact a higher quality of democracy with respect to various indicators (1999; 1977: 52). But the 
questions of governmental inefficacy and governmental rigidity remain pertinent, especially in 
post-war settings, and carry the risk of destabilization of the entire system (Roeder & Rothchild, 
2005: 39; Jarstad, 2008: 122-129). 
Three Debates in Power-sharing Theory 
Despite these criticisms, this thesis does not intend to reject power-sharing as a tool for peace-
building in divided societies out-of-hand. Rather, I argue that the above-mentioned issues 
experienced by power-sharing in practice are linked to conceptual weaknesses in the theory of 
power-sharing. They could be partly addressed if power-sharing theory manages to develop 
precise answers to at least three long-running debates: the underlying conception of ethnicity; the 
relationship between power-sharing institutions and their environment; and the way to integrate 
citizens in the analysis. These issues have been debated since the beginning of power-sharing 
theory, but theoretical developments in political science can arguably shed new light on them. This 
section reviews the controversies regarding each of these debates and specifies the approach of 
power-sharing which will be adopted in this thesis. 
Underlying Conceptions of Ethnicity 
As discussed earlier, consociationalism has been criticized for its underlying primordialist 
conception of ethnicity, and the ethnic reification effect it may have on the long run. Power-
sharing’s first formulations were indeed rooted in a “primordialist” conception of ethnicity, which 
was dominant at the time (Lijphart, 2001). These primordialist postulates have in great part been 
discredited by the constructivist literature on ethnicity. However, the implications of this 
constructivist understanding of ethnicity have arguably not yet been fully exploited in power-
sharing theory.  
Primordialism dominated studies on ethnicity and ethnic conflict for a long time, but was too rigid 
to explain the variations and changes in ethnicity that were observed empirically (Bannon et al., 
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2004; Schlee, 2002). To fill this gap, the development of a new theory was necessary. 
Constructivist theory of ethnicity has thus developed as a reaction to primordialism. It is therefore 
useful to quickly return to the primordialist foundations, before discussing how constructivism 
undermined them.  
 “Primordialism,” Chandra summarizes, “is defined by three minimal propositions: (1) Individuals 
have a single ethnic identity; (2) this ethnic identity is by nature fixed; and (3) this ethnic identity 
is exogenous to human processes” (2012: 19). Various versions of primordialism explained the 
origin of ethnic identities and their fixedness by referring to biology or social factors. For example, 
Esman’s primordialism “looks upon ethnic identities as historically rooted, deeply embedded in a 
people’s culture, reinforced by collective myths and memories, social institutions and practices, 
perpetuated inter-generationally by early socialization and therefore likely to persist over time” 
(2004: 30). Because these ethnic identities are unique and fixed, ethnic groups are easily 
identifiable and do not change over time.  
At a group level, primordialism is thus the equivalent of what Wimmer (2013) calls 
“herderianism”. According to this view, inherited from the German philosopher Herder, the world 
is filled with different “peoples” defined by three characteristics. “First, each forms a community 
held together by close ties amongst its members […]. Second, each people has a consciousness of 
itself, an identity based on a sense of shared historical destiny. Finally, each people is endowed 
with its own culture and language that define a unique worldview” (Wimmer, 2013: 16).  
As Fearon and Laitin note, “primordialism is itself something of a construct of constructivists” 
(2000a: 849). Indeed, primordialism in its “pure” form is only rarely explicitly formulated in the 
literature on ethnicity (with few exceptions, including Geertz, 1973). However, as Chandra rightly 
observes, “like many influential ideas, its power lies in its invisibility” (Chandra, 2012: 1). 
Primordialism’s strength is that its assumptions are commonly utilized implicitly, and that these 
assumptions underlie a great number of works that build upon the theory of ethnicity.  
The main theoretical implication of primordialism is that ethnic identity and ethnic groups can be 
considered as explanatory variables. Primordialism thus explains various phenomena (including 
ethnic conflict) by the presence of ethnic diversity. Empirical evidence demonstrated that the story 
was not that simple: ethnic identities appears to be much more fluid than assumed by 
primordialism, and their political and social salience appears to vary across time and space (see 
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Bannon and al. 2004; Schlee, 2002; Chandra, 2012). These explanatory gaps led to the 
development of a new theory based on constructivist assumptions. 
At a group level, three theoretical moves undermined the fundamental assumptions of 
primordialism (Wimmer, 2013: 21). The first move beyond herderianism was undertaken by 
Barth, in his 1969 book Ethnic groups and boundaries, in which he questioned the idea that ethnic 
groups are cultural groups. Rather, what matters, he says, is the boundary that delimitates these 
groups. This boundary is defined and signalled by a small number of “cultural markers”, that allow 
the differentiation of group vs. non-group members. A second move was done by the contextualist 
school, which noted the existence of multiple variations and changes in ethnicity among time and 
space. These authors observed that collective and individual identities could change over time 
(Schlee, 2002). This led these researchers to note the fluid and dynamic nature of ethnicity, as well 
as its contextual and relational nature (Wimmer, 2013: 23). Finally, a perhaps even more 
consequential criticism was formulated by Rogers Brubaker in his book Ethnicity without groups 
(2004), in which he criticized the broad tendency of scholars to “take groups for granted”. 
Brubaker called this problem “groupism”: “the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, 
internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief 
protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis.” (Brubaker, 2002: 164). 
In fact, Brubaker observed, “ethnic groups” are often not “groups” characterized by a high level of 
intragroup ties. It is therefore an analytical mistake to “treat ethnic groups, nations and races as 
substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed.” (Brubaker, 2002: 164).  
This criticism led to a reorientation of the constructivist theory of ethnicity toward individuals as 
units of analysis. Instead of being single, individual identities are multiple; instead of being fixed, 
they can change (Chandra, 2012: 2-3). The focus is no more on ethnic groups, but on ethnic 
(individual and collective) identities, and the link between them. In brief, where primordialism 
considered ethnic identities as single and fixed, constructivism shows that they are multiple and 
that they can change over time and space. Where primordialism considered ethnic identities and 
ethnic groups as synonyms, constructivism disentangles the two.  
Consociationalism, because it provides segmental representation and autonomy, tends to reify 
groups and maintain the centrality of the ethnic cleavage in the political game. It tends to create an 
equilibrium between groups that can be contested if there are changes in group demography or 
distribution of power, potentially leading to a return to violence. More recent versions of 
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consociational theory integrated this critique and proposed a distinction between “predetermined” 
and “self-determined” ethnic groups. In a “corporate” consociational model, groups are 
predetermined and the system offers autonomies to these groups. A consociational model based on 
group self-determination is more open and thus allows for groups to change over time, or for new 
cleavages to arise. While “corporate” consociationalism was institutionalized by pre-determined 
ethnic quotas for the political representation of groups, “liberal” consociationalism prefers “pure” 
proportional representation which allows for self-determination of the groups (Lijphart, 1991, 
2001; O’Leary and McGarry 2006b).  
This solution is not completely convincing. Even though it opens the door to change in ethnic 
divisions, nothing proves that this change will actually happen. In post-ethnic conflict settings, it is 
even unlikely to happen, since recent violence results in group polarization (Jarstad, 2008; Zahar, 
2003). Parties will probably be organized on an ethnic basis and society will be segmented rather 
than reconciled. More problematically, in the absence of specific guarantees for the representation 
of minorities, problems of permanent or “frozen” minorities and majorities (Horowitz, 1985) may 
emerge and can be conducive to ethnic conflict. In a post-conflict context, the absence of 
guarantees for the representation of each group in political institutions and in the army can also 
lead to security dilemmas which have been identified as a cause of ethnic violence (Posen, 1993; 
Rose, 2000; Lake & Rothchild, 1996).  
This debate has the merit of raising the question of ethnic group formation and perpetuation, and 
of the integration of constructivist findings in power-sharing theory (Lijphart, 2001). The “self-
determination” solution, however, emphasizes only the fluid and dynamic nature of ethnicity; it 
does not address another important finding of the constructivists, namely that individual identities 
are multiple. Moreover, all individual identities are not ethnic. In fact, the constructivist theory of 
ethnicity, more than simply focusing our attention on individuals, also provides a new conception 
of individual identities: “an individual’s identity is composed of many grafted together identities, 
which are weighted, valued, and combined in non-linear ways depending on context” (Wilson, 
2015: 464). This leads to what could be called an “individualist situationism” where each 
individual can mobilize his or her different identities depending on the situation.  
This thesis aims at injecting the constructivist theory of ethnicity in the power-sharing literature, 
and at exploring how it might, or might not, transform our approach to power-sharing. I will argue 
that individuals have multiple identities and that one of the aims of power-sharing institutions 
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might be to provide incentives for individuals to mobilize non-ethnic identities instead of ethnic 
ones, therefore contributing to a depoliticization of ethnic identities. More generally, this thesis 
aims at demonstrating that a reflection on ethnic power-sharing cannot be led independently of a 
reflection on ethnicity and ethnic conflict.  
Institutions and their Environment 
The second debate focuses on the conceptualization of institutions and their effect on the social 
interactions. As Schraml accurately observes, “the ‘institutional engineering’-debate (…) is subject 
to a rather narrow concept of institution” (2011: 74). This conception assumes that certain types of 
institutions have the same effects in different context. Schraml further argues that “the 
predominant understanding of institutions assumes a universally valid, generalizable and partly 
causal relationship between political institutions and the desired outcome of conflict management, 
political stability and democracy” (2011: 72). This echoes Horowitz’s criticism of the 
consociational approach of institutions: “there is little recognition that any policy or technique may 
have an array of consequences–some desired, some undesired, some intended, some unintended–or 
that a given measure may have varying or opposite consequences under varying environmental 
conditions, and there is nothing whatever about a phenomenon endemic to policy and policy 
analysis: the second order-consequences that all policies tend to have” (1985: 571).  
This conceptualization takes root in an “institutionalist” approach, which was developed in legal 
studies, and focused on institutional design, out of context. A further evolution of this theory has 
however put emphasis on several other factors. The influence of history and of the environment in 
which institutions are implanted has been shown to influence their functioning (Peters, 2005; 
Putnam, 1993; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). These approaches are grouped under the label “neo-
institutionalism”. The implication of these theories is that the effect of institutions is not 
necessarily universal. Rather, Putnam demonstrated that the context matters (1993). The 
interaction between power-sharing systems and their environment has been the matter of 
controversies from the beginning of power-sharing theory. However, the potential of a neo-
institutionalist approach of power-sharing has arguably not been fully explored yet.  
This debate emerged when scholars tried to explain why elites cooperated in certain situations but 
not in others (McRae, 1990: 95). In his 1967 article, Lehmbruch emphasized the variable of 
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political culture, “the fact that peculiar norms of conflict management develop under specific 
historical circumstances”. He wrote:  
Under certain (and quite different) historical circumstances “fragmented” political cultures 
generate methods of conflict management which permit the survival and continued existence 
of the political system and at the same time a considerable measure of group autonomy. 
These methods consist in transactions which differ markedly from bargains in a 
“homogeneous” political culture and have much in common with agreements as they take 
place among nations. Then they become norms which are retransmitted by the learning 
processes in the political socialization of elites and thus acquire a strong degree of 
persistence through time (Lehmbruch, 1967: 5). 
Daadler (1971) followed in his footsteps by considering historical processes as major explanations 
for the existence of consociational systems.  
For Lijphart, on the other hand, the existence of consociational systems is not necessarily the fruit 
of a specific political culture. For him, the most important factor is the capacity of elites to 
understand the interest of cooperation. However, Lijphart integrates context into his consociational 
theory through his famous “favourable conditions” (1977: chapter 3). These conditions, he argues, 
may facilitate the emergence of consociationalism but in no way are they necessary. Lijphart’s list 
of favourable conditions evolved across his career. His final 1985 list includes: geographical 
concentration of segments, equal size and small number of the segments, the presence of external 
threats and overarching loyalties, a tradition of elite accommodation and socioeconomic equality 
(a comparative table of the different versions of this list can be found in Bogaards, 1998: 478). 
The status of these favourable conditions has been the subject of much debate in the field 
(Bogaards, 1998). Some like Pappalardo (1981) or Dew (1972) argue that these conditions are a 
prerequisite to consociationalism; others, including Lijphart, consider them only as helpful 
circumstances (Bogaards, 1998: 486-7). Bogaards shows that this debate opposes a more 
“determinist” to a more “voluntarist” point of view. For Lijphart, the favourable conditions were a 
way to try reconcile contextual determinism to voluntarism: contextual factors are helpful, but do 
not fully determine the outcome. But in so doing, Lijphart arguably created a certain ambiguity, or 
even an “inherent contradiction”, in consociationalism (Bogaards, 1998: 489):  
Lijphart has attempted to obviate the tension between determinism and voluntarism in 
consociational theory by separating the two approaches. Voluntarism plays a key-role in the 
self-negating prediction; the deterministic elements are relegated to the category of 
favourable factors. However, this separation was bound to be incomplete, since the 
favourable factors cannot function as conditions without impairing the voluntaristic 
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character of consociationalism. With that the favourable factors fell between two stools and 
became a popular object of critique” (Bogaards, 1998: 490).  
The problem is that the normative value of consociationalism derives from its voluntaristic 
character: consociationalism is a useful model only if it can be used to build democracy in 
unfavourable contexts. If the success or failure of consociationalism is fully determined by 
external conditions, institutional engineering does not have much reason to be. More importantly, 
the exact theoretical explanation of why a given contextual factor would be more or less 
favourable to consociationalism seems quite vague. There needs to be more theorizing on exactly 
how the context interacts with power-sharing institutions to influence the cooperative behaviour of 
elites. As Bogaards puts it, “voluntarism has not yet produced a theory of elite behaviour which is 
able to explain and predict political choices in plural societies” (1998: 492).  
Such a theory of elite behaviour has however been –at least partly– developed on the other side of 
the debate, by the centripetalists, starting with Horowitz (1985). They focus on incentives for 
cooperation provided by the electoral system to leaders. This focus on political institutions and 
incentives allows us to understand more precisely why leaders sometimes cooperate and 
sometimes do not. Centripetalists, however, tend to focus too exclusively on electoral systems and 
therefore they do not fully integrate context in their analysis.  
In this thesis, I conceptualize context as a set of institutions which interact with the power-sharing 
system. As Spears observes, “an elementary, though perhaps implicit, assumption [in power-
sharing theory] […] is […] the existence of a deeper institutional framework on which [power-
sharing] agreements rest” (2013: 37). To say it differently, power-sharing accords are not 
established in a vacuum: pre-existing institutions interact with power-sharing institutions to 
produce a certain political outcome. A promising way to understand the functioning of power-
sharing systems is thus to contextualize them, not in abstract and general terms, but in a more 
practical study of pre-existing (or co-existing) institutions. Studying the interaction of these 
institutions presents a theoretical and methodological challenge that can be addressed by using a 
theory of incentives.  
However, a theory of incentives cannot limit itself to electoral incentives; it must integrate diverse 
conflicting incentives stemming from other formal and informal institutions. This has partly been 
done by centripetalists. Horowitz (1985: 574) insists on the necessity of integrating variables 
relative to the size and distribution of groups and the structure of cleavages in the analysis. More 
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generally, there is an understanding that different constitutional dispositions can provide different 
and potentially contradictory incentives to leaders, which can sometimes compromise the aims of 
the centripetal system as a whole. More recently, Reilly emphasized the importance of micro-level 
institutions including how small changes, such as single vs. multi-member districts or optional 
versus compulsory preferential marking in preferential voting systems, can have major impacts on 
the political outcomes of the institutional structure (Reilly, 2001: Chapter 7).  
Much like formal institutions, informal institutions have an impact on the functioning of power-
sharing systems. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) have underlined the necessity of taking such 
institutions into account, since they have a deep influence on the outcome of politics, especially in 
contexts where patronage and clientelism are important features of social life. Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson (2007) have also proposed to pay more attention to citizen/elite linkages, in addition to 
formal institutional structures, to understand the outcomes of politics. In both cases, the argument 
is not that formal institutions have no effect, but that the outcome of politics is better understood 
when considering the interaction between formal and informal institutions. This is particularly 
important in “neo-patrimonial” contexts such as Burundi (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1997). Power-sharing systems are often established in this type of environment, 
characterized by a predominance of informal institutions over formal ones. In this context, the 
exclusive focus of most power-sharing theory on formal institutions makes little sense (Spears, 
2013).  
In this research, I argue that the “practical performance” (Putnam, 1993: 8) of power-sharing 
institutions is best understood if power-sharing is studied in its institutional context. To study the 
interaction of these different institutional complexes, I focus on individual actors. Following 
Chandra (2004), I adopt the “assumption that individuals are instrumentally rational actors who 
pursue objectives however defined, by selecting those means that maximize their chances of 
obtaining them” (Chandra, 2004: 11). These actors are confronted to various institutional 
complexes which provide them with different sets of incentives and constraints (Posner, 2005). If 
incentives coming from different institutional frameworks overlap, they may be mutually-
reinforcing or conflicting (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). I argue that taking this variety of 
incentives in consideration helps understand the functioning of power-sharing in context.  
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The Elite-Citizen Linkage 
The third debate within consociational theory concerns the relationship between elites and citizens. 
Consociationalism focuses explicitly on elites, since accommodation is supposed to happen at the 
top. It therefore pays disproportionate attention to leaders and does not spend much time 
questioning their link to citizens.  
Horowitz pays more attention to this question. Reviewing previous theories of ethnic conflict, he 
notes that more “attention needs to be paid to developing theory that links elite to mass concerns 
and answers the insistent question of why the followers follow” (1985: 140). He does so by 
incorporating the psychological elements of “group worth” and “entitlement” in his theory of 
ethnic conflict, and by paying attention to the relationship of party leaders with their electorate, 
and how it can affect ethnic conflict. 
Centripetalism has thus attributed more importance to people. For example, as Reilly writes, “a 
particular characteristic of the centripetal approach is its reliance on mass rather than elite activity 
as the driving force for moderation: while vote-pooling deals are made between candidates, the 
ultimate success of such strategies is dependent on the behaviour of their supporters ‘on the 
ground’” (2001: 196). But centripetalism remains mainly focused on electoral systems and on 
providing incentives for cooperation and accommodation to the leaders of ethnic groups. The idea 
is that designing systems that reward the most centrist and moderate candidates will lead to the 
formulation of less extremist discourses by elites, and, thus, yield more peaceful inter-group 
relationships. There is an underlying instrumentalist understanding of ethnicity, which considers 
that ethnic conflict results at least partly from elite manipulation. Thus, while including the 
electorate in the analysis, centripetalism remains predominantly focused on providing incentives 
for elite moderation. This can however become a weakness in instances where elites are moderate 
while the people are not, or if the political system produces inter-elite accommodation whereas 
inter-group relations remain conflictual (Horowitz, 1985).  
In short, both consociationalism and centripetalism did not fully explore the impact of the link 
between elites and followers on the functioning of power-sharing systems. Just as integrating 
context in the analysis was theoretically important, so is integrating people. Theoretically, 
understanding the behaviour of citizens may in some cases help us understand the success or 
failure of power-sharing systems. Moreover, power-sharing should also focus on providing 
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incentives for the moderation of citizens, since these can sometimes be the instigators of ethnic 
tensions. Methodologically, this implies paying attention to the linkage between people and elites 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) as well as to the hierarchies in communities. This linkage can 
vary in nature. Kitschelt and Wilkinson identify two types of linkages: programmatic or 
clientelistic.  
The question of the linkage between people and elites is developed in chapters 2, 5 and 6. In 
chapter 2, the question of the structure of ethnic groups, and how clientelist networks reinforce or 
alter the politicization of ethnic identities is discussed. In chapter 5 and 6, I focus on power-
sharing institutions in neo-patrimonial contexts. I argue that the dynamics of the relationship 
between state leaders, elites and citizens helps understand the functioning of power-sharing 
systems. At each level, specific imperatives make each actor more or less susceptible to react to 
different types of incentives.  
Conclusion 
In sum, this chapter has retraced the emergence of power-sharing theory and the main theoretical 
divisions within the field. I have then reviewed several criticisms addressed to power-sharing as a 
peacebuilding device. In the second part, I have discussed three major debates in power-sharing 
theory. I showed that a good part of the power-sharing theories are rooted in a primordialist 
conception of ethnicity and in an “institutionalist” conception of institutions. Moreover, I 
established that power-sharing theory focuses mainly on elites. I argued that these three points are 
theoretical weaknesses and I proposed to introduce three modifications in the theory of power-
sharing: a constructivist conception of ethnicity which acknowledges the multiplicity and the 
relative fluidity of ethnic identities; a neo-institutionalist approach which studies the interaction of 
power-sharing with its institutional context; and a close attention to citizen-elite linkages. This 
chapter has thus exposed the big lines of the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis. Before 
developing these ideas further, it is necessary to clarify the manner in which this thesis 
understands ethnicity. This is the object the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Theory of Ethnicity 
 
“Tous les sangs des races de couleurs sont ‘dominants’, jaunes rouges ou parme… 
le sang des blancs est ‘dominé’… toujours ! Les enfants des belles unions mixtes 
seront jaunes, noirs, rouges, jamais blancs, jamais plus blancs !...”  
Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Rigodon, 1969: 712.  
 
“C’est à force de concevoir les hommes comme des échantillons que l’on apprend 
à les traiter comme s’ils n’étaient point des hommes.” 
Wladimir Weidlé, Les abeilles d’Artistée, 1936/2002: 80. 
 
Although things have evolved since Chandra’s 2001 remark about the lack of integration of 
constructivist theory in the study of the outcomes of ethnic politics, the integration of 
constructivist findings in the power-sharing literature remains a challenge for three interrelated 
reasons. First, many scholars working on power-sharing come from the study of electoral systems 
and focus primarily on constitutional institutions without incorporating a deep reflection about 
ethnicity in their analysis of power-sharing.8 This is legitimate since specialization in one field is 
already arduous work –but this may result in the unintended reproduction of implicit 
primordialism in their research. A second reason is the lack of unity, coherence and conceptual 
clarity in the constructivist corpus on ethnicity, which makes it harder to incorporate its findings. 
The recent publication of two books synthetizing these findings, Kanchan Chandra’s 
Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (2012), and Andreas Wimmer’s Ethnic Boundary 
Making (2013) contributes to filling this gap. They also contribute to moving the debate away from 
the opposition between primordialism and constructivism and inside constructivism (Chandra, 
2012: 4-5). Finally, a third reason is that, when constructivist theories have been applied to 
outcomes of ethnic politics, they have sometimes been applied poorly. Constructivist approaches 
focusing on discourse have tended to overestimate the fluidity of ethnic identities and assume that 
“because [ethnicity] is imagined, it can also be unimagined” easily (Esman, 2004: 34). This has led 
to the promotion of idealistic solutions, and has sometimes made primordialism appear to fit more 
closely with the reality (Van Evera, 2001).  
																																																								
8 One of the notable exceptions is Horowitz (1985).  
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This chapter will attempt to start addressing these three problems as they relate to power-sharing 
theory. While power-sharing theorists often focus exclusively on constitutional institutions and 
electoral systems, this chapter aims to anchor a reflection on power-sharing in a constructivist 
theory of ethnicity and ethnic identity change. This chapter’s goal is thus to lay the theoretical 
foundations and develop a constructivist conceptual framework suited for a reflection on ethnic 
conflict management.  
To do so, I discuss three important dimensions of the literature on ethnicity, with the aim of 
clarifying the concepts used in the rest of this thesis. I start by discussing the definition of ethnicity 
and adopting a constructivist one. Following Chandra, an ethnic identity is defined here as “a 
subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership” (2012: 58). 
In part two, I review the literature on ethnic identity change and specify the possible and 
impossible, probable and improbable modalities of change in ethnic identities. Theorizing change 
is important to be able to formulate realistic proposals for ethnic conflict management, without 
overestimating the fluidity of ethnic identities. Indeed, whereas most previous constructivist 
theories emphasize the fluidity of ethnic identities, I argue that this fluidity is limited at an 
individual level. I put the emphasis on another dimension of the constructivist understanding of 
ethnic identities: their multiplicity. The third part finally discusses the concept of ethnic conflict, 
and proposes an understanding of ethnic conflict based on a “triangle of conflict” which builds on 
Galtung (2009) and Bramsen and Wæver (2016).  
Defining Ethnicity 
At first sight, the concept of ethnicity appears to cover such an extraordinary variety of social 
groupings, united by such diverse criteria - such as common language, religion, past political 
alliance, territory or culture - that the notion may well seem to be too inclusive, a catch-all 
concept, “un fourre-tout” (Chrétien et Prunier, 2003: VII). What is the common denominator of 
ethnic identities? How can we define the concept? However challenging, this question cannot be 
avoided since this definition is the cornerstone of a theory of ethnicity.9 To summarize the wide 
																																																								
9 Retracing the history of the term “ethnicity”, its emergence and its uses in social sciences could be interesting. 
In this regard, see Chapman (1993) or Chrétien & Prunier (2003: VII) or Jenkins (2008: chapter 2). The object of 
this section, however, is the clarification of the conception of ethnicity adopted in this thesis more than the 
varying historical uses of this concept. 
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literature on the question, two types of definitions can be differentiated: definitions with “groupist” 
assumptions and definitions with individualistic assumptions.  
Groupist Definitions of Ethnicity 
Definitions based on “groupist” presuppositions are of three kinds: objectivist, subjectivist, and 
mixed. They all substitute a definition of “ethnic groups” to a definition of ethnicity. Objectivist 
definitions typically include a list of criteria which are shared by ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin, 
2000b: 9). For example, Smith defines an ethnic group as “a named human population with myths 
of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a 
link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 6). As opposed to 
these lists of material, objective elements, “subjectivist” definitions emphasize the inter-subjective 
feeling of belonging to an ethnic group. Following Max Weber’s definition, ethnic groups consist 
of “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their customs or both, or because of 
memories of colonization or migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group 
formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” 
(quoted by Chandra, 2012: 69).  
The standard definition of ethnicity commonly found in the literature consists of a mix of 
“objective” and “subjective” elements. An example is the definition proposed by Wimmer: 
“ethnicity is understood as a subjectively felt belonging to a group that is distinguished by a shared 
culture and common ancestry. This belief in shared culture and ancestry rests on cultural practices 
perceived as ‘typical’ for the community, or on myths of a common historical origin, or on 
phenotypical similarities indicating common descent” (2013: 7). Moreover, a consensus has 
emerged about the understanding of ethnicity as an “umbrella concept” that “easily embraces 
groups differentiated by colour, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes’, ‘races’, ‘nationalities’, 
and ‘castes’” (Horowitz, 1985: 53).  
These definitions may be considered problematic because of their lack of precision and their 
underlying groupist assumption that lead to some analytical mistakes. First, because of their vague 
and imprecise character, they tend to create controversies about which group should be defined as 
ethnic, and debates about whether a definition is too large or too exclusive (Fearon and Laitin, 
2000b: 11; for a detailed discussion see Chandra, 2012: 73-93). This is problematic since a good 
definition should cover precisely the phenomenon it is supposed to define. But the most important 
	31	
problem is that this lack of precision leads to methodological mistakes. Because no clear criteria 
are established to differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic groups, scholars tend to uncritically 
import everyday life classifications of ethnic and non-ethnic groups in their analysis. By so doing, 
the sociological analysis only reproduces pre-notions or common wisdoms which are not 
theoretical but pre-theoretical. As stressed by Durkheim (1895), sociology must instead 
emancipate itself from these “empirical categories”. A sociology of ethnicity must rest on a more 
solid ground. 
The second problem with these definitions is the confusion between ethnic categories (or 
identities) and ethnic groups. As already noted in chapter 1, Brubaker (2004) demonstrated that the 
group dimension of ethnicity should not be taken for granted. “Ethnic groups” are in fact often not 
“groups” in the sense of homogeneous units, characterized by a high level of internal ties, and 
feelings of belonging. Ethnicity can instead exist without group: members of an ethnic category 
may well not form a group; they still have an identity in common. Since the group is not 
necessary, ethnic identities can be considered as individual identities, which are shared by a 
multiplicity of individuals. This does not mean that ethnic groups do not exist, but their existence 
is not given by nature; it must be empirically demonstrated, and the degree of cohesion of these 
groups may vary.  
Individualistic Definitions of Ethnicity 
To avoid the confusion, it is in fact necessary to differentiate between the concept of group and the 
concept of category. From this point on view, it is not one, but two definitions that are required: 
ethnic group and ethnic category (or its synonym, ethnic identity). The literature on ethnicity based 
on constructivist premises increasingly focuses on ethnic identities rather than ethnic groups. An 
identity is defined as “a category that can be used to classify or describe an individual–that is, a 
category for which she possesses the attributes that determine eligibility for membership” 
(Chandra, 2012: 100). The concept of category does not imply any specific relationship between 
the members of a same category, they only need to possess a certain criterion of classification in 
common. For example, the members of the category “men” do not need to be organized in any 
particular way to be part of the category. On the other hand, the concept of group, as understood in 
this thesis, implies the existence of interrelationships, interdependence, intra-group 
communications between the members of a group, as well as a feeling of belonging to the group 
understood as a unit. For the purpose of this chapter, suffice it to discuss two “individualistic” 
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definitions of ethnic identities, one proposed by Fearon and Laitin (2000b), and the other by 
Chandra (2005, 2012).  
Fearon and Laitin (2000b) distinguish between rules of membership in a social category, and 
content of this category, which are the typical characteristics of members of this category. This 
distinction is important because it recognizes the existence of the content of categories (the 
aforementioned “objective elements”) but shows that they can vary and have nothing to do with 
the definition of the category in itself. Culture, for example, can be the content of an ethnic 
identity. However, this element does not define an ethnic category in itself, because culture can 
change over time. As Horowitz puts it, “culture is important in the making of ethnic groups, but it 
is more important for providing post facto content to group identity than it is for providing some 
ineluctable prerequisite for an identity to come into being” (1985: 69). Content certainly 
contributes to the reinforcement of the feeling of belonging to an ethnic group in certain cases, 
however these elements are neither prerequisite for the delimitation of a category boundary, nor 
fixed over time (see Barth, 1969).  
Accordingly, the inclusion of elements of content of the categories in the definition is both 
problematic and unnecessary. Problematic, since these elements can change over time; they are 
variables and thus cannot be included in definitions that aim to be stable. Unnecessary, because, as 
we shall see, it is possible to develop a theory of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence with a 
definition that does not include elements of the content of ethnic categories. Following previous 
constructivist definitions, the definition of ethnicity adopted in this thesis is thus minimalist. It 
does not deny the existence of several elements that are often linked to ethnic identity; it only 
considers them variable and unnecessary to define an identity as ethnic.   
If the content is not necessary for building a definition of ethnic identity, the rule of membership 
is. Starting from a reflection on how an individual’s ethnic identity is determined in everyday life, 
Fearon and Laitin (2000b) identify the “descent rule”, which can be formulated as follows: “all 
that is necessary to be counted as a member of an ethnic group is to be able to have accepted the 
claim to be immediately descended from other members of the group” (2000b: 13). This centrality 
of (imagined) decent in ethnic classifications is also acknowledged by other constructivist authors 
including Jenkins (2008), Karner, (2007), or Scharml (2012, 2014). Fearon and Laitin’s important 
“descent rule” is however not free of ambiguities. Indeed, it may not correspond to some 
situations, including the “creation” of new ethnic groups. For example, the group Yoruba “was 
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invented in Nigeria in the nineteenth century. At this time period, the parents of those who were 
classified as Yoruba were not themselves classified as Yoruba for the reason that this category did 
not exist during their lifetimes” (Chandra 2006: 408; about Yorubas’ ethnogenesis see Peel, 2000). 
According to the descent rule, Yoruba would thus not be an ethnic group, since parents were not 
member of an ethnic group.  
Chandra’s definition of ethnicity, builds on this “descent rule” and tries to solves this problem. 
Chandra (2012) defines ethnic identity as “a subset of categories in which descent-based attributes 
are necessary for membership” (Chandra, 2012: 58). This definition is based on the distinction 
between category and attribute. An attribute is “a characteristic that qualifies an individual for 
membership in [a] category, or signals membership” (Chandra, 2012: 105). An ethnic attribute is 
an attribute which is “associated with or believed to be associated with descent”. It can be 
inherited genetically (physical characteristics) or socially (name, language, geographical origin, 
etc.) (Chandra, 2012: 59). For Chandra, what makes a category ethnic, is that the rule of 
membership in this category is the possession of such a descent-based attribute. In other words, it 
is not the categories in themselves that are transmitted by descent, but the attributes. And the 
eligibility for membership in an ethnic category is restricted to the individuals who possess a 
specific descent-based attribute. This solves the problem that was just identified with the “descent 
rule” since “this [definition] does not require that children share the same descent-based categories 
as their parents – just that the attributes that qualify them for membership in ethnic categories are 
acquired through descent” (Chandra, 2006: 409).  
The set of social categories associated with descent-based attributes is wider than the set of 
identities which are conventionally classified as “ethnic”. Ethnic categories are thus a subset of 
this wider set, which Chandra defines by adding four restrictions. These aim at eliminating the 
identities which could be “associated with descent”, but are not conventionally considered ethnic. 
In Chandra’s words, these restrictions aim at “approximating the conventional classification of 
ethnic identities” (Chandra, 2012: 62): 
(1) [Ethnic identities] are impersonal—that is, they are an “imagined community” in which 
members are not part of an immediate family or kin group; (2) they constitute a section of a 
country’s population rather than the whole; (3) if one sibling is eligible for membership in a 
category at any given place, then all other siblings would also be eligible in that place; and 
(4) the qualifying attributes for membership are restricted to one’s own genetically 
transmitted features or to the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, region, caste, clan, 
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nationality, or race of one’s parents and ancestors (Chandra, 2006: 400; for a detailed 
discussion of these restrictions see Chandra, 2012: 61.)  
These four restrictions may be considered the weakness of Chandra’s sophisticated conceptual 
framework. Indeed, Chandra recognises that they are not analytically justified, but are rather 
determined arbitrarily to eliminate non-ethnic identities from the definition. Their theoretical 
justification is yet to be developed (2012: 61). The problem is that this lets open the question of 
why so-called “ethnic” identities should be analysed distinctively from other “descent-based” 
identities. Chandra writes that “in the absence of such justifications, [she does] not think that there 
is so far a good reason to wall off ethnic identities from other types of descent-based identities” 
(Chandra, 2012: 62).  
These restrictions can also be criticised individually. Indeed, restriction 1 carries the risk of 
introducing a “groupist” element in the definition. The size criteria introduced by restriction 2 
might well be problematic: it is not because a country is mono-ethnic that its inhabitants have no 
ethnic identity–it is only that these identities are latent. A change in the context (for example, 
immigration or emigration) might well activate these identities. Restriction 4 is similarly 
ambiguous in regard of constructivist assumptions for it reintroduces in the definition a list which 
resembles the “objectivist” definitions. 
It may be argued that these restrictions are needed because the basic definition is not sufficiently 
precise. In the next subsection, I propose a definition of ethnicity which is arguably consistent with 
Chandra’s definition, but allows for the elimination of these restrictions.  
Ethnic Identity and Filial Transmission 
Building on Chandra (2012), this thesis defines ethnic attributes as being automatically transmitted 
to the next generation (but not necessarily acquired) by descent.10 A social category is defined as 
ethnic when the attribute of eligibility for membership in it is ethnic. Accordingly, I define ethnic 
identities as social categories in which the attribute necessary for membership is automatically 
transmitted to the next generation by descent. This implies that members of an ethnic category will 
automatically transmit the attributes necessary for membership in this category to their children. 
																																																								
10 By “automatically transmitted”, I mean that ethnic attributes are those attributes which are ineluctably 
transmitted to the next generation. This excludes, for example, the colour of eyes, which is linked to descent, but 
is not automatically transmitted to one’s children.  
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On the other hand, non-ethnic identities encompass all social categories in which the attribute 
necessary for membership is not transmitted by descent. 
Although Chandra (2012) uses the word “group” as a synonym for “category”, I prefer, as noted 
earlier, to differentiate between the two concepts. I define an ethnic group as a set of persons 
eligible in the same ethnic category and united by a feeling of belonging to the same social entity, 
as well as by internal networks of exchange, communication, solidarity and interdependence. Note 
that while all members of an ethnic group need to be eligible in at least one common ethnic 
category, all the members of an ethnic category need not be members of the same group. To say it 
differently, there may be many groups in one ethnic category, for example, many political parties 
(Horowitz, 1985). What differentiates an ethnic group from a non-ethnic group is that the 
membership in an ethnic group is limited to individuals who possess an ethnic attribute.  
A first particularity of this definition is that it makes no assumption about how an ethnic identity 
has been acquired, it only focuses on how it is transmitted. Following a widespread understanding 
of ethnicity as linked to the past, the focus of the definitions proposed by Fearon and Laitin 
(2000b) and Chandra (2012) was on inheritance of ethnic identities. Chandra, for example, notes 
that “descent-based” attributes are the attributes that are “acquired through [genetic, cultural or 
historical] inheritance” (2012: 59). This focus is probably due to the fact that ethnic extremists 
themselves often refer to a phantasmagorical past and myth of historical ancestry. As Anderson 
puts it, “racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an 
endless sequence of loathsome copulations” (1983: 149). This mythical history, however, is not 
necessarily more than a dream (see Anderson, 1983). As Horowitz notes, “Ethnicity is connected 
to birth and blood, but not absolutely so” (1985: 51-52). Ethnic identities, although often inherited, 
are also sometimes acquired by choice: “conversion, intermarriage, passing, ‘forgetting origins’ 
and the likes” (Horowitz, 1985: 52-53) are mechanisms of ethnic identification which are not 
linked to decent. Horowitz therefore notes that there are two “principles of membership” in ethnic 
categories: “birth and choice” (1985:55). 
The definition proposed in this thesis induces a subtle, but important shift away from the focus on 
inheritance. With this definition, the focus is put on the future, on the transmission of identity to 
the next generation. It is based on the idea that ethnic attributes are not always inherited from the 
parents, but are always transmitted to children. For example, religious conversion may allow an 
individual to change his ethnic identity: this identity will not have been acquired from his parents, 
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however, it is considered ethnic because he will transmit it to his children. Since ethnic attributes 
are transmitted to children, they are indeed, most of the time, inherited from parents; but this is not 
always the case, while ethnic attributes (however acquired) are always transmitted to children. 
This definition thus also allows us to solve the problems identified by Chandra regarding Fearon 
and Laitin’s descent rule. To continue with the same example, Yoruba is defined as an ethnic 
identity not because Yorubas have inherited this identity from their parents, but because they will 
automatically transmit it to their children.  
This slight modification of Chandra’s definition allows for the suppression of her four restrictions, 
since “descent-based non-ethnic” identities are arguably ruled out of the definition. These include 
the “large number of categories typically based on attributes distributed arbitrarily across siblings” 
such as the colour of eyes, or the sex (Chandra, 2012: 61): as these attributes are not automatically 
transmitted from a parent to his child, they are not considered ethnic by this thesis’s definition. 
Other identities excluded from the definition are class or political affiliation (Chandra, 2012: 63), 
as there is no guarantee that these will be transmitted automatically to an individual’s child. It 
should be noted, however, that some identities that are excluded by Chandra’s definition are not 
excluded by the definition proposed in this thesis. This includes nationality, Chandra notes that 
“‘German’ would not be an ethnic category in a country that is 100% German” (2012: 61). As 
noted above, I do not think this is accurate. Any German traveling abroad would feel he has a 
“German” ethnic identity. A nationality cannot be ethnic and non-ethnic at the same time. With 
this definition, it is considered ethnic if it is automatically transmitted to children. Another such 
identity is “family” which is excluded by Chandra’s definition. Although families are 
“conventionally” not considered ethnic identities, I do not see any reason to differentiate them 
from other ethnic identities. If family is generally not considered ethnic, it is maybe more because 
families are rarely politically relevant due to the small number of their members–but the fact that 
family is almost never politically relevant, does not mean this is not an ethnic category. In at least 
one case, royal families, the group is politically relevant and, in this case it shares a remarkable 
number of common traits with ethnic groups. Royal families display for example the same myth of 
common ancestry, of purity of blood, sometimes the same restriction on marriage as ethnic 
groups.11  
																																																								
11  Although nobility is often considered as a class or a family identity, its links to racism have been 
acknowledged in the literature. Hannah Arendt traces the origins of “race thinking” back to 17th century Europe. 
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Except for genetic characteristics, the transmission of ethnic attributes by descent is socially 
constructed, and can be considered as a shared subjectivity, an “idea”, or a “belief”.12 It is worth 
noting that the modalities of this transmission by descent (which of the two parents will transmit 
its ethnic attribute to the children) are socially constructed, culturally varied, and differentiated by 
gender. In certain cases, ethnic attributes are transmitted to the children by both the mother and the 
father; in other cases, the transmission might be restricted to one of the parents only. Three 
example can be provided to demonstrate this variety. In Germany, both parents are believed to 
transmit ethnic attributes. Consequently, “the Nazis viewed racial purity as the absence of any 
non-Aryan blood, whether maternally or paternally derived” (Weitsman, 2008: 564). On the other 
hand, Weitsman notes that for Serbians “identity [is] viewed as exclusively paternally derived” 
(2008: 565). The opposite case, exists too. For the category “Jewish”, it is mothers who transmit 
the ethnic identity (Chandra, 2012: 59). As demonstrated by Weitsman (2008), these varying 
modalities of transmission have very concrete consequences. Based on their conceptions, Nazis 
strictly forbade sexual intercourse with non-Aryans, and even led campaigns of sterilization of 
what they called “inferior races”. On the other hand, Serbian militias’ belief informed a policy of 
forced impregnation of Bosnian Muslim women as a technique of genocide: the men’s identity 
being transmitted to the children of these women. These two strategies were thus tightly linked 
with specific and socially constructed understandings of “descent” and the Serbian strategy would 
have been completely counterproductive for Nazis13 (Weitsman, 2008). 
As this last point already slightly suggests, this definition arguably allows for a better 
understanding of the specificity of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. At the end of this chapter, and in 
chapter 4, I will argue that, because ethnic attributes are transmitted by descent, human 
reproduction becomes central in ethnic politics, which has specific consequences on the 
																																																																																																																																																																														
She shows that French Aristocrats progressively developed the idea that they were of a different “race” as the 
bourgeoisie. They gradually came to read French politics as the fight between a “Germanic nobility and a Celtic 
bourgeoisie” (Arendt, 1951: 45). Anderson makes a similar observation and notes that “the dreams of racism 
actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity 
among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and ‘breeding’ among aristocracies” (Anderson, 1983: 149). This 
metaphor of “blood” is common with other ethnic identities and proves that nobility is about filiation: however 
symbolic, blue blood is an ethnic attribute transmitted by filiation to the next generation. The link between 
nobility and ethnicity is even more obvious in pre-colonial Burundi, where the nobles were classified as a distinct 
ethnic category: the Ganwa (Chrétien, 1993; Reyntjens, 1994; Lemarchand, 1994).  
12 Schraml (2012) and Karner (2007) put a specific emphasis on this subjective dimension, which is also 
acknowledged by Chandra (2012), but their focus is mainly on the inheritance of ethnic identities. 
13 “The maternal contribution to identity must be completely assumed away for an ethnic group to embark on a 
policy of forced impregnation or forced maternity in order to promote “genocide” or “ethnic cleansing” 
(Weitsman, 2008: 565). 
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functioning of an electoral system and on ethnic violence. But before tackling these questions, 
more needs to be said on the conceptual framework adopted in this thesis regarding change in 
ethnic identities and ethnic conflict. 
Theorizing Change 
“Who are the Darfurians?” asks Alex De Waal. He identifies “four overlapping processes of 
identity formation, each of them primarily associated with a different period in the region’s 
history”: Sudanese identities, Islamic identities, administrative tribalism, and the Arab vs. African 
polarization (De Waal, 2005: 181). These shifts of identity do not result from migrations waves in 
Darfur. Rather, they are the product of shifts in the way the same people identify themselves 
across time. Observing a variety of examples of this type of identity shifts, constructivists have 
emphasized the fluid and dynamic nature of ethnicity, as opposed to the primordialist “fixed” 
conception of ethnicity.  
The modalities of this change and the extent of fluidity can however be subject to debate. At least 
three different modalities of change have been identified by what I describe here as three different 
approaches to ethnic identity change: approaches focusing on group amalgamation and 
fragmentation, approaches focusing on the fluidity of ethnic identities, and approaches focusing on 
the multiplicity of ethnic identities. These three modalities are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
and the three phenomena are empirically observable. Disagreement between these approaches can 
however exist regarding the probability, frequency, or rapidity of change in ethnic categories.  
Amalgamation and Fragmentation of Ethnic Groups  
Halfway between contemporary constructivist theory and primordialism, the first integration of 
constructivism in the theory of ethnicity was undertaken by scholars focusing on the ability of 
ethnic groups to change by either fusion or fragmentation. This can be identified as the origin of 
the constructivist agenda in ethnic politics. For example, Horowitz observed in 1975 that “the 
extent and the importance of boundary change have generally been underrated” (1975: 113). The 
main concern of this first set of scholars is less with individual short term change in ethnic identity 
than with change in ethnic identities at a societal level. Put differently, their focus is not so much 
on changes in ethnic identities, but on changes in ethnic groups.   
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The categorization proposed by Horowitz (1975; 1985: 64-74) is representative of this type of 
approaches. For him,  
Ethnic groups can become more or less inclusive. Some small ethnic groups merge with or 
absorb others, or are absorbed by them producing larger, composite groups. Larger groups, 
on the other hand, may divide into their component parts, or a portion of such a group may 
leave it to form a new, smaller group. (1985: 64-65).  
Processes of assimilation or differentiation thus explain change in ethnic groups. These processes 
of fusion and fission are summarized in table 1 (Horowitz, 1985: 65). There is, moreover, the 
notion that ethnic groups are internally divided into subgroups. This “hierarchy” of groups 
explains that, depending on territorial and political context, different levels may be mobilized for 
identification. While groups A and B may be in conflict at the national level, at an ethnically 
homogeneous local level, two subgroups of A may enter into a rivalry. Context and political 
leadership explains why groups may sometimes divide and sometimes merge.14  
Table 1: Processes of Ethnic Fusion and Fission 
 
Source: Horowitz, 1985: 65 
																																																								
14 Andreas Wimmer (2013) has proposed an updated version of this. From his perspective, ethnic groups are 
mainly defined by the boundary that separates them and change is theorized as the displacement of the 
boundaries or the crossing of boundaries by individuals or groups. Wimmer identifies five mechanisms of 
change: expansion, contraction, transvaluation, positional move and blurring. Expansion is the process by which 
an ethnic group enlarges itself by including other groups, it is a process of amalgamation of previously separated 
groups. Contraction, on the opposite, is a process of fission of previously unified categories, to form many 
smaller ethnic groups. Transvaluation is the process by which the normative principles attributed to an ethnic 
group may change. Positional move is individual or collective move from a category to another, this includes 
assimilation (of an individual in a new category) or re-categorization. This can happen at an individual level, for 
example by changing one’s ethnic identity by marriage or by adopting attributes of another ethnic category. 
Blurring, finally, is the process of reducing the importance of ethnic identities in the social sphere, and trying to 
promote, instead, another base of cleavage, for example, social class (Wimmer, 2013: 50-61). This categorization 
has the advantage of including more mechanisms of change than Horowitz’s version. Wimmer also stresses the 
importance of strategic calculations at the root of these changes. 
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In regard to the theoretical framework developed in this thesis, it is important to note that this 
approach focuses on change in ethnic groups rather than ethnic identities. Its weakness is that it 
does not really identify the constraints on change. A closer look at the internal institutions and 
structures of ethnic groups is arguably necessary to understand these limits to change. Moreover, 
this approach theorizes how groups change but does not say much about what is specific to ethnic 
groups. To understand this, we must pay specific attention to ethnic identities.  
The Fluidity of Ethnic Identities 
A second set of researchers have observed that ethnic identity can change intrinsically and have 
thus emphasized the fluid nature of ethnic categories. Following the work of Benedict Anderson 
(1983) on nations as imagined communities, scholars have emphasized the ideational construction 
of ethnic identities, and “regarded ethnic solidarity as an invention of the human imagination, an 
intellectual construct, not an objective reality” (Esman, 2004: 34). This view has progressively 
become dominant in the field and is summarized by Wimmer: “the routine assertion that ethnicity 
is constructed, contextually variable, contested, and contingently eventful – representing the four 
Cs of the constructivist credo that is currently shared by most authors writing on ethnicity” (2013: 
204).  
While this approach has made a valuable contribution to questioning and countering the static 
primordialist understanding of ethnicity, its strength is also its weakness. Where primordialist 
theory could not explain change, these constructivist approaches have trouble explaining stability. 
Emphasizing fluidity creates risks of advocating for idealistic solutions for ethnic conflict, which 
have pushed certain scholars back to primordialism. As Kaufmann writes, “it follows that ethnic 
conflict generated by the promotion of pernicious, exclusive identities should be reversible by 
encouraging individuals and groups to adopt more benign, inclusive identities” (1996: 152). While 
this may appear feasible on paper, the reality of ethnic conflict often makes things more 
complicated. As Wimmer writes, “hélas, not everything is possible, not all ethnic boundaries are 
fluid and in motion, not all are cognitively and emotionally unstable, contextually shifting and 
continuously contested” (2013: 204). The problem here, as with the first approach, is an 
insufficient description of the constraints on change.   
“How fluid is fluid?” asks Ferree (2012). Without denying the existence of identity shifts, other 
constructivists have thus argued that this change is significantly slower and harder to achieve than 
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expected, because of institutional, psychological or emotional factors. “Constructivism” Varshney 
writes “is [thus] basically about long-run stickiness” of ethnic identities (2009: 288). Ethnic 
individual identities have a certain fluidity but it should not be overestimated.  
The Multiplicity of Ethnic Identities 
The third approach recognizes a relative fluidity of individual ethnic identities but emphasizes 
their multiplicity as the principal mechanism for change in collective ethnic identities. Brubaker’s 
argument (2004) that ethnicity is not necessarily linked to groups has led to a reorientation of the 
constructivist theory of ethnicity toward individuals as units of analysis. Whereas primordialism 
considers that an individual had only one ethnic identity, constructivism acknowledges that an 
individual has many ethnic identities (Wilson, 2015).  
This multiplicity of individual identities can explain observed shifts in collective identities. 
Chandra (2012) provides a sophisticated framework to theorise this change. Because every 
individual has a great number of ethnic attributes15, he is eligible in many ethnic categories, 
although he may not mobilize all of these identities. Chandra thus differentiates between 
“nominal” and “activated” categories. Nominal categories are all the potential categories an 
individual is eligible in due to his set of attributes. The activated categories are the few categories 
that are actually activated. Each individual thus has a “repertoire of nominal ethnic identities” 
composed of the totality of these identities. Because the attributes are generally fixed in the short 
term, the repertoire of nominal ethnic identities is relatively stable (Chandra, 2012: 9). However, 
change is possible at a societal level, when individuals choose or are forced to activate a specific 
ethnic category instead of another.  
Let’s take the fictional example of a French-Canadian woman living in Montreal. Her nominal 
ethnic identities’ repertoire includes a language (French), a nationality (Canadian), a religion (say, 
Catholic), and a skin colour (say, white). She may activate or be forced to activate these different 
ethnic identities at different moments. When living in Quebec, she may activate the “French-
speaker” identity while advocating for independence. While traveling, she will however have to 
activate her “Canadian” identity, because “Quebecker” is not an internationally recognized 
national identity, which is necessary to travel (and materialised as a passport). If she had lived 
																																																								
15 Although the definition of ethnic attributes utilized in this thesis is slightly different from Chandra’s, this 
definition is fully compatible with Chandra’s conceptualization of change. 
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three-hundred years ago, she may have activated her “white” identity as opposed to First Nations. 
Note, finally, that the activation of specific identities can be the outcome of her will, but can also 
be externally imposed, for example by institutional constraints or by ethnic violence (Chandra, 
2012: 101-104; Felouzis & Fouquet-Chauprade, 2013). 
Change can therefore be understood at an individual level as the activation by an individual of 
certain categories in which he is eligible instead of others. At a collective level, identity shifts in 
ethnic groups can be understood as the collective activation of a certain ethnic category instead of 
another. These changes can happen in the long, but also in the short run. Individuals activate 
different categories depending on the situation.  
This framework thus allows for the reconciliation of the approaches which stress the stability of 
individual ethnic identities with those who emphasize the fluidity of ethnic identities at a collective 
level. Let’s be clear: at an individual level, ethnic attributes do (most of the time) not disappear or 
change in the short run, and neither do nominal ethnic identities. These identities can however be 
activated or “deactivated” socially and politically at different times. Inactive attributes and 
categories remain latent until they are reactivated. The four identities which have successively 
been politically relevant in Darfur, in the example provided at the beginning of this section (De 
Waal, 2005), have not appeared and disappear across time: individuals possessed them all in their 
nominal repertoires of identities, but politically activated a specific one at different periods. 
The strength of this approach is that it allows for theoretical developments on the constraints on 
change in ethnic identities. Change is first constrained by the given set of attributes an individual 
possesses by descent (Chandra, 2012: 9). For example, a white American will hardly be able to 
shift to an Afro-American identity, since he does not possess the required descent-based 
attribute.16 But the constraints on change are also limited by external factors: “history, institutional 
background, economic factors, ideological factors, social norms, and territorial factors may, taken 
individually or together, eliminate certain categories from the set of feasible choices while 
privileging others” (Chandra, 2012: 17).  
																																																								
16 Although the recent scandal about Rachel Dolezal, a white woman who pretended to be black and became 
president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, shows that descent-based 
attributes can be faked. However, once it became known that her bodily attributes were not acquired by descent, 
she was excluded from the “colored people” category, which is another proof of the importance of descent in 
ethnic categorizations.  
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Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Identities in Interaction: the Politicization of Ethnicity 
While the above described approaches to change aimed at theorizing the way ethnic identities 
change, another important question is why ethnic identities are activated in certain contexts instead 
of other non-ethnic (i.e. non-descent based) identities such as ideological or economic identities. In 
other words, why are descent-based identities politically and socially salient in certain contexts 
and not in others? (Posner, 2004). A classical17 explanation has been that ethnicity was a 
primordial loyalty that persisted in certain contexts because of a lack of modernization. As Bannon 
et al. write, with a focus on Africa, “ask most people why ethnicity is so salient in Africa and they 
will tell you that it is because Africans are so ‘backward’. Once Africans become more educated 
and urbanized (in short more “modern”) it is assumed, ethnicity will cease to cause so much 
conflict, distort so many elections and pervert so many public policies” (2004: 1). This view must 
be rejected first for its obvious western-centrism and its unawareness that ethnic politics does also 
exist in the western world, and second because ethnicity has proven to be a phenomenon fully 
inscribed in modernity (Horowitz, 1985: 96; Wimmer, 2002; Chrétien & Prunier, 2003). 
A slight enlargement of Chandra’s framework can help conceptualize the problem of the variations 
in the politicization of ethnic identities. If we think in general terms, and not only in terms of 
ethnicity, it is obvious that individuals' nominal identity repertoires are not limited to ethnic 
identities. Rather ethnic identities co-exist with other non-ethnic identities in these repertoires. The 
politicization of ethnicity thus happens when individuals activate one of their ethnic identities 
rather than a non-ethnic one in their country’s political arena. At a societal level, ethnicity is 
politically and socially salient when the activated identities are mostly or exclusively ethnic.  
The politicization of ethnicity can thus be reconceptualised as the reduction of the set of nominal 
identities that can be activated by individuals to ethnic identities only. This restriction is done by a 
variety of external factors, which can be identified and studied. Among these, formal and informal 
institutions may provide incentives for the activation or the non-activation of ethnic identities. 
Violence and emotions may also explain the restriction of the repertoire of identities that can be 
activated. Following Chandra (2004), Posner (2005) and Wimmer (2013), I consider that 
individuals act in a strategic way when activating an identity instead of another. To put it 
differently, they are likely to react to a variety of incentives in ‘hierarchizing’ their identities. This 
																																																								
17 And still widespread in everyday life, although discredited in academia. 
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thesis’ argument is that, if incentives for the activation of ethnic identities are removed and 
sufficient incentives for the activation of non-ethnic identities are provided, a shift away from 
ethnic politics may take place.  
In this thesis, I use this approach, based on a modified version of Chandra’s concept of identity 
repertoire, to study the politicization of ethnic identities, ethnic politics and ethnic violence. This 
framework has the advantage of explaining change and the absence of change, as well as providing 
a conceptual framework for thinking about the politicization and depoliticization of ethnicity. The 
next chapters focus on three main explanatory factors for the reduction of the multiplicity of 
identities that can be activated to ethnic ones only: formal and informal institutions (Chapter 3), 
violence, and to a lesser extent emotions (Chapter 4). 
But before studying the factors conducting to a politicization of ethnicity, it is useful to discuss the 
notion of ethnic conflict. Indeed, ethnic conflict is central in the literature on ethnicity and it is the 
object of this thesis. However, most previous theories of ethnic conflict do not fit very well with 
the theoretical framework developed in this chapter. This is because they are built on theories of 
ethnicity which were based on different assumptions than our constructivist approach. The next 
section reviews these theories. It then develops a theoretical framework which is compatible with a 
constructivist theory of ethnicity, and which allows us to understand what is specifically “ethnic” 
in an “ethnic conflict”.  
Conceptualizing Ethnic Conflict 
Most of the literature on ethnic conflict has in fact focused on conflict between ethnic groups, and 
has tried to identify the causes of conflict to prevent or manage them. After reviewing these 
approaches, this section questions these “groupists” and “causal” assumptions and their 
compatibility with our constructivist framework. In the second subsection, I argue that it is 
possible to conceptualize conflict in a way that allows us to think in terms of ethnic categories 
instead of ethnic groups, and in terms of process rather than causal relationships. In the third 
subsection, I ask what is the specificity of ethnic conflicts as opposed to other conflicts. I argue 
that the organization of politics around an ethnic cleavage has the specific effect of transforming 
the nature of the political game into a zero-sum game, which threatens the good functioning of 
democratic institutions and may induce a specific logic of violence. Based on this 
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reconceptualization, I explore a possible way of managing conflict in diverse societies: the 
depoliticization of ethnic identities.  
Causes of Conflict between Ethnic Groups 
A significant part of the approaches to ethnic conflict has focused on searching for the causes of 
these conflicts. They are based on a specific understanding of conflict, defined as the pursuit of 
incompatible goals by a multiple number of actors (Galtung, 2009: 23). An example of this type of 
definitions of conflict is provided by Wallensteen who defines conflict as a “social situation in 
which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available 
set of scarce resources” (2011: 16). Similarly, Horowitz defines conflict as “a struggle in which 
the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals” (1985: 
95). In this view, and as suggested in Horowitz’s definition, violence is understood as an outcome, 
or a degree of conflict (Zartmann & Faure, 2005: chapter 1; Kalyvas, 2006: 20-22).  
Based on this definition, scholars have identified various causes of ethnic conflict. A first 
argument is that ethnic groups are naturally prone to conflict because of ancient hatred, differing 
worldviews or conflicting interests (Kaplan, 1993). Per this classical primordialist explanation, 
ethnic conflict needs no explanation (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). Although widespread in journalistic 
and common sense interpretations of many conflicts, more sophisticated explanations have been 
developed in academia.  
A second explanation is that ethnic conflict results from competition between ethnic groups for 
“scarce resources”. These can be of various types:  economic or political (see Esman, 2004; Wolff, 
2006), territorial (Toft, 2002), symbolic, or cultural (Horowitz, 1985). In any case, inequalities of 
access to resources are at the root of conflict. Political, economic, or cultural discrimination 
creates grievances that motivate conflict, in line with Gurr’s theory of “relative deprivation” 
(1970). In this view, ethnic conflict results from the frustration created by a group’s feeling of 
being deprived of what they deserved or expected.  
A third set of approaches, following the works of Tajfel on inter-group psychology, have focused 
on psychological and emotional causes of ethnic conflict. Through experimental research in social 
psychology, Tajfel (1974) finds the existence of an “in-group bias”: individuals tend to favour 
members of their own group even if the group is formed on a minimal criterion (Horowitz, 1985: 
144-147). Horowitz (1985) builds on this literature to develop a theory of ethnic conflict. For him, 
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ethnic conflict is the result of inter-group comparison and competition for “group entitlement” 
understood as the “joint function of comparative worth and legitimacy” of ethnic groups in a 
society (Horowitz, 1985: 226). Since individual feelings of worth and legitimacy are intimately 
tied to a group’s worth and legitimacy, the members of an ethnic group will be inclined to engage 
in ethnic conflict to increase their group’s entitlements (Horowitz, 1985: 185-228). For his part, 
Petersen developed a sophisticated framework that describes how emotions such as fear, 
resentment, rage and hatred between groups are at the root of ethnic conflict and violence 
(Petersen, 2002, 2012).  
A fourth set of explanations links ethnic violence to democracy. According to this approach, ethnic 
diversity creates permanent (or frozen) majorities and minorities in the electoral system because 
voters tend to vote on an ethnic basis. An ethnic group will thus be permanently excluded of the 
electoral system and therefore have incentive to use violence to change the situation (Horowitz, 
1985; Welsh, 1993; Mann, 2005; Galvan, 2001a). 
A fifth set of approaches focuses on structural and contextual factors. These include the weakness 
of the state, intra-state security problems, neighbouring countries’ instability, or the repartition of 
ethnic groups on a territory (Wolff, 2006: 66). For example, Toft (2002) develops the idea that 
ethnic conflict is mainly explained by settlement patterns and whether ethnic groups consider their 
territory indivisible. In such a case, they may mobilize for independence.18 (For the discussion of 
these various approaches, also see Chandra, 2006: 418-421; Varshney, 2009; Toft, 2002; Esman 
2004; Wolff, 2006: 66-73) 
A last set of arguments considers that conflict arises from “strategic interactions between groups” 
(Lake & Rothchild, 1998: 8). For these authors, ethnic conflict and ethnic violence results from 
problems of limited information and security dilemmas. This set of arguments comes from an 
attempt to apply international relations’ realist theory to ethnic groups. Fearon and Laitin (1996) 
and, later, Wilson (2015) focus on the asymmetry of information. Because information flows are 
more important inside than between groups, the reaction to an offence differs depending on the 
position of the criminal. When he is a member of the group, the individual in question will be 
punished. When he is a member of the other group, however, the whole group will be held 
accountable. This mechanism can create spirals of violence. Posen (1993) has applied the “security 
																																																								
18 Another possibility that should at least be considered from a constructivist point of view, however, is that the 
boundaries of the groups are defined in a certain way because of independentist claims (Wimmer, 2013: 91). 
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dilemma” theory to ethnic conflict. He argues that, due to mutual mistrust, ethnic groups may have 
incentives for pre-emptive violence. This dynamic explains the emergence of conflict. A 
subsequent development of the theory also focused on diplomatic tactics between ethnic groups 
that might also lead to violence (Rose, 2000). Lake and Rothchild (1996) place fear at the center of 
their explanation of ethnic violence, they cover information failures and security dilemma 
mechanisms, but also highlight problems of credible commitment between groups. 
Problematizing Causal Approaches of Ethnic Conflict 
These approaches build on specific understandings of ethnic groups, ethnic violence and causes of 
conflict, which do not fully correspond with the constructivist theory of ethnicity. A constructivist 
approach in fact problematizes these approaches in three ways; it questions their conception of 
ethnic groups, their conception of ethnic violence, and the reflection in terms of causal 
relationships. 
The first constructivist critique targets the underlying “groupist” assumptions of these approaches. 
Building on the existing literature and on empirical observations of conflicts, these approaches 
tend to assume that the existence of ethnic groups precedes ethnic conflict, or at least that ethnic 
groups are well defined during ethnic conflicts. According to the constructivist framework 
developed in this thesis, however, the homogeneity and closure of ethnic groups even during 
ethnic conflict (especially when it is non-violent) should not be over-stated. Accordingly, taking 
the pre-existence of ethnic groups for granted, or comparing ethnic groups to states may be 
problematic in certain cases. This does not mean that these theories are wrong. In fact, as Chandra 
notes, “constructivist approaches do not, as is often assumed, dismiss primordialist interpretations 
of ethnic identities–they problematize them” (Chandra, 2012: 8). These theories are certainly 
relevant, but they apply only when ethnic groups are clearly constituted, which may not always be 
the case, and must first be demonstrated. To put it differently, constructivism asks an additional 
question: are “ethnic groups” really groups? And, more puzzlingly, are “ethnic groups” necessary 
for ethnic conflict to happen? The conceptualization of ethnic conflict I propose above allows for a 
focus on ethnic identities, rather than ethnic groups. It allows us to take the cohesion of ethnic 
groups in conflict as a variable rather than a given.  
Second, the conception of violence adopted in these approaches has been problematized. Whereas 
causal approaches consider violence as the outcome or the fruit of an escalation of the conflict, a 
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growing number of scholars advocate for a conceptual differentiation between violence and 
conflict (Kalyvas, 2006: 75; Fearon and Laitin, 1998: 426). As we shall see in the next chapter, 
ethnic violence might in fact sometimes precede and generate generalized ethnic conflict by 
politicizing ethnic identities. In certain instances, ethnic violence may thus be closer to a cause of 
ethnic conflict than to its outcome. In this thesis, I disentangle the two phenomena, to gain a better 
understanding of the connection between them. Ethnic violence and its links to ethnic conflict are 
studied in detail in chapter 4. 
Thirdly, the underlying conception of conflict and the research for its “causes” can also be 
problematized. Focusing on causes may indeed be misleading for three reasons. First, causes are 
likely to be multiple and to differ in every ethnic conflict. Generalization seems difficult as 
illustrated by the variety of causes identified in the literature. Second, reasons for entering in 
conflict might vary depending on the level. Local and national causes of conflict might in fact be 
very different (Kalyvas, 2006). Thirdly, as emphasized by Bramsen and Wæver (2016: 4) and 
Vorrath (2009), conflict is a dynamic process which evolves over time. Conflict may thus continue 
independently from its initial cause. Unlike in medicine, treating the causes of conflict might well 
have no effect on the disease itself. Moreover, what is perceived as a cause of conflict (the various 
reasons for polarization of the belligerents) might in fact be an outcome of this conflict (Kalyvas, 
2006: 76). This proves the limitations of using metaphors or comparisons with natural sciences to 
guide social science research and the necessity to develop a more dynamic and processual 
understanding of conflicts rather than focusing exclusively on their causes. In the next section, I 
develop a conceptualization of ethnic conflict which tries to address these three issues.  
A “Triangle” Conceptualization of Ethnic Conflict 
Following an idea first developed by Galtung19, Bramsen and Wæver (2016) have developed a 
dynamic “triangle” conceptualization of conflict. The idea is that a conflict (or the resolution of a 
conflict) may emerge from any of the three tips of this triangle (Galtung, 2009). The three “tips” of 
the triangle identified by Bramsen and Wæver are “Situation”, “Interaction”, and “Tension” (SIT). 
																																																								
19 Johann Galtung proposed an “ABC” triangle. This triangle is formed of three interacting but separate elements 
Attitude (A), behaviour (B) and contradiction (C). (Galtung, 2009: 105). For Galtung, “attitude” includes 
psychological and emotional dispositions related to conflict; “behaviour” is more focused on concrete actions; 
“contradiction” refers to the incompatibility of goals pursued by the actors.  
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In brief, conflict is thus conceptualized as a relation between actors, characterized by a tension and 
taking place in a certain situation.20 
For the purposes of this thesis, I adapt Bramsen and Wæver’s triangle to my theoretical 
framework. While the SIT triangle is very general in its conceptualization, I attempt to gain 
analytical precision and coherence by reframing it within a more limited neo-institutionalist 
theoretical framework. I replace the term situation by institutional structure; I qualify the term 
interaction as strategic interaction; and more importantly, I substitute the term tension by the 
concept of cleavage(s).  
Figure 1: Conflict Triangle 
 
The institutional structure includes the formal and informal institutions that constitute the structure 
of the society, and provide constraints and opportunities for actors’ behaviour. As Bramsen and 
Wæver note (2016), in a conflict situation, the structure includes a dimension of contradiction or 
conflicting interests between groups. Focusing on institutions allows for a more precise 
understanding of how political power and other types of resources are distributed in a society. 
Formal and informal institutions define a certain structure of opportunity (Horowitz, 1985) and 
create constraints, opportunities and potentially grievances amongst members of the categories in 
conflict.   
Strategic interaction highlights the fact that, in our theoretical framework, actors in conflict not 
only interact, but interact strategically in the pursuit of some goals. Actors define their strategies 
																																																								
20 For these authors the conflict “situation” implies mainly a dimension of contradiction, competition, or 
incompatibility of goals linked to identity categories (2016: 8). “Interaction” underlines the fact that a conflict is a 
relationship rather than a rupture of a relationship (as is often implied). It is because parties are in uninterrupted 
contact that the conflict happens (2016: 10-11). “Tension” corresponds to a “stretching” of the relationship 
between parties, where uncertainty is prevalent (2016: 14). According to the authors, these three “tips” are more 
intrinsically dynamic than Galtung’s and thus permit a more dynamic understanding of conflict. 
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depending on their position in the institutional structure but also given the resources at their 
disposal. Whereas “structure” includes institutions, “strategic interaction” allows for the 
integration of actor’s agency in the conceptualization of conflict. More precisely, this 
conceptualization of conflict borrows some of the premises of the “family of ‘thin’ rational choice 
explanations that abandon the narrow assumption that individuals are economically motivated but 
retain the assumption that individuals are instrumentally rational actors who pursue objectives 
however defined, by selecting those means that maximize their chances of obtaining them” 
(Chandra, 2004: 11).   
Thirdly, the concept of cleavage(s) underlines that the society in which conflict takes place is 
divided around one (or more) cleavage(s). A political cleavage can be defined as an alignment of 
individuals, which implies a division between two social categories which have contradictory 
preferences or objectives. Following Lipset & Rokkan (1967), this definition stresses the 
dimension of “alignment” of voters (or any other type of actors who share membership in a certain 
social category). The tension between the two parties is implicit in the concept of cleavage: the 
individuals are aligned in two opposite groups because they have opposite preferences. The 
concept of cleavage is thus compatible with Bramsen and Wæver’s concept of tension. A cleavage 
implies the formation of vertical alliances and divisions in a society. As Kalyvas stresses, “the 
social science literature uses the concept of cleavage to refer to the link between actors at the 
center and action on the ground” (2006: 382). A cleavage can result from the aggregation of 
various micro-level tensions, but in general, it can be understood as the organizing line of the 
conflict. “Master cleavages can be understood as simultaneously symbolic and material formations 
that simplify, streamline, and incorporate a bewildering variety of local conflicts–a view 
compatible with the way outside observers, such as historians, rely on ‘master narrative’ as a 
means of ‘emplotment’–to tell a straight, compelling story out of many complex ones” (Kalyvas, 
2006: 384).  
A political cleavage thus implies the politicization of an identity category, as underlined by 
Bingham Powell, “political cleavage means an objective demographic division, such as class, 
ethnicity, or religion, in which particular membership categories are strongly associated with a 
particular political party” (1976: 2). As emphasised in this thesis, these identities are not 
necessarily ethnic, and their politicization results from a process of political activation. Just as 
there are many identities that can be activated, there are many cleavages in a society but some are 
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more salient than others, thus defining a certain “hierarchy of cleavages bases” (Lipset & Rokkan, 
1967: 6). While Lipset and Rokkan studied four types of cleavages21, for this thesis suffice it to 
differentiate between two: cleavages based on ethnic and non-ethnic identities.  
In regard to this triangle of conflict, it is easier to “locate” the specificity of ethnic conflict. While 
all societies have a given institutional structure and strategic interaction between groups, the 
specificity of societies marked by ethnic conflict is that the main cleavage is ethnic.22 The 
emergence of an ethnic cleavage as the principal cleavage organizing politics in a given society 
results from the process of politicization of ethnicity. As described in the first subsection of this 
chapter, this is the result of a process whereby the individual repertoire of identities that can be 
politically activated is restricted to ethnic identities. Since the “tips” of the triangle interact, the 
politicization of ethnicity can come from two sides: the institutional structure, or the strategic 
interaction. Chapters 3 and 4 study how institutions and violence contribute to the politicization of 
ethnicity in certain contexts.  
Another question however arises. In its most general sense, conflict is a natural feature of any 
society and is at the basis of politics. Moreover, some of the “causes” of ethnic conflict identified 
earlier, such as competition for economic of political goods, are in fact common to all types of 
political conflicts. Accordingly, what is the specificity of ethnic conflict? Is conflict different when 
ethnic identities rather than other types of identities are mobilized? In what way? 
The Specificity of Ethnic Conflict 
Understanding how the politicization of ethnic identities changes the nature of conflict is 
important since it justifies the interest of studying ethnic conflict in particular. It also justifies the 
definition of success of power-sharing adopted in this thesis. Before developing the theory of the 
politicization of ethnic identities, I therefore now ask how the political game changes when an 
ethnic cleavage is politicized. In this subsection, I focus on non-violent ethnic conflict. The 
specificity of ethnic violence will be discussed in chapter 4.  
The specificity of ethnic conflict can arguably be understood in relation to the specificity of ethnic 
identities, namely, the fact that they are transmitted by descent. This specificity has two main 
																																																								
21 Subject vs. Dominant culture ; Church vs. Government ; Primary vs. Secondary economy, Workers vs. 
employers and owners (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 14) 
22 Note that societies are rarely divided by a unique cleavage and that “pure” forms of ethnic conflicts are 
consequently rare. 
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consequences. First, ethnic identities are sticky. When they become the main identity to be 
mobilized in politics, the fluidity which is necessary for the good functioning of a democracy 
disappears. Second, because ethnic attributes are transmitted by descent, human reproduction, and 
its site–the body–are central in ethnic politics: ethnic politics is always close to matters of life and 
death.  
First, because ethnic attributes are transmitted by descent, these identities are often associated to 
the bodies: ethnic identities, even if most of them are social, are essentialized. This idea is 
formulated by Chapman: “for most children, heredity and environment are completely and 
conjointly embodied in their parents, beyond any possibility of separation. The continual 
suggestion, therefore that cultural groupings are, in human terms, virtually the same thing as 
biological groupings, must be understood in this light. Within the reproduction of social forms, 
biological and cultural transmission are often jointly experienced” (1993: 21). Sciences such as 
craniology and physical anthropology have reflected and participated in the construction of these 
beliefs by trying to find distinctive physical characteristics for ethnic categories.23 From this point 
of view, ethnicity can be understood, not as a biological reality, but as a “biological social 
construct” (Jackson, 1991). Through this process, social identities become understood as 
biological identities, deeply inscribed in an individual’s body. As noted by Bourdieu, “this 
language of natural identity is in fact a language of social identity, which has been naturalized”24 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 51). Despite its “artificiality” this construction however nourishes phantasms and 
keeps an operative power in politics (Chrétien & Prunier, 2003: X).  
One of the consequences of this essentialization of ethnic identities by their association to the 
bodies is that these identities become difficult to change, in Chandra’s words, they are sticky. 
Chandra identified “stickiness”–defined as “the property of being difficult to change credibly in 
the short term” (Chandra 2012: 14)–as one of the inherent properties of ethnic identities.25 As 
																																																								
23 Examples are numerous. For example, in an article on the question, MacClancy studies how the Basques were 
constructed and studied as a biological group (1993).  
24 “Ce langage de l’identité naturelle est en fait un langage de l’identité sociale, ainsi naturalisée” (Bourdieu, 
1977 : 51).  
25 For Chandra (2004, 2012), ethnic identities have two inherent properties: “stickiness” and “visibility”. 
“Visibility refers to the availability of raw data even in superficial observation, regardless of how those data are 
interpreted and whether the interpretation are correct” (Chandra 2012: 14). Many examples seem to suggest that 
the “visibility” property is less inherent to ethnic identities than estimated by Chandra. For example, Berckmoes 
observed strategies utilized by youth in Burundi to determine the ethnic identity of strangers they meet. One of 
them is for example to ask for the place of residence (Berckmoes, 2014: 99). These strategies are necessary 
because ethnic identities are not visible (also see Horowitz, 1985: 49). 
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noted earlier in this chapter, this does not mean that change of individual ethnic identities is 
impossible, only that it is difficult and rare.  Chandra herself notes that “the greater stickiness […] 
of descent-based attributes […] is a product of their association with the body” (2012: 99). 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, because ethnic attributes are transmitted to children, this 
stickiness is not only restricted to an individual, but extends to all his descendants. In common 
language, this phenomenon is often referred to by using the surprisingly widespread metaphor of 
blood (Ignatieff, 1993). This metaphor expresses symbolically both transmission by descent and 
association with bodies. Most importantly, blood symbolises that ethnic identities cannot be easily 
changed, neither for an individual, nor for his descendants (Schiller & Fouron, 1999). 
These three characteristics of ethnic identities (transmission by descent, essentialization, 
stickiness) arguably hinder the normal functioning of a democracy. Indeed, a democracy requires a 
certain fluidity of political affiliations as well as a certain feeling of community amongst the 
citizens. When ethnicity becomes the dominant political cleavage, both fluidity and the feeling of 
community tend to disappear. On the one hand, when political affiliations are determined by 
ethnicity, they lose almost all fluidity. As Chandra states, “democracy requires fluid majorities and 
minorities in order to survive. Ethnically divided societies, however, tend to produce ‘permanent’ 
majorities and minorities, based on ethnic census. Consequently, democracy in ethnically divided 
societies is threatened” (Chandra, 2012: 39). Indeed, without a chance of winning elections, the 
‘frozen’ minority might be tempted to recourse to other means of political action, such as violence 
(Horowitz, 1985). 
While electoral engineers have developed many potential solutions to this problem of “frozen” 
majorities and minorities (see chapter 1), another problem is that the politicization of ethnic 
identities tends to eliminate the feeling of community amongst citizens. Since politicians are 
elected by members of their ethnic category only, they have no incentives to redistribute state 
resources or to establish state services which benefit the entire population.26 Rather, the allocation 
of goods will tend to be based on ethnic identities, which leads to the development of unequal 
structures of opportunity in a society. Access to state services, resources, and jobs will be 
dependent on the ethnic identity of individuals, which cannot be changed (Horowitz, 1985). The 
only way to improve one’s condition is thus to improve the category’s condition. Hence, the 
politicization of the ethnic cleavage tends to turn politics into a zero-sum game between members 
																																																								
26 This point will be further developed in chapter 5. 
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of different ethnic categories. The fact that identities are transmitted by descent and inequalities 
thus potentially concern one’s whole progeny might explain the high emotional charge of these 
political conflicts. As Reilly writes, “under such conditions, the logic of elections changes from 
one of convergence on median policy positions to one of extreme divergence. Politics becomes a 
centrifugal game” (2006: 813).  
A last aspect of ethnic politics is that, because human reproduction is the mechanism of 
transmission of ethnic identities, it takes a central place in ethnic politics. Sexuality–which is, in 
Foucault’s words, “access to both the life of the body and the life of the species” (1976: 192)– 
becomes a central political issue, and is the subject of constraining techniques of management. In 
his History of Sexuality, Foucault noted the importance of the management of sexuality in “racist” 
societies, such as the Nazi regime. These policies “have received their color and their justification 
from the mythical concern of protecting the purity of blood and ensuring the triumph of the race” 
(Foucault, 1976: 197).27 In contexts where ethnicity is politicized, birth rates are highly political 
objects, because they determine the evolution of demographic equilibriums. Strict rules regulating 
inter-ethnic marriage are also typical. One of the consequences of this centrality of reproduction is 
that, even if it does not always degenerate into mass murder, ethnic politics is always close to 
matters of life and death. This fact may well explain the important emotional dimension of ethnic 
politics: existential fears are always present. 
In sum, the few inherent features of ethnicity which have been identified above make the 
consolidation of democracy and peace very difficult, if not improbable, in contexts where ethnicity 
is politicized. By contrast, democracy and peace are more easily established when non-ethnic 
cleavages such as class or ideology are politicized since these are more fluid and not tied to 
descent. 
Managing Ethnic Conflict?  
The conflict triangle proposed above offers three different ways to manage or move away from 
ethnic conflict: changing the institutional structure of society, changing the strategic interaction of 
belligerents, or changing the cleavage. Power-sharing theory has mainly focused on changing the 
structure of the society (and more specifically political institutions) to change the strategic 
																																																								
27 Translated by the author, from french: “ont reçu alors leur couleur et leur justification du souci mythique de 
protéger la pureté du sang et de faire triompher la race” (Foucault, 1976: 197). 
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interaction between ethnic groups (Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985). The theory of ethnicity 
developed in this chapter provides the theoretical basis necessary to explore another solution: 
changing the cleavage. It indeed shows that it is at least theoretically possible for actors to 
deactivate ethnic identities and activate non-ethnic identities instead. An alternative aim for 
power-sharing can be the de-politicization of the ethnic cleavage. The specificity of ethnic 
cleavages in comparison with non-ethnic ones justifies the pursuit of this objective. Indeed, the 
consolidation and sane functioning of a democracy is thwarted in contexts where ethnicity is 
politicized.  
The idea of de-politicizing ethnicity exists in some constructivist approaches, based on the notion 
that “because [ethnicity] is imagined, it can also be unimagined” (Esman, 2004: 34). Most 
proposals, however, can be found in the literature on reconciliation and “bottom-up” peacebuilding 
(Galtung, 2001; Afzali & Colleton, 2003; Peleg, 2004; Chayes & Minow, 2003). Although 
interesting and important, these approaches do not address the structural causes of the 
politicization of ethnic identities (Lefranc, 2012). Although this concern is very close to the 
centripetalist agenda, there have been, to my knowledge, few institutional design proposals with 
the explicit aim of depoliticizing ethnic identities (with the exception of some interesting proposals 
by Paris, 2004).28 This thesis aims at filling this gap.  
To do so, it is necessary to develop an in-depth understanding of the external constraints on the 
repertoires of identities, which lead to the activation of ethnic identities only. The following two 
chapters study how formal and institutions, as well as violence, constitute such constraints. Based 
on this discussion, it will be easier to differentiate between possible and impossible ways to 
depoliticize ethnicity in different contexts. 
  
																																																								
28 Another proposal has focused on cross-cutting cleavages. Beginning with Lipset and Rokkan’s 1967 Party 
systems and voter alignments, the idea that cross-cutting cleavages can reduce the probability of ethnic conflict 
has almost become consensual in the field. The rationale is that “a connection is forged across the gap formed by 
one dimension of identity (…) by virtue of a shared other dimension of identity (…)” (Wilson, 2015: 457). On 
the other hand, this gap cannot be crossed when cleavages are aligned (also see Gubler & Selway, 2012). Based 
on the study of ethnic parties’ behaviour in India, Chandra (2005) has argued that the politicization of multiple 
rather than a unique dimension of ethnic identities can act in favour of the stability of the system, even if parties 
are ethnic. In this model, citizens vote according to ethnic identities but they have a choice between several 
identities; the fixity of ethnic voting is thus eliminated. This model however, differs from this thesis’ purpose, 
since it does not really contribute to the depoliticization of ethnicity.  
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Chapter 3: Formal and Informal Institutions 
 
“Not until the end of the century were dignity and importance accorded to race-
thinking as though it had been one of the major spiritual contributions of the 
Western world”.  
Hannah Arendt, Imperialism, 1951: 38 
 
The reduction of the multiplicity of identities that can be activated into ethnic identities 
exclusively is in great part attributable to institutions. Neo-institutionalist approaches have offered 
interesting explanations of why ethnic identities rather than non-ethnic ones are activated in 
certain contexts, as well as why a certain ethnic identity is mobilized. This literature is reviewed in 
the first part of this chapter. While it brings valuable insight on why individuals activate ethnic 
instead of non-ethnic identities and which ethnic identity they activate, this literature does not pay 
much attention to informal institutions. The second part attempts to fill this gap by paying closer 
attention to the incentives for the politicization of ethnic identities provided by informal 
institutions, including clientelist networks. In the third part, I focus on political parties, which can 
be considered as a link between formal and informal institutions. This focus may also provide a 
first suggestion about institutional design for the depoliticization of ethnic identities.  
Formal Institutions 
The idea that political institutions can affect ethnicity and the outcomes of ethnic processes is at 
the foundation of power-sharing theory (Varshney, 2009: 289). But classical institutionalism 
mainly approached ethnicity through ethnic conflict regulation. Neo-institutionalist approaches 
have gone further and showed that the politicization of ethnicity and of specific ethnic identities is 
highly dependent on institutions. Three types of neo-institutionalisms have tackled these questions: 
historical neo-institutionalism (Mamdani, 1996; Young, 1994; Berri, 1992; Wimmer, 2002), 
rational-choice neo-institutionalism (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005), and sociological neo-
institutionalism (Wimmer, 2013). 
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Historical Neo-institutionalism: Politicizing Ethnicity 
The fact that so many people worldwide self-identify in ethnic terms cannot be taken as a natural 
given. In fact, it seems to be closely related to the (relatively recent) global spread of nationalism. 
Indeed, “while it may be an exaggeration to maintain that empires or premodern territorial states 
were not at all interested in shaping and policing ethnic boundaries, the change from empire to 
nation-state provided […] new incentives for state elites to pursue strategies of ethnic boundary 
making” (Wimmer, 2013: 90). In the process of establishment of what Malkki calls a “national 
order of things”, an “ethnic order of things” seems to have been established too.29 This order of 
things seems to result from a process which started in Europe and spread around the world through 
colonialism. Historical neo-institutionalist approaches have studied this process and put the 
emphasis on the historical construction of institutions and on the linkage between this institutional 
construction and the worldwide politicization of ethnicity.  
As noted by Hannah Arendt, ethnicity and nationalism have been tied intimately from the very 
beginning of nationalism in the 19th century. “Race-thinking” she writes “was the ever present 
shadow accompanying the development of the comity of European nations” (Arendt, 1951: 41).  A 
“growing tradition of research looks at the interplay between nation-building and the making of 
ethnic minorities” (Wimmer, 2013: 90; Young, 1976; Williams, 1989; Verdery, 1994; Wimmer, 
2002; Mann, 2005). This literature observes that politics seems to have been increasingly 
ethnicized since nationalism–and especially its ethnic variant–associated the belonging to the 
political community to a certain ethnic identity. The process of nation-building was accompanied 
by a process of ethnic majority- and minority-making. As Wimmer writes,  
On the one side, the modern principles of democracy, citizenship and popular sovereignty 
allowed for the inclusion of large sections of the population previously confined to the status 
of subjects and subordinates. On the other, shadowy side, however, forms of exclusion based 
on ethnic and national criteria developed. […] Belonging to a specific national or ethnic 
group determines access to the rights and services the modern state is supposed to 
guarantee” (2002: 1).  
																																																								
29 Malkki uses the term “national order of things” with the intent of describing “a class of phenomena that is 
deeply cultural and yet global in its significance. That is, the nation–having powerful association with particular 
localities and territories–is simultaneously a supralocal, transnational cultural form”  (Malkki, 1991: 37). In this 
sense, an “ethnic order of things” might refer to the fact, that, although ethnic identities vary from place to place, 
the phenomenon of identification to descent-based categories rather than non-ethnic identities is gobal.  
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The nation state in fact created institutional constraints on the repertoires of identities which led to 
the activation of ethnic identities instead of others. Moreover, the nation-state provided specific 
incentives for elites, majorities, and minorities, to frame their political action in ethnic terms - 
incentives to politically mobilize ethnic identities rather than non-ethnic ones, since those 
identified allowed for access to state services (Wimmer, 2013: 90-92). In sum, “modernity itself is 
structured according to ethnic and nationalist principles, because modern institutions of inclusion 
(citizenship, democracy, welfare) are systematically tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion” 
(Wimmer, 2002: 4-5). 
This model of the nation-state was then spread worldwide by colonization. As Arendt shows, the 
whole colonial enterprise, and the institutions it produced, were deeply rooted in “race-thinking”. 
Colonial institutions were founded on the principle of race “as a substitute for the nation” and “as 
a principle for body politics” (Arendt, 1951: 65). Although it might have existed in some places 
before colonization, the idea that social groups are defined by descent, has been generalized in the 
colonies, and especially in Africa. Colonization has thus played a crucial role in the constitution 
and separation of ethnic groups and the inscription of ethnicity as the main political cleavage. As 
studied by Sara Berri (1992), whereas precolonial groupings were multiple and fluid, colonial rule 
was accompanied by a process of definition, selection, simplification, and separation of ethnic 
groupings. For organizational and administrative purposes, colonizers clarified previously unclear 
ethnic boundaries and reduced the multiplicity of ethnic identities which could be identified, by 
building an institutional order which provided incentives for the mobilization of specific ethnic 
identities. Ethnic identities were thereby politicized since political rights, access to resources or 
territories were allocated based on these ethnic classifications. As Migdal notes “the colonizers 
could allocate the right to disburse resources, opportunities, and sanctions to various indigenous 
groups; these in turn could fashion new strategies of survival for peasants and workers” (1988: 
102). This had a profound impact on the way people saw their own identity and the organization of 
politics after independence (Migdal, 1988: 130). These groups and hierarchies were 
institutionalized through the legal order of the colonial state, and particularly through “customary” 
laws that organized relations among populations and the use of “indirect rule” (Young, 1994). This 
legal order of the colonial state thus institutionalized the political activation of ethnicity. The 
persistence of this institutional order, and this organization of society long after independence 
(Mamdani, 1996) partly explain the salience of ethnic identities until today.  
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While this set of approaches explains the general tendency for the politicization of ethnicity, it 
does not provide much in the way of explanations for local variations in the intensity of the 
politicization of ethnicity (Varshney, 2009: 289). Nor does it explain why specific ethnic attributes 
are politicized in different contexts (Posner, 2005).  
Rational-choice Neo-insitutionalism: Identity Activation as a Rational Calculation 
Rational-choice neo-institutionalism has put the emphasis on the way individuals or groups 
activate different ethnic categories in different contexts for instrumentalist reasons such as 
building winning coalitions in electoral competition (Bates, 1893; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2004, 
2005). This approach, which is not incompatible with historical-neo-institutionalism, helps 
understand local and temporal variations, as well as variations in the activated ethnic attribute.  
This approach builds on the idea, first developed by Bates (1983), that ethnic politics results from 
a process of coalition building by rational actors. Thus, societal mobilization around one cleavage 
rather than another results from the aggregation of individual behaviours. Individuals are 
considered rational and seeking to maximize their interests (although these are not limited to 
economic interests); they interact in a given institutional framework (Chandra, 2004). Posner 
(2004, 2005) builds upon this approach to explain why a specific dimension of ethnicity rather 
than another is politically salient in different contexts. 
Posner observes that lines of ethnic division are often multiple in a country. For example, Nigeria 
is divided by language, region, and religion. How then to explain that politics is organized around 
one specific cleavage rather than another? (Posner, 2005: 1) His answer to this question is double. 
First, institutions reduce the number of ethnic categories politically salient in a society. They 
restrict the nominal ethnic categories that an individual can potentially activate. Second, 
institutions also shape incentives for an individual to mobilize one of these nominal categories 
rather than another. Posner uses the metaphor of a card game: “political institutions explain, first, 
why players’ hands contain the card they do, and then, why the players play one of these cards 
rather than another. They also explain why one player or set of players ultimately wins the game” 
(2005: 3).  
Following the rational choice reasoning described above, individuals seek to maximize their 
chances of winning. To do so, Posner argues, they will mobilize the category that gives them the 
most chances of being part of the winning coalition. In an electoral system, this is simply the 
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category with the highest number of members. Posner bases his argumentation on an empirical 
study of Zambia. The country is divided around language and tribe as a result of socio-historical 
processes. However, Posner observes a variation across time: at some times language is politically 
salient and at other times it is tribalism. He shows that this depends on the nature of the party 
system: during multi-party rule, incentives favour coalescing with people of the same language, 
while during periods of one-party rule, incentives favour coalescing around tribes (2005: 8-9). 
This process of coalition building can also be multi-ethnic. By responding to institutional 
incentives, individuals can ally or compete with members of other ethnic categories. For example, 
Posner shows that Chewas and Tumbaks are allies in Zambia, but adversaries in Malawi (2004), 
this variation can be explained by the different structure of incentives created by political 
institutions and demography.  
Sociological Neo-institutionalism: Identity Activation as a Strategic Calculation 
The rational-choice conception of rational and interest-maximizing individuals has been criticized 
for not fully corresponding to the reality. A weakness of this approach may be the difficulty to 
explain change in the politicization of ethnic cleavages in the absence of change in institutions. 
Wimmer (2013) proposes a sociological neo-institutionalist approach, which solves these 
problems by attributing more agency to actors. From Wimmer’s point of view, the location and 
politicization of ethnic boundaries, as well as the level of groupness are the result of actors’ 
struggles which take place in an institutional framework. Individuals are considered to act 
strategically in an institutional environment which provides constraints and opportunities for 
actors’ strategic choices. In other words, although they may respond to institutional incentives, the 
goals they pursue may not always be only self-interested and may change over time.  
According to Wimmer (2013), the politicization of a particular ethnic category changes primarily 
as a result of actors’ strategic behaviour. This behaviour depends on institutions, but also on the 
distribution of power in the society and on the organization of social networks of alliance. 
Institutions provide incentives for the politicization of ethnicity. Networks define exactly who is 
included or not in each group (more on this later in the chapter). Actors’ power and interests will 
define which strategy they can and will use. These strategies include the use of discourse, 
discrimination, political mobilization, or violence and aim at changing the location of the ethnic 
boundaries. The definition of the cleavage is thus the result of a permanent struggle, with actors 
acting strategically to impose their vision and interests. The exact ethnic attribute being politicized 
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is the outcome of this struggle (Wimmer, 2013). In this framework, a change in the ethnic 
cleavage can occur in three ways: 1–exogenous shift: for example, a change in the institutions, in 
the distribution of power, or external influences. 2–endogenous shift: destabilization due to the 
cumulative impact of the actors’ strategies or change in their strategies. 3–exogenous drift: the 
adoption of new strategies by actors (Wimmer, 2013: 106-108).  
The three forms of neo-institutionalism described in this section combine to explain why and how 
the repertoire of identities that can be activated politically is limited to ethnic identities in certain 
context, and why and how a specific ethnic identity is activated. While rejecting too hard a version 
of rational choice theory, this thesis considers that individuals act strategically in a given 
institutional framework, while deciding which ethnic identity to activate (Chandra, 2004). Actors 
may thus respond to institutional incentives to activate an ethnic identity instead of another, and to 
mobilize non-ethnic identities instead of ethnic ones.  
Informal Institutions 
Formal institutions help us understand a good part of the constraints on the repertoires of identity. 
The picture would not be complete, however, without integrating informal institutions. Informal 
institutions represent additional constraints on the repertoire of identities that can be activated, as 
well as supplementary incentives for the mobilization of specific identities. Paying attention to 
informal institutions helps us better understand variations such as the non-politicization of ethnic 
identities or the unusual persistence of the high salience of ethnicity. Their integration in the 
analysis provides a more encompassing understanding of the incentives that shape the strategic 
decisions of individuals concerning the activation of a certain identity. This is arguably true 
everywhere, but it is even more important in contexts such as neo-patrimonial societies, where 
informal institutions are predominant. In focusing on these informal institutions, I reconnect with a 
tradition of studying the interaction between clientelism and ethnicity (Lemarchand, 1972; 
Schmidt et al. 1977). I also participate in the renewed neo-institutionalist interest in informal 
institutions, according to which the outcomes of formal institutions is better understood when 
taking in account their interaction with informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004 ; Kitshelt 
and Wilkinson, 2007). As we shall see, this may also be read as a way of linking studies of 
ethnicity to the “social capital” literature (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Norris, 2002). 
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Clientelist Networks and Ethnic Divisions 
“Informal networks of alliances”, as understood by Wimmer, include clientelist networks but also 
any type of informal organization such as elite clubs (literary societies, officer circles) civil society 
organizations (associations dedicated to a specific cause), professional organizations or political 
organizations (Wimmer, 2011: 725; Putnam, 1993: 90). While including other type of informal 
netwroks in the analysis may be interesting, the main type of informal institutions discussed in this 
section is clientelist networks. Clientelism can be defined as a personal relationship between a 
patron and a client that is characterized by its reciprocity and its asymmetry. The patron is superior 
to the client in terms of economic wealth, social status and political power (Lemieux, 1977: 5-10). 
This relationship is based on mutual exchange of favours, usually the distribution of material 
resources by the patron in exchange for political support (Schmidt and al., 1977: xv). The 
relationship has material motivations, but is also rooted in affective ties between clients and 
patrons (Beck, 2008: 27). Clientelism is often organized by superimposition of multiple dyadic 
relations of clientelism. In these vertical structures, the patron of a client is himself the client of a 
superior patron. These relationships are organized in “pyramids” since a patron has usually 
multiple clients. Moreover, a client may also have multiple patrons (Schmidt, 1977: xx). These 
pyramids have at least three levels. 1–Patrons are at the top of the pyramid. 2–Brokers, who are 
intermediates between the people and the politicians and 3–Clients (or followers). 
The fact that clientelism and ethnic diversity tend to be correlated is relatively well established in 
the literature (Alesina, Baquir and Easterly, 1999; Bates, 1974; Fearon, 1999; Caselli and 
Colemann, 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Chandra, 2004; Laitin & van der Veen, 2012). 
The explanations of this correlation however vary. A first set of approaches argue that ethnic 
diversity leads to the development of clientelism, because ethnic favouritism leads to an ethnic 
redistribution of state resources (Alesina, Baquir and Easterly, 1999). Another argument is that 
reliance on ethnic groups as an answer to uncertainty and limited information is at the root of the 
development of clientelist networks. Landa (1981) stresses that the high intra-ethnic group flows 
of information may act as substitute for contract law in uncertain environments. Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson note in the same vein that “the critical ingredient to bring about this dynamic of 
“deepening” clientelism under conditions of intensifying inter-ethnic party competition may not be 
necessarily the existence of ethnic markers, but the presence of dense organisational networks 
configured around particular interpretations of ethnicity” (2007: 34). 
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A second set of explanations explores the hypothesis that clientelism reinforces ethnic divisions 
(Bates, 1974). According to these authors, reliance on ethnic identities allows the resolution of 
certain problems associated with clientelism. Lemarchand thus notes that relying on religious 
authority, or ethnic identities might allow leaders to redistribute less resources and get “clientelism 
at a discount” (Lemarchand, 1988: 151-154; Beck, 2008). For Fearon (1999) or Caselli and 
Colemann (2006), the reliance of politicians on ethnic identities allows for an easy delimitation of 
the boundaries of their winning coalition. For Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 14), relying on 
ethnicity is also a technique for facilitating the monitoring and enforcement of clientelist 
relationships. Finally, for Chandra (2007: 85), the bias toward co-ethnics in the selection of 
patrons or clients is due to the visibility of ethnic attributes. For these authors, clientelism is thus a 
cause of the reinforcement of ethnic divisions. However, this does not mean that the relationship 
cannot go the other way. Rather, “it suggests at a minimum that there may be a cyclical and 
dynamic relationship between ethnic divisions and patronage politics” (Chandra, 2012: 40).  
In their efforts to theorize the relationship between ethnic diversity and clientelism, these theories 
however forget a bit quickly that, even if clientelism and ethnic divisions often go together, they 
do not always do so. Instead, “one of the most persistent theme of African scholarship in the 1970s 
and 1980s was that clientelism was one of the instruments used to fashion cross-ethnic 
cooperation” (Van de Walle, 2007: 54). Lemarchand (1972) stresses the importance of 
differentiating between the concepts of ethnicity and clientelism since clientelism is potentially 
more inclusive than ethnicity. For example, the Senegalese political system has been built on 
clientelist networks, but not on ethnic ones. Instead, Senegalese clientelism is organised around 
Islamic brotherhoods (membership into which is not necessarily transmitted by descent) and 
ethnicity is not politicized in the country (Beck, 2008). Thus, the literature on the mutual 
reinforcement of ethnic divisions and clientelism only tells half of the story. Clientelist networks 
can in fact have both effects: depending on their configuration, they can reinforce or bridge ethnic 
divides (also see Landé, 1977).  
Configurations of Informal Networks and Ethnic Identities 
In this thesis, rather than trying to develop a theory to explain the correlation of ethnic divisions 
and clienteles, I take the configuration of informal institutions and ethnic divisions as a variable. 
The historical process which combined the emergence of nationalism in Europe and its worldwide 
spread through colonization to produce a national and ethnic “order of things” may well explain 
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that informal institutions, just as formal ones, are very often–but not always– organized on an 
ethnic basis.  
The configuration of informal networks and ethnic divisions can however arguably have important 
consequences. Following Tocqueville, the social capital literature (Norris, 2002), first formulated 
by Putnam (1993) has noted that associational networks play a major role in the functioning of 
democracy. These informal networks have two types of effects: “Internally, associations instil in 
their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness. (…) Externally, what 
twentieth-century political scientists have called ‘interest articulation’ and ‘interest aggregation’ 
are enhanced by a dense network of secondary associations” (Putnam, 1993: 89-90). As Wimmer 
(2002, 2013) has noted, however, the crucial element in the case of ethnic conflict is whether these 
networks–that he calls “informal networks of alliance”–are ethnically exclusive or not. For him, 
when these networks are organized ethnically, they reinforce divisions; but when they cut across 
ethnic divides, they may have nation-building effects. He observes that: 
Where the political alliances of the elites controlling the nation-building project reach across 
an ethnic divide, become institutionalised and organisationally stabilised, a pan-ethnic 
national identity will develop. Where the networks of political alliances are bounded by 
ethnic divisions and, importantly, when such ethnically defined networks are excluded from 
access to state power, ethnicity will be politicised and ethno-national identities will emerge 
(Wimmer, 2011: 734).  
This effect was also acknowledged by Putnam who noted that “when individuals belong to ‘cross-
cutting’ groups with diverse goals and members, their attitude will tend to moderate as a result of 
group interaction and cross-pressures” (1993: 90). The “contact” literature (Samii, 2013) also 
notes that the simple existence of these areas of bargaining is likely to have conciliatory effects 
between members of different ethnic categories since “even in competitive situation, regular, 
reciprocal interactions are, in and of themselves, likely to facilitate cooperation” (Reilly, 2001: 8; 
Axelrod, 1984; Raiffa, 1982). 
Wimmer provides comparative empirical evidence from Mexico, the USA, Brazil, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Iraq, Canada, and Spain (Wimmer, 2002). To briefly illustrate the logic of his 
argument, the development of trans-ethnic associations in Switzerland contributed to the 
integration of the various segments of the population and the development of Swiss multi-ethnic 
nation before formal power-sharing and the modern Swiss nation was institutionalized (Wimmer, 
2011). On the other hand, the lack of these trans-ethnic networks, and the ethnic organization of 
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informal institutions in Iraq and Belgium can explain part of the difficulties of national unification 
in these two countries (Wimmer, 2002, 2003).  
To conclude, this discussion can be reformulated in the conceptual vocabulary of this thesis as 
follows: when informal networks are aligned with ethnic divisions, they tend to provide incentives 
for individuals to activate their ethnic identities instead of non-ethnic ones. On the other hand, 
when these networks are multi-ethnic, they create disincentives for the mobilization of ethnic 
identities and incentives for the mobilization of other identities.  
Political Institutions and Political Party Systems 
Acknowledging the role of informal institutions in the politicization of ethnicity might first appear 
depressing for the proponents of institutional engineering for ethnic conflict management. Indeed, 
by definition, informal institutions can only difficultly be influenced by constitutional design. In 
this section, I argue that focusing on political parties may provide a solution to this problem. 
Political parties can indeed be considered as an intermediate category between state and non-state 
institutions. On the one hand, they may be considered formal institutions30 since they are legalized 
by the state. As such, they can partly be shaped by constitutional dispositions and incentives 
provided by the electoral system. On the other hand, they have a strong influence on the formation 
of informal institutions, especially in neo-patrimonial contexts. Political parties are indeed 
considered central in the formation of political cleavages (which is taken, in this thesis, as a 
synonymous for politicization of an identity) by a large literature of political science. From this 
point of view, political parties can be considered as a link between formal macro-structural 
institutions, and informal institutions. For this reason, they deserve a specific attention for the 
purpose of this thesis.  
Political Parties and Political Cleavages 
Lipset & Rokkan (1967) put party systems at the core of their analysis of political cleavages. 
Political parties, they argue, have aggregative and expressive functions. They aggregate the variety 
of demands coming from their electorate in a coherent program, and formulate the main cleavages 
																																																								
30 In this conceptualization, political parties are not considered as actors or units of analysis, as some of the 
literature on political parties do (Arian and Barnes, 1974). Political parties are considered institutions which 
affect individuals’ behaviours.  
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of the society in discourses and rhetoric. “They help crystalize and make explicit the conflicting 
interests, the latent strains and contrasts in themselves across structural cleavage lines and to set up 
priorities among their commitments to established or prospective roles in the system” (Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967: 5). In sum, “as key agents of political articulation, aggregation and representation, 
political parties are the institutions that most directly affect the extent to which social cleavages 
are translated into national politics” (Reilly and Nordlund, 2008: 9).  
The specificity of political parties in neo-patrimonial societies must not be overlooked. Butler and 
van de Walle (1999) question the role and effectivity of political parties in African neo-patrimonial 
“illiberal democracies”. “A striking feature of these party systems is the absence of differentiation 
of parties along programmatic lines”, they write (1999: 23). Instead of  being framed in ideological 
terms, appeals are done on personal or ethnic basis. This corresponds to Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s 
observation (2007) that vertical linkages in neo-patrimonial societies are clientelist rather than 
programmatic. In neo-patrimonial systems, parties gain their legitimacy from their capacity to 
redistribute resources to their electoral basis. “A party without control of government and without 
influence over someone else’s victory or loss […] cannot distribute either material benefits or the 
status benefits that come from the acquisition of political power” (Chandra, 2004: 13). Thus, “the 
main ambition of parties is either to gain control of the state or to gain leverage over those who 
have it” (Butler and van de Walle, 1999: 23). Even with few programmatic linkages, political 
parties still play a major role in the alignment of voters and thus the formation of dominant 
political cleavages since they develop clientelist networks. They thus represent vertical links of 
alliance and accountability (Butler and van de Walle, 1999: 14). 
Political Parties in Diverse Societies 
Due to this clientelist dimension, as well as the absence of programmatic appeals, political parties 
in Africa have sometimes been assumed to be mainly based on ethnicity. For this reason, Butler 
and van de Walle conclude: “in Africa today, parties do not really serve to aggregate interests; 
rather they serve a representation function in a context of clientelistic politics” (1999: 26). While 
this is true when parties are ethnic, nothing indicates that it can be formulated as a general rule. On 
the contrary, empirical data shows that most African parties are not ethnic (Elischer, 2013; 
Cheeseman & Ford, 2007) and that African citizens do not always identify primarily in ethnic 
terms (Bannon, Miguel, and Posner, 2004). Even if party-citizen linkage is clientelist (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007), there is no necessity for the dominant political cleavage to be ethnicity. As I 
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argued earlier, when institutions (including political parties) are organized on an ethnic basis, they 
are likely to have ethnically polarizing effects on societies, as described by Butler and van de 
Walle (1999). On the other hand, when party systems are not organized around the ethnic 
cleavage, they may provide incentives for individuals to mobilize non-ethnic identities.  
Political parties in diverse societies can be classified in three categories: ethnic, multi-ethnic, and 
non-ethnic parties. Various definitions of an ethnic party have been proposed. Chandra writes: “an 
ethnic party is a party that overtly represents itself as a champion of the cause of one particular 
ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and that makes such a representation 
central to its strategy of mobilizing voters” (2004: 3). This definition has however the 
disadvantage of overlooking the possibility that party leaders do not mobilize ethnicity in their 
discourse, but that the citizens vote ethnically for a party despite its multi-ethnic discourse. There 
are instances where parties became ethnic despite the will of their leaders. “Ethnic party system 
can and do emerge contrary to the conviction of the principal party leader” summarizes Horowitz 
(1985: 306). From this point of view, Horowitz’s definition is preferable. For him, “an ethnically 
based party derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of 
ethnic groups) and serves the interests of that group” (1985: 291). Accordingly, an ethnic party is 
not principally defined by its discourse, but “the test of an ethnic party is simply the distribution of 
support” (1985: 291).   
The definition of multi-ethnic and non-ethnic parties follows. “A multi ethnic party is defined here 
as a party that also makes an appeal related to ethnicity central to its mobilizing strategy but that 
assumes a position of neutrality or equidistance toward all relevant categories on the salient 
dimension(s) of ethnicity” (Chandra 2004: 3). A non-ethnic party, on the other hand, does not 
mobilize ethnic classification as a factor to differentiate between its members. “The distinction 
between non-ethnic and multi-ethnic parties […] depends on whether group members participate 
in the party on a group basis, whether in other words, the party comprises a coalition of ethnic 
groups” (Horowitz, 1985: 300). Chandra rightly observes that these classifications are not fixed 
but “time specific” (2004 : 4) since discourse or distribution of support can vary across time. 
Bogaards (2008) identifies three functions party systems can have in diverse societies. A first 
function is articulation (2008: 54). As advocated by the proponents of consociationalism, 
ethnically based parties may contribute to the representation of all groups of a society, and 
contribute to the articulation of their demands at an elite level (Reilly, 2008: 9). As Butler and van 
	68	
de Walle (1999: 26) however observed, this type of parties can hardly contribute to the second 
possible function of party systems: the aggregation of interests of various ethnic categories 
(Bogaards, 2008: 52). Neither are they suited to fulfill the third function: blocking the appearance 
of overtly ethnic conflict (Bogaards, 2008: 52). Blocking the re-emergence of ethnic tensions after 
ethnic wars, as well as fostering aggregation of varying ethnic interests is however the object of 
the strategy proposed in this thesis.  
Multi-ethnic or non-ethnic parties are arguably best suited to block ethnic conflict, or aggregate 
various societal interests, or, to put it differently, to de-emphasise the politicization of ethnicity in 
a society, for three reasons. First, political parties are the groups in competition during elections, 
and thus they shape the cleavage structure of the campaign. In ethnic party systems “there is a 
single axis of political conflict and a single way of pursuing the conflict: through ethnic parties” 
(Horowitz, 1985: 342). Because all parties are ethnic, “there is little relief from the ethnic 
character of politics in the form of alternating issues. Hence divisive issues can cumulate in the 
party system, and all voters are identified with parties that have taken a stand on the main divisive 
issues” (Horowitz, 1985: 346). On the other hand, multi-ethnic parties need to mobilize a wider 
electoral basis and will thus tend to moderate their discourse to be able to attract votes from 
different ethnic categories. In other words, in multi-ethnic party systems, elites have incentives not 
to mobilize ethnic identities since they seek votes from members from other ethnic categories 
(Reilly, 2001).  
Second, multi-ethnic political parties favour accommodation of elites of different ethnic categories 
by putting them in contact. Multi-ethnic parties indeed provide “areas of bargaining” where elites 
can negotiate and cooperate. As noted above, the existence of these areas may favour cooperative 
behaviours (Axelrod, 1984; Raiffa, 1982, Reilly, 2001). Moreover, multi-ethnic parties also have 
internal mechanisms of ethnic accommodation. Bogaards (2014) has studied the manner in which 
the principles of consociationalism are sometimes implemented in the internal structure of political 
parties to form “consociational parties”. The Congress Party in India is an example of this kind of 
internal accommodation mechanism (Bogaards, 2014). Although the model described by Bogaards 
is quite precise, informal intra-elite accommodation, or “ethnic arithmetic”, is common in multi-
ethnic parties, and can take various forms (Rothschild, 1997).  
Third, the multi-ethnic character of political parties is likely to be reproduced in clientelist 
networks which are attached to these parties. In neo-patrimonial societies, political parties are at 
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the top of clientelist pyramids. When the electoral basis of these parties is ethnically restricted, so 
will be their clientelist networks. However, when parties gain support from members of a variety 
of ethnic categories, the networks of clientelist redistribution will include all these categories, and 
therefore become multi-ethnic. As detailed above, multi-ethnic clientelist networks are likely to 
contribute to the de-emphasis of ethnic politicization at citizens’ level for two reasons. First, they 
eliminate economic incentives for the politicization of ethnicity, and instead provide incentives for 
the mobilization of non-ethnic identities. Second, they create interactions, and even links of 
interdependence between members of different ethnic categories. They can thus be understood as 
“areas of bargaining” too and contribute positively to the integration of ethnic groups at citizens’ 
level. 31  
Institutional Engineering and Party Systems  
“Because political parties in theory represent the political expression of underlying societal 
cleavages, parties and party systems have not usually been thought amenable to overt political 
engineering”, Reilly writes (2006: 812). A great part of the literature on divided societies indeed 
tends to take the predominance of ethnic parties for granted in diverse societies. Horowitz 
theorized the phenomenon of “ethnic outbidding” which states that once the ethnic cleavage 
becomes politicized, it tends to become the dominant cleavage in a society, because of electoral 
pressures toward ethnic extremism (1985: 318-33). As Chandra summarizes, “these theoretical 
families assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the success of ethnic parties is a natural by-product 
of the process by which ethnic identities become politically salient” (2004: 9). As already 
mentioned, this view is problematized by the fact that not all ethnically diverse societies have 
predominantly ethnic party systems (Elischer, 2013; Cheeseman & Ford, 2007; Bannon, et al., 
2004). In fact, the relationship between underlying societal cleavages and political parties seems to 
be more complex than assumed by these theories.  
																																																								
31 Attention could also be paid to intra-party ethnic divisions. This question is interesting and could be the object 
of another research, but for this thesis I mostly take multi-ethnic parties as “black boxes”. This simplification is 
acceptable since multi-ethnic parties are likely to have integrating and depoliticizing effects even if they are 
internally organized on an ethnic basis, as discussed earlier. Even if it does not completely disappear, the ethnic 
cleavage is thus not the dominant cleavage in the political system anymore. Ethnicity is largely depoliticized, 
even though not completely. If they do not disappear on the long run, however, persisting intra-party ethnic 
divisions could be a source of re-politicization of ethnicity. This issue would thus be an interesting subject for 
future research. 
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First, the relationship between societal cleavages and political parties seems to be reciprocal rather 
than unidirectional. Political parties in part reflect pre-existing cleavages, but also affect the 
hierarchy of cleavages by reinforcing or lessening the dominance of certain cleavages. In brief, 
“party and society act on each other” (Horowitz, 1985: 291).  
Second, the influence of contextual factors and strategic considerations in the formation of parties 
also matters. Lipset and Rokkan note that: 
Cleavages do not translate themselves into party organizations as a matter of course: there 
are considerations of organizational and electoral strategy; there is the weighing of payoffs 
of alliances against losses through split-offs; and there is the successive narrowing of the 
‘mobilization market’ through the time sequences of organizational efforts (1967: 26). 
Chandra (2004) and Posner (2005) thus explains the success and failure of ethnic parties in 
winning elections different contexts by various factors, including the size of ethnic categories. The 
fundamental assumption being that citizens try to vote for the party that has the most chances of 
winning and therefore gaining access to state resources. “The voter, therefore, should vote for her 
preferred [ethnic] party only if it has reasonable chances of obtaining control or influence after the 
election and not otherwise” (2004: 13).  
Institutional engineering also seems to have a potential influence on the formation party systems. 
Although it has not been studied much for the aforementioned reasons, this subject is gaining 
growing attention in the literature on institutional design for divided societies (Horowitz, 1985; 
Reilly, 2001; Reilly, 2006; Reilly & Nordlung, 2008). Moreover, institutional design practitioners 
had developed tools for the regulation of political parties before political science paid close 
attention to this question (Reilly, 2006).  
Reilly studied attempts to fashion party systems through institutional engineering (2001; 2006). 
Two options can be distinguished. Formal rules which regulate the political parties and for 
example ban ethnic parties, and the utilization of electoral systems to provide incentives for the 
development of multi-ethnic parties (Reilly, 2001, 2006; Bogaards, 2008; Horowitz, 1985, 1991). I 
discuss these in more details in chapter 5. For now, suffice it to acknowledge with Horowitz that 
“party systems are a key policy problem of severely divided societies” (1985: 306).  
Party systems represent a link between formal institutions and informal networks, since they can 
be influenced by institutional engineering, and their shape will determine the shape of clientelist 
networks. As I have argued in this chapter, the promotion of multi-ethnic political parties and 
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clientelist networks can have important effects of depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage; fostering 
their emergence should thus be central in a strategy of depoliticization of ethnicity through power-
sharing institutions. 
Although the literature briefly reviewed here is fruitful, one can identify three issues that it does 
not solve. First, institutional party regulations are often poorly implemented (Reilly, 2006; 
Bogaards et al., 2013; Kadima, 2008). When they are indeed implemented, this seems to be due to 
factors other than institutional rule, such as an already low salience of ethnicity, as was the case in 
in Senegal (Hartmann, 2010), or the presence of an authoritarian regime, which uses these bans to 
repress the political opposition, as in Rwanda (Niesen, 2013). We must thus identify which 
incentives can be sufficiently strong to encourage leaders to form multi-ethnic parties and respect 
the regulations that states are often too weak to enforce.  
The second question regards the role of people. As noted in chapter 1, centripetalist approaches are 
mainly focused on influencing elite behaviour. The institutions described by Reilly provide 
electoral incentives for elites to compromise and cooperate. While state leaders and elites are two 
groups of actors who have a great importance on political processes, the electorate should not 
completely be neglected. Indeed, as shown by Horowitz (1985: 306) pressures from the people for 
ethnic extremism can force leaders to modify their discourse against their will. Even more, ethnic 
voting can occur even if the elites campaigned without reference to ethnicity. This can have 
catastrophic consequences; in Burundi, the first attempt to establish informal power-sharing was 
undermined by ethnic voting which led to civil war (Lothe, 2007).  
The third question regards the specificity of post-war settings as a context for institutional 
engineering. Indeed, post-war settings offer conditions which make the emergence of multi-ethnic 
parties without external intervention rather dubious. As Jarstad writes, 
After a violent intrastate conflict, conditions conductive to democratization are typically 
absent and the legacies of conflict tend to linger. (…) Owing to psychological trauma of 
violence and fear of renewed violence, mass mobilization along extremist lines remains. 
Political ideologies are based on exclusive group-based interest rather than on universal, 
society-wide interests. (…) Political trust is low, which hinders cooperation across 
subcultures (2008a: 31).  
The memory of recent violence, high levels of mistrust as well as negative emotions such as fear, 
resentment, or hatred, reinforce group antipathies and complicate the formation of multi-ethnic 
	72	
parties further. Institutional design for ethnic conflict management in post-conflict societies needs 
to take this into account and develop specific dispositions to deal with it.  
To tackle these issues a theory of incentives, based on a model of actors’ behaviour in neo-
patrimonial societies is required. This model will help us understand two things. First, it will help 
specify which types of incentives are likely to affect different actors. Second, it will theorize the 
vertical interactions between these actors, therefore allowing us to integrate citizens in the 
analysis. I develop this model in chapter 5, and build on it to propose a framework for the 
depoliticization of ethnicity in post-conflict neo-patrimonial societies. Before doing so, however, 
the next chapter examines ethnic violence. Beside institutions, violence is indeed the most 
important factor contributing to the reduction of the range of identities that can be activated. 
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Chapter 4: Ethnic Violence 
 
“A bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory.”  
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 1985: 140. 
 
“The ethnicity of the body is built in its dismemberment and disfigurement.” 
Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence, 1991: 64. 
 
If the observation of the tragedies of ethnic violence has any utility, it may be to remind the reader 
what the point of a constructivist analysis is not: denying the existence of deeply felt ethnic 
loyalties and the terrible effects they may have.  
As noted in chapter 2, ethnic violence and ethnic conflict must be understood as analytically 
autonomous although interconnected phenomena (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 426; Kalyvas, 2006: 
20). This chapter studies the interaction between these two concepts. The first part reviews some 
of the criticisms that can be formulated against previous conceptualizations of ethnic violence. In 
the second part, I tackle a first question: what is the interaction between ethnic violence and ethnic 
conflict. I locate ethnic violence in the triangle of conflict, under the “strategy” tip. This strategy, I 
argue, aims to change either the structure of the conflict or the cleavage, namely, by politicizing 
ethnic identities. I conclude that ethnic violence is, beside institutions, a factor in the activation of 
ethnic identities. The third part tackles a second question: what is the specificity of ethnic 
violence? In other words, how does “the adjective ‘ethnic’ modify the noun ‘violence’?” 
(Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 427). I argue that the organization of violence around an ethnic 
cleavage changes its logic. Because ethnic attributes are targeted, ethnic violence is indiscriminate 
(group-based), dispossessive (genocidal) and linked with atrocities. Because of this specificity, it 
deserves a special attention both from analytical and normative points of view. In conclusion, I 
argue that ethnic violence should be prevented because of its specific logic, but also because it 
leads to long standing ethnic polarization. In this process, the bodies, rendered political by the 
politicization of ethnicity, are central–dead or alive. The destruction, mutilation, and 
traumatization of bodies and minds are major features and consequences of ethnic violence. In 
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different ways, “the power of bodies is that they control how history will be told” (Rohde quoted 
by Kalyvas, 2006: 35).  
Depressing Implications 
“It is easy to get depressed about the implications of constructivist insight for the study of ethnic 
violence” observed Wilkinson (2001: 17). Indeed, constructivism have put into question core 
aspects of the theories of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence.32 First, these approaches have been 
based on the concept of ethnic groups, which has been questioned by the constructivist literature 
on ethnicity. Second, this literature has sometimes considered that ethnic heterogeneity as a cause 
of violence. But this causal link does not seem to be clearly observable empirically. Finally, ethnic 
violence has mostly been understood as a “degree” of ethnic conflict, which does not seem to be 
always the case. This section develops on these three weaknesses of non-constructivist approaches 
of ethnic violence.  
Groupism  
First, these approaches tend to consider ethnic violence as violent conflict between groups. This is 
problematic in regard of the constructivist theoretical framework adopted in this thesis, which 
problematizes the existence of ethnic groups. More concretely, the empirical observations of 
Mueller (2000), Valentino (2000) or Kalyvas (2006: 21) have shown that far from the entirety of 
ethnic group engaging in ethnic violence, it is most of the time a very small number of people who 
are directly involved. The authors argue that most people are reluctant to commit violence. Hence, 
small groups of thugs, led, encouraged and organized by politicians usually perpetrate the 
violence. The non-opposition of the masses is crucial for mass atrocities to occur –“Large 
segments of the public may support violent regimes while remaining indifferent or even opposed 
to mass killing itself” (Valentino 2000: 22)– but it does not mean these masses act violently, or 
even agree with this violence.  
Since only a small group of perpetrators do act violently, nothing indicates that ethnic groups with 
dense internal solidarity or feeling of belonging need to exist for ethnic violence to happen. 
Rather, in many instances, civilians’ testimonies indicate that they did not consider their ethnic 
																																																								
32 Theories of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence have been reviewed in chapter 2, and I therefore do not review 
them in this chapter. Constructivist theories which focus more exclusively on ethnic violence (Wilkinson, 2006; 
Kaufmann, 1996; Mueller, 2000) are reviewed more specifically later in the chapter.  
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identity as prevailing on other identities before violence occurred (Kaufmann, 1996: 144). For 
Mueller, “the whole concept of “ethnic warfare” may [accordingly] be misguided. Specifically, 
insofar as it is taken to imply a war of all against all and neighbour against neighbour–a condition 
in which pretty much everyone in one ethnic group becomes the ardent, dedicated, and murderous 
enemy of everyone in another group–ethnic war essentially does not exist” (2000: 42). As theories 
of violence between ethnic groups exist, the challenge for a theory of ethnic violence is thus to 
develop an understanding of ethnic violence without groups. 
Ethnic Polarization as a Cause of Ethnic Violence 
The major cause of ethnic violence is considered by many theories to be deep pre-existing ethnic 
cleavages. Counter-intuitively, however, this does not seem to be the case empirically. Empirical 
observation has indeed shown that higher levels of ethnic polarization do not lead to more violence 
or civil wars (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Kalyvas, 2006: 74). As Valentino notes, “unusually severe, 
pre-existing social cleavages are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions” (2000: 13) to explain 
the outbreak of ethnic violence. In fact, theories of ethnic conflict appear to over-predict conflict 
and violence, but have difficulties explaining inter-ethnic peaceful cooperation (Fearon and Laitin, 
1996). Ethnic diversity is not always a source of ethnic conflict, and “cold” ethnic wars can remain 
non-violent for decades, although group-feeling is high. Fearon and Laitin (1996) thus stress the 
necessity to develop theories that explain both conflict and cooperation in ethnically divided 
places. 
Taking the problem from the other side, I argue that the hypothesis that ethnic violence may occur 
when ethnicity is not widely politicized, and ethnic groups are not very cohesive should be taken 
into consideration. Indeed, as mentioned above, ethnic identities are in some cases not particularly 
salient before ethnic violence happens. This is illustrated by victims in Bosnia or Rwanda, who say 
that they did not primarily identify in ethnic terms before ethnic violence occurred (Kaufmann, 
1996: 144). As we shall see with Wilkinson (2006), ethnic violence can also be used with the 
explicit purpose of polarizing ethnicity.  
More generally, the problems linked with the approaches looking for the “causes” of ethnic 
conflict and violence have been underlined in chapter 2. Since these causes can evolve over time 
(Vorrath, 2009) and since violence may be sustained by other factors than those that first created it 
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(Kalyvas, 2006: 75) focusing on causes may be misleading and have little utility. In this chapter, I 
try to develop a more dynamic and processual understanding of ethnic violence.  
Ethnic Violence as a Degree of Ethnic Conflict 
Since ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to violence, and ethnic groups are not necessary 
for ethnic violence to emerge, ethnic violence can hardly be exclusively considered as a “degree” 
of ethnic conflict. This is not to argue that ethnic violence never results from the escalation of 
ethnic conflict. But it should be acknowledged that ethnic violence is not always an outcome of 
ethnic conflict. As well put by Fearon and Laitin,  
Even where violence is clearly rooted in preexisting conflict, it should not be treated as a 
natural, self-explanatory outgrowth of such conflict, something that occurs automatically 
when the conflict reaches a certain intensity, a certain "temperature". Violence is not a 
quantitative degree of conflict but a qualitative form of conflict, with its own dynamics 
(1998: 426).  
Following other authors, this thesis therefore argues for the analytical separation of ethnic violence 
and ethnic conflict, and gives specific attention to the relationship between the two concepts 
(Kalyvas, 2006: 75)  
In sum, the challenges for a theory of ethnic violence based on constructivist premises are to 
understand ethnic violence independently from the notion of ethnic groups, understand how ethnic 
violence can precede ethnic polarization, and specify the relationship between ethnic violence and 
ethnic conflict. The next section tries to develop a theoretical framework to this effect.  
Ethnic Violence and Ethnic Conflict 
This section tries to address the three challenges identified above by developing a framework for 
theorizing the relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. I start by defining ethnic 
violence. I then note its strategic character in ethnic conflicts and place violence in the triangle of 
ethnic conflict. Finally, I identify the two aims that ethnic violence may have: changing the 
structure or changing the dominant cleavage. 
Defining Ethnic Violence 
In order to analytically differentiate between ethnic violence and ethnic conflict, a definition of 
ethnic violence independent from the notion of ethnic conflict should first be formulated. Kalyvas 
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writes that “at the very basic level, violence is the deliberate infliction of harm on people” (2006: 
19). Building on this definition and on the definition of ethnic identities, I define ethnic violence as 
the deliberate infliction of harm on people because they possess, or are believed to possess, an 
attribute that makes them members of an ethnic category.33 This is a minimalist definition. 
According to this definition, violence is ethnic when, and only when, the victim is targeted on the 
basis of her possession of ethnic attributes.34 This definition has at least three advantages.  
First, it does not presuppose the existence of ethnic groups, ethnic conflict, or ethnic polarization 
for ethnic violence to happen. In fact, it does not rest on a judgement on the general nature of 
inter-ethnic relations. This definition also does not prejudge the nature of the perpetrator. Ethnic 
violence can be perpetrated by a wide range of actors including states, armed groups, thugs, but 
also individuals. The perpetrators need not be a group, or have the feeling of belonging to a group 
(although they of course often do so)–the only criteria is that they select their targets because of 
their membership in an ethnic category.35 Similarly, this definition does not imply that the victims 
feel any particular loyalty to an ethnic group; they just have to possess a certain ethnic attribute. 
Indeed, as Valentino observes, “the victim group is defined by the perpetrator because, in many 
cases, the victims do not perceive themselves to be members of the targeted group” (Valentino, 
2000: 6). 
Second, this definition allows for the integration of all forms of ethnic violence and for a clear-cut 
distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic violence. The test rests in the intentionality of the 
perpetrators to target the member of a certain ethnic category. It lets open the question of the scale 
of violence: ethnic violence is neither defined by its intensity nor by the number of victims. Forms 
																																																								
33 This definition also builds on antecedent definitions of ethnic violence, but tries to be more succinct. For 
example, Fearon and Laitin “term violence ‘ethnic’ if it involves members of different ethnic groups and either 1. 
it is motivated by hatred or dislike of ethnic others in general; 2. the criterion for selecting victims is ethnicity, 
meaning that members of one's own group are exempted and members of the other group are eligible (as it were); 
3. [a] it is committed with the idea of being on behalf of or in the name of an ethnic group, or [b] is committed 
against those who claim to represent or act on behalf of an ethnic group (and because of this status)” (2000b: 22). 
Brubaker and Laitin “define ethnic violence on first approximation as violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in 
which at least one party is not a state (or a representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is 
coded by perpetrators, targets, influential third parties, or analysts as having been integral rather than incidental to 
the violence, that is, in which the violence is coded as having been meaningfully oriented in some way to the 
different ethnicity of the target” (1998: 428).  
34 In this regard, I follow Horowitz’s focus on “selective targeting” (2001). 
35 The perpetrator may be a collective, but may also be an individual. In this sense, what we usually term 
everyday ‘racism’ might be considered as a subtype of ethnic violence.   
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of ethnic violence include ethnic riots, pogroms, feuds, genocide, ethnic cleansing, certain terrorist 
attacks (where victims are selected on an ethnic basis), and ethnic fights.36  
Third, this definition provides a basis for understanding the specificity of ethnic violence since it 
emphasises the targeting of ethnic attributes. As noted in chapter 2, because the attributes are 
transmitted by human reproduction they are sticky (Chandra, 2012: 14), often essentialized, 
associated with bodies, which are important in the understanding of the logic of ethnic violence 
developed in the third part of this chapter.  
The Strategic Use of Ethnic Violence 
Ethnic violence is often described as a spontaneous and irrational outburst of violence resulting 
from deep and ancient hatreds. However, as observed by many authors, ethnic violence serves 
certain aims and should be considered strategic. Studying ethnic riots, Horowitz notes that “even 
in the most spontaneous specimens of such episode there is room for a slightly enlarged, if not 
fully consciously formulated, agenda on the part of rioters” (2001: 423).  A wide “instrumentalist” 
literature understands ethnic violence as the fruit of elite machinations (see for example 
Lemarchand, 1994; Wilkinson, 2006; Travaglianti, 2014). Focusing on mass killings, Valentino 
argues that this type of violence “should be recognized as a goal-oriented policy calculated to 
achieve leaders’ most important political military objectives with respect to other groups–a bloody 
solution to leaders’ most urgent problems” (2000: 29). Although the attention of scholars has often 
been focused on elites, citizens can also be at the root of a strategic use of violence, since cases 
show that “ethnic violence can spiral because of political contestation over group boundaries that 
are not the result of elite manipulation” (Fearon and Laitin, 2000a: 872; Brass, 1997).37 This 
																																																								
36 For space reasons, I do not define and discuss these different types of violence in detail, but see Horowitz, 
2001: 17-26. 
37 An opposition to the idea that ethnic violence is strategic could come from its “indiscriminate” character. 
Indeed, indiscriminate violence is often considered counterproductive. For Kalyvas, it “decreases the opportunity 
costs of collaboration with the rival actor” (2006: 144; 2004). He however explains the use of indiscriminate 
violence by its cheap costs as compared to selective violence. Even if counterproductive, this form of violence is 
thus understood as used rationally by actors (Kalyvas, 2006: chapter 6; Kalyvas, 2004). Downes (2011) focusing 
on civilian targeting notes that this is generally a bad strategy but that desperation can explain its use. This 
argument is close to the argument developed by Kalyvas. Downes however adds that desire for territorial 
conquest might also justify civilian targeting. This suggests that indiscriminate violence may become productive 
depending on the aims pursued by the actors. In fact, ethnic violence, although indiscriminate, may well be 
productive in regard of its aims. A crucial difference lies in the type of violence on which attention is focused. 
Kalyvas focuses on “coercive” violence, whereas ethnic violence is firstly “dispossessive” violence. When 
violence aims at controlling the enemy, its indiscriminate character may well be counterproductive, but when it 
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strategic use of ethnic violence is also acknowledged by the “realist” literature on ethnic conflict, 
which focuses on strategic interaction between groups (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, 1998; Fearon & 
Laitin, 1996; Wilson, 2005; Posen, 1993; Rose, 2000).  
Recourse to violence can in fact be understood as a strategic choice. In an ethnic conflict, actors 
decide to use to violence when they believe it will serve their aims better than non-violence 
strategies. Ethnic violence can thus be located in our ethnic conflict “triangle” as a type of 
strategic interaction 
Figure 2: Violence and the Conflict Triangle  
 
Two Aims of Ethnic Violence 
Our framework helps us understand the two goals that ethnic violence can have in an ethnic 
conflict. On the one hand, it may aim at impacting the structure of the society (A). On the other 
hand, it may help impacting the cleavage hierarchy by politicizing ethnic identities (B). These two 
different aims of ethnic violence have been described in the literature.  
Influencing the Structure 
Most of the literature on ethnic conflict and ethnic violence has in fact focused on the aim of 
impacting the structure of the society, because they took the (ethnic) cleavage mostly as a 
constant, or at least as a pre-condition for ethnic violence to happen. Theories focusing on 
competition between ethnic groups for access to scarce resources (Esman, 2004; Wolff, 2006), for 
																																																																																																																																																																														
aims at the elimination of the enemy then it makes more sense. Moreover, as will be argued below, atrocities may 
be “productive” in the sense that they inscribe domination and humiliation in the body of the victims. 
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territory (Toft, 2002) for psychological rewards (Horowitz, 1985) or for electoral results 
(Horowitz, 1985; Welsh, 1993; Mann, 2005; Galvan, 2001a), as well as approaches focusing on 
“relative deprivation” (Gurr, 1970) all have in common the idea that ethnic violence is utilized to 
affect the distribution of certain resources amongst ethnic groups. The general mechanism can be 
summarized as follows: in a society where ethnicity is politicized, actors decide to use violence 
with the aim of influencing or affecting the structure of society, either by transforming or 
maintaining it to their advantage. If the actors resorting to violence are members of a dominated 
ethnic category, they may aim at changing the structure of society to their advantage. But violence 
can also be used by members of dominant categories who wish to maintain the current structure of 
society, when they feel it is threatened. With his focus on elites, Valentino thus summarizes: 
“political conflict escalates to mass killing when powerful groups decide that only fundamental 
restructuring of society along ethnic lines will permanently end the conflict, secure their political 
domination or achieve other important goals” (2000: 41).  
Rothchild and Roeder (2005) also observe this mechanism in regard to power-sharing systems. 
Power-sharing institutionalizes a certain structure of society, in the sense that it establishes a 
certain distribution of resources. Belligerents agree on a certain share of power based on the 
balance of power at the time of negotiations. When the balance changes (because of shifts in the 
demography, in the distribution of resources, or in military power, for example), some ethnic 
group may consider favourably the option of a return to violence to try changing the power-
sharing agreement.  
The strategic shift from a non-violent to a violent strategy can probably be explained by the 
calculations of the actors: when they start perceiving they might gain more through violence than 
through non-violence, they may turn to violence (Petersen, 2002: 256). Structural changes in the 
distribution of power, resources or demography amongst ethnic categories may thus be at the root 
of such a strategic shift (Wimmer, 2013). Structural changes in the environment, such as state 
collapse (Petersen, 2012), new elections (Horowitz, 1985) or the departure of a foreign protector 
(Zahar, 2005) may also provoke a shift toward violence. Note that the categories that benefit from 
structural changes are not necessarily the ones that use violence . Instead, fear or resentment linked 
with a loss of status or power may push ethnic categories toward violence (Lake & Rothchild, 
1996; Posen, 1993; Howoritz, 1985; Gurr, 1970; Sullivan, 2005). 
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Influencing the Cleavage Hierarchy 
An alternative aim of ethnic violence is to impact the cleavage hierarchy in a society. This aim is 
less often acknowledged in the literature but has been highlighted by some authors which include 
constructivist insights in their analysis (Fearon & Laitin, 2000a; Kaufmann, 1996; Wilkinson, 
2006). Two different types of impact can be targeted. On the one hand, ethnic violence can in fact 
be utilized to maintain the politicization of the ethnic cleavage by actors who have interests in it. 
On the other hand, this suggests that ethnic violence can also be used in conflicts where ethnicity 
is not (or not very) politicized, to increase the politicization of ethnic identities.  
Ethnic violence has indeed the effect of activating specific ethnic identities. Chandra notes that 
ethnic violence “can trigger almost all of the mechanisms of ethnic identity change” (2012: 34). 
Wimmer also notes that violence is sometimes utilized by actors to impose their vision of ethnic 
boundaries (Wimmer 2013: 70-71). As Fearon and Laitin put it:  
Most simply, the provocation of violence by elites can construct groups in a more 
antagonistic manner—that is, alter the social content associated with being a member of 
each category—and in turn set in motion a spiral of vengeance. Second, extremists who 
provoke violence or push more moderate leaders to do so often wish to "purify" their 
culture, to sharply delineate identity boundaries that everyday inter-action and moderates' 
political agendas threaten to blur (2000a: 865).  
What is interesting for our purpose is that this type of ethnic violence does not require the 
existence of firmly constituted ethnic groups. It does not even require that the majority of 
individuals in a population think of themselves in ethnic terms. At the minimum, only a handful of 
perpetrators need to think in ethnic terms. Recurrent violence however, will tend to make ethnic 
identities more salient. Lambert formulates the phenomenon in an intuitive way: “when one is 
subject to stray assault or mob attack upon the basis of his association with a religious community, 
he is quickly impressed with the significance of that membership” (quoted in Horowitz, 2001: 
443). In other words, ethnic violence forces the activation of a specific ethnic identity. Since all 
members of a category are equally and indiscriminately targeted, they will tend to develop links of 
solidarity. At the same time, the relation with members of other groups will tend to disappear. In 
brief, “polarization encompasses outgroup aversion and ingroup solidarity” (Horowitz, 2001: 443). 
Appadurai (1998, 2006) also notes that ethnic violence ascribes ethnic identities. Indeed, as we 
have seen, before violence occurs, there is no need for victims to perceive themselves as members 
a specific ethnic group. Neither do they need to politically activate the ethnic identity for which 
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they are targeted. Violence, in a way, imposes a specific identity. The testimony of a Bosnian 
schoolteacher is striking in this regard: “We never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. 
We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered, because we are Muslims, things 
changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killers” (Kaufmann, 
1996: 144, emphasis added). For Appadurai, ethnic violence thus has the effect of creating 
“certainty” about the identities of the perpetrators and the victims, even if it may be “the worst 
kind of certainty: dead certainty” (1998: 245).   
Kaufmann (1996) also observes this phenomenon. He argues that, in ethnic wars, 
“hypernationalist” rhetoric, tales of atrocities perpetuated by the ethnic enemy, actual violence 
endured, fear of genocide as well as sanctions imposed by in-group hardliners tend to “shrink 
scope for individual identity choice” (1996: 143) and increase group cohesion. As a result, while 
members of the same ethnic category may be trusted, members of the enemy category are 
considered dangerous. The resulting “security dilemma” leads to the territorial unmixing of 
population (Kaufmann, 1996: 149): ethnic groups are politically, psychologically, and even 
territorially defined by violence. This effect of ethnic group formation and separation has been 
utilized to propose a “qualified” version of primordialism (Van Evera, 2001: 20). This “new 
primordialism” is based on the idea that violence and ethnic wars tend to “harden” ethnic identities 
so much that the situation can be explained in primordialist terms. 
Petersen (2002) explains the phenomenon in terms of the emotions created by ethnic violence. For 
him, emotions help hierarchize individual identities: “while identities are multiple and malleable, 
identities can crystallize when one is in the grasp of a powerful emotion” (Petersen, 2002: 3). In 
the vocabulary used in this thesis, fear, hatred, or resentment thus act as constraints on the 
repertoires of identities. These emotions also explain that ethnic violence has long-term impacts, 
even when the actual violence has ended.   
This effect of polarization of ethnic identities is often an unintended consequence of ethnic 
violence, but it is also sometimes used on purpose by individuals who would benefit from the 
polarization of ethnic identities. Wilkinson (2006) develops a theory of ethnic violence from a 
constructivist perspective. He argues that, while ethnic identities are multiple, some political actors 
build political organizations on specific ethnic cleavages. If these cleavages are not politicized 
during an election, their chances of success decrease. Because they have incentives to politicize a 
particular ethnic identity, politicians may use violence to reinforce their group’s cohesion in 
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periods of electoral competition, and to make sure that only one of their followers’ multiple 
identities (the one that favours them electorally) will be politically salient at a given time.  One of 
the strategies is to organize small “anti-minority events (…) [which] are designed to spark a 
minority counter-mobilization (preferably a violent counter-mobilization that can be portrayed as 
threatening to the majority) that will polarize the majority ethnic group behind the political party 
that has the strongest anti-minority identity” (Wilkinson, 2006: 4). Another strategy is highlighted 
by Travaglianti (2014) who develops the argument that intra-ethnic violence can be used by 
incumbents to coerce their co-ethnics in voting for them. Ethnic violence can thus be used 
deliberately as a strategy for ethnic mobilization. 
The strategic shift toward the use of ethnic violence for impacting the hierarchy of cleavages in a 
society can thus be explained by a (real or feared) relative “erasure” or depoliticization of ethnic 
identities, and the reaction of actors who refuse this change. Appadurai (1998, 2006) links ethnic 
violence to uncertainty about ethnic identities. For him, the recent rise in ethnic violence is linked 
with a feeling of uncertainty about ethnic categories, which is brought about by globalization. 
Ethnic violence is a reaction to this uncertainty since it acts to clarify, redraw, both physically and 
symbolically, the boundaries between groups. “Large scale violence is not simply the product of 
antagonistic identities but that violence itself is one of the ways in which the illusion of fixed and 
charged identities is produced, partly to allay the uncertainties about identities that global flows 
invariably produce” (Appadurai, 2006: 7). However, as Wilkinson (2006) demonstrates, other 
events, such as elections, may lead certain actors to provoke ethnic violence to “harden” ethnic 
antagonisms. The common denominator is the lack of clarity in ethnic identities, whereas some 
actors believe they can take advantage of an increased clarity. “Ambiguous [ethnic 38 ] 
boundaries” write Fearon and Laitin “are as inflammatory as territorial ones” (2000a: 873).  
In sum, this section has integrated ethnic violence in our framework of ethnic conflict. I defined 
ethnic violence as violence which targets individuals because they possess, or are believed to 
possess, a specific ethnic attribute. Violence is used strategically in ethnic conflicts for two 
different aims. In the case where a conflict is already ethnic, i.e. when the ethnic cleavage 
dominates other cleavages in a society, violence may be used to impact the structure of a society to 
the advantage of the perpetrator, either by changing of by maintaining this structure. On the other 
																																																								
38 They write “cultural”, but, following Barth (1969) I consider that ethnic groups and cultural groups are 
different entities. 
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hand, ethnic violence can also occur when ethnicity is not politicized at a societal level, or at least 
not sufficiently from the point of view of the perpetrator. It may indeed seek to politicize ethnic 
identities with the very aim of making the conflict ethnic. Note that, as we shall see below, 
although analytically distinguishable, both aims are pursued in parallel in a majority of cases.  
Table 2: Ethnic Violence: Aims, Triggers, Effects 






Yes Real or feared structural change: 
change in the balance of power or 
in the repartition of resources; 
state collapse; elections; departure 






Not necessary Real or feared lack of clarity on 





This second aim has allowed us to highlight an important effect of ethnic violence: the activation 
of ethnic identities. Ethnic violence can thus be not only the outcome but the source of the 
politicization of ethnic identities. This analysis allows us to propose two types of mechanisms to 
prevent ethnic violence. When violence aims at changing the structure of a society, the main 
solution is to change the ethnic cleavage, so that politics is not understood as a zero-sum game 
between ethnic categories. Preventing the use of ethnic violence to politicize ethnicity seems to 
require the provision of sufficient incentives for individuals not to want to pursue this path. In 
sum, since ethnic violence is strategic, actors can be expected to respond to incentives to use or 
discard this strategy (Wilkinson, 2006): What incentives can be provided? This is the object of 
chapter 5.  
But before asking how to prevent ethnic violence, it is useful to think about the normative basis of 
this question. Most of the scholarly attention on ethnic conflict has followed the spread of ethnic 
civil wars in the 90s. As we shall see in the next section, some authors have however questioned 
whether this violence had any specificity as compared to other types of violence. In other words, 
why should our focus be on the prevention of ethnic violence in particular rather than simply on 
the prevention of violence? More generally, does ethnic violence deserve to be analytically 
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separated from other types of violence? In the next section, I take ethnic violence as a process and 
argue that there actually are good reasons to study and try to prevent ethnic violence specifically.  
The Logic of Ethnic Violence 
This section argues that, because it targets ethnic attributes, ethnic violence deserves to be 
analytically and politically separated from violence in general. Ethnic violence, I argue, aims at 
breaking the chain of descent of an ethnic category. By definition, it is thus dispossessive and 
indiscriminate. As a corollary of its ethnic character, it is characterized by physical atrocities and 
takes a genocidal turn. These appear to be sufficient reasons to pay specific attention to ethnic 
violence. In the first part, I review approaches that question the specificity of ethnic violence. In 
the second part, I describe ethnicity as a “transformative” cleavage which modifies the logic of 
violence. In the third part, I identify and review three aims of ethnic violence, and the means used 
to pursue it.  
The Banality of Ethnic Violence?  
While the “instrumentalist” approach stressed the opportunistic use of ethnicity by elites, an 
important question arose: if ethnicity is politicized by leaders, why do followers follow? Although 
various answers–ranging from “ancient hatred” to psychosocial reasons (Horowitz, 1985; Fearon 
& Laitin, 2000a)–have been given to this question, a particularly interesting argument, first 
developed by Brass (1997), is that followers do not actually follow leaders but pursue their own 
agendas, which are not linked with ethnic antagonisms. 
For Brass, much of what is commonly designated as “communal” violence, is not really motivated 
by communal antagonisms. In fact, violence might only be labelled as “ethnic”. But “the 
motivations of those implicated in ‘ethnic violence’ may be more complex than simple hatred for 
an out-group” (Fearon & Laitin, 2000a: 869). By studying local disputes, Brass argues that these 
motives are quite ambiguous, but fit in a broader scheme and are thus post-facto labelled as ethnic, 
because this interpretation “fits with the political needs of local or national politicians” (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2000a: 869).  
In the same vein, Mueller (2000) argues that ethnic violence is much more “banal” than expected, 
and results in great part from greedy behaviour of “on the ground” actors than ethnic antipathies. 
Based on the analysis of ethnic massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia, he shows that ethnic violence is 
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often perpetrated by small numbers of thugs, whose reasons for fighting are principally 
opportunistic. The massacres, he argues, were led by the greed of actors rather than ethnic group 
grievances (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). “Indeed, based on these studies, one might conjecture that 
a necessary condition for sustained ‘ethnic violence’ is the availability of thugs (in most cases 
young men who are ill-educated, unemployed or underemployed, and from small towns) who can 
be mobilized by nationalist ideologues, who themselves, university educated, would shy away 
from killing their neighbours with machetes” (Fearon & Laitin, 2000a: 869).  
These authors in fact observe what Kalyvas noted in the broader context of civil wars: there is 
often a disjunction between national and local causes of conflict. While national causes of war 
might be ethnic, on the local level, actors may use civil war as an opportunity to use violence to 
resolve individual or personal quarrels (Kalyvas, 2006: 372). Kalyvas however argues that 
attention to alliances and cleavages might allow for an understanding of the vertical linkages and 
the cohesion of belligerent groups. Alliances indeed provide a linkage between elites and citizens. 
“Alliance entails a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the 
latter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive local advantage; in exchange, 
supralocal actors recruit and motivate supporters at the local level” (Kalyvas, 2006: 365). 
Although their initial reasons for using violence are different, these alliances lead to a convergence 
between the aims of elites and citizens. Thus, “civil war can be analysed as a process that 
transforms the political actor’s quest for victory and power and the local and individual actor’s 
quest for personal and local advantage into a joint process of violence” (Kalyvas, 2006: 365). 
The same logic can be applied to ethnic violence: although local and national causes of violence 
might vary, the cleavage is the same and the alliances are ethnic. Müeller (2000)’s conclusion that 
ethnic violence is just “banal” violence rests on a causal approach to violence which does not fit 
with my theoretical framework and with the definition of ethnic violence that I use. The 
conceptualization of ethnic violence and ethnic conflict that I proposed does not take ethnicity as a 
cause of conflict, but as the main cleavage which organises this conflict. Accordingly, the fact that 
the “causes” of violence are not ethnic does not mean that the violence is not ethnic. Violence is 
only defined as ethnic when the victim is selected based on ethnic attributes, whatever the 
motivations. When the violence is organized around the ethnic cleavage, however, this cleavage 
transforms politicians and citizen’s reasons for fighting into a “joint process of violence”.  The 
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argument I develop in the next sections is that the logic of violence changes when it becomes 
ethnic.  
The Specificity of Ethnic Violence 
The specificity of ethnic violence comes from the fact that ethnic attributes are transmitted by 
descent. As noted in chapter 2, this particularity makes human reproduction central in ethnic 
politics. In fact, ethnic violence, just like ethnic conflict, can be read as the politicization of 
descent. This centrality of descent, I have noted, leads to an essentialization of attributes which 
become understood as inscribed in the bodies, since they are transmitted by filiation. Foucault was 
probably one of the first to acknowledge this link between the politicization of reproduction and 
ethnic violence in the 20th century. If on the one hand, many policies of control and intervention 
on the bodies and sexual behaviours “have received their color and their justification from the 
mythical concern of protecting the purity of blood and ensuring the triumph of the race” (Foucault, 
1976: 197),39 the centrality of sexuality also transforms the nature of violence. He writes: “if 
genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers […] it is because the power is located and 
exercised at the level of life, of the species and the race, and of massive population phenomena”40 
(Foucualt, 1976: 180; on this idea of “body politics” and genocide, also see Fleming, 2003). In 
other words, the organization of politics around ethnic categories has important effects on the logic 
of ethnic violence. As Appadurai notes, “the first step toward […] an understanding [of ethnic 
violence] must be the most obvious and striking feature of such violence, which is its site and 
target—the body” (1998: 229).  
Ethnic violence results from the belief held by at least a small group of perpetrators that their 
political problems come from individuals who possess a certain ethnic attribute. What they target, 
therefore, are not so much specific persons (who could be differentiated by guilt or innocence), but 
specific ethnic attributes. This has three important repercussions. First, because any person who 
possesses a specific ethnic attribute is a potential target, ethnic violence is “category-based” 
violence, which I call indiscriminate. Second, because ethnic attributes are essentialized and 
sticky, ethnic violence–in opposition to most other types of violence in civil war–does not aim at 
																																																								
39 Translated from French by the author: “ont reçu alors leur couleur et leur justification du souci mythique de 
protéger la pureté́ du sang et de faire triompher la race” (Foucault, 1976: 197) 
40 “Si le génocide est bien le rêve des pouvoir modernes ce n’est pas pour un retour aujourd’hui au vieux droit de 
tuer; c’est parce que le pouvoir se situe et s’exerce au niveau de la vie, de l’espèce, de la race et des phénomènes 
massifs de population” (Foucault, 1976: 180). 
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controlling a population, but at exterminating it. It can thus be termed “disposessive” violence 
(Valentino, 2000: 30). Third, because ethnic attributes are transmitted by descent, often understood 
as bodily and linked to discourses about blood, atrocities are central in ethnic violence. I detail 
these three points below. 
Targeting attributes: indiscriminate violence 
Because ethnic violence aims at eliminating an ethnic category, it is characterized by what 
Horowitz (2001) calls “selective targeting”: victims are carefully selected on the basis of their 
possession of an ethnic attribute. This makes ethnic violence “indiscriminate”, as opposed to 
“discriminate” violence. In the case of indiscriminate violence “the concept of individual guilt is 
replaced by the concept of guilt by association” (Kalyvas, 2006: 141). Ethnic violence is typically 
indiscriminate since it targets any member of a category independently of any judgement of their 
guilt or innocence. Kalyvas indeed notes that “the most extreme form of indiscriminate violence is 
probably the one that selects its victims on the basis of membership in a nation or an ethnic or a 
religious group” (2006: 141).  
Ethnic violence can be at the same time “selective” and “indiscriminate”, because “indiscriminate” 
violence is not a synonym of “random” violence (Kalyvas, 2006: 141). Rather, “indiscriminate” 
violence occurs when the selection of victims is done at a category, rather than at an individual 
level. From this point of view the notion of group conflict must be put in perspective. As Kalyvas 
notes, “‘Group conflict’ makes sense only if group members are fully substitutable for each other” 
(2006: 373). In the case of ethnic violence, perpetrators are most of the time not substitutable, 
since most members of an ethnic category will not act violently. Victims, however, are 
substitutable: in an ethnic category, any individual can be targeted indiscriminately.41 Moreover, 
because ethnic attributes are sticky, there is no way for the members of the targeted ethnic 
category to escape from this violence. It is most of the time impossible for them to change their 
ethnic identity. Accordingly, distinctions between guilty or non-guilty, and between civilians and 
military makes no sense in ethnic violence.  
An example can help clarifying the logic of indiscriminate violence. The following quote describes 
a situation during the civil war in Lebanon. “We’re heading straight for the slaughterhouse. … it’s 
																																																								
41 Although it should be noted that ethnic conflict is rarely “purely” ethnic and other motives may interfere with 
ethnicity in victim selection. 
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just a couple of blocks behind your house. You know the empty lot there. That’s where Halabi, the 
Moslem butcher whose son was kidnapped, is collecting Christian Maronites. He wants revenge, 
that man! We’d better stay out of that area” (Tabbara, 1979, quoted by Kalyvas, 2006: 24). In this 
example, the butcher intends to commit “indiscriminate” violence. He selects his victims at a 
group level rather than at an individual level. Any member of the “Christian Maronite” category is 
a potential target, independently from any consideration about her guilt or innocence. There is no 
need for targeted Christians to have strong feelings of belonging to a group (although the common 
threat may create this feeling). On the other side, there is no indication that, and no need for, the 
butcher to feel a high level of solidarity with the members of the “Muslim” category. He only 
displaced the culpability for the kidnapping of his son from the actual criminal to the whole ethnic 
category. By so doing, he has transformed the nature of the intended violence: instead of planning 
to punish the real criminal (which would be discriminate violence), he targets any member of the 
ethnic category of the criminal: this is indiscriminate violence. 
Interrupting descent chains: dispossessive violence 
Ethnic violence comes from the fact that people of a certain ethnic category are considered a 
political problem by at least a small group of perpetrators. For the perpetrators, the only way to 
solve the political problem is to eliminate every individual who possesses these attributes. A 
second specificity of ethnic violence is thus that its ultimate goal is homogenization: the 
elimination of the ethnic category in its totality (Horowitz, 2001: 424), which means the 
eradication of specific ethnic attributes in a society. Although complete homogenization may not 
be the primary aim of ethnic violence, the dynamic of violence easily allows for it to descend into 
genocide. As Appadurai writes, “the domino effect to cleanse, as they ripple through the victim 
group, create further efforts to cleanse gray areas and achieve complete clarity and purity” (1998: 
236).  
The literature on violence in civil war identifies two general types of violence. Coercive violence, 
which aims at controlling or dominating a group and “dispossessive” violence which aims at 
exterminating a group (Valentino, 2000: 30; Kalyvas, 2006: 26). “A way to distinguish between 
the two is to ask whether at least one political actor intends to govern the population it targets for 
violence; an empirical indicator of this intention is whether a target of violence has the option to 
surrender” (Kalyvas, 2006: 26). While most of the violence in civil wars is coercive and aims at 
controlling the enemy group; ethnic violence is primarily dispossessive since its aim is 
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homogenization: the enemy cannot surrender. Since victims are selected due to their possession of 
ethnic attributes, “innocence is irrelevant and compliance is utterly impossible” (Kalyvas, 2006: 
143).  
However, unlike what is often assumed, the aim of ethnic violence is not necessarily to kill 
members of an ethnic category; it is first and foremost to increase the homogeneity of society. 
“There is abundant evidence that rioters want members of the target group to disappear: to die, to 
leave, or, occasionally, to renounce their identity and assume the identity of the aggressor group, 
restoring what is usually an idealized homogeneous status quo ante”. (Horowitz, 2001: 433). Other 
forms of violence, such as mass displacement may thus be as “efficient” as killing for serving the 
goal of ethnic violence.  
The fact that ethnic attributes are transmitted by descent has another consequence: a central aim in 
ethnic violence is to impede ethnic reproduction, to interrupt the chain of descent (Foucault, 1976; 
Fleming, 2003). This is particularly obvious in the descriptions of the “techniques” or “manners” 
of killing reported by the Hutu refugees of Tanzania interviewed by Malkki (1995). She observed 
that “there were certain body parts on which mutilation and destruction converged”, these are 
differentiated by gender; for women, these are tightly linked to reproductive functions.  
The sex of the body seems to have dictated the focal points for the infliction of violence on 
the body when the target was not a larger group. The mouth, the brain, and the head as a 
whole, as well as the anus, were focal areas on the bodies of men in particular. Women’s 
bodies were said to have been destroyed largely through the vagina and the uterus. When the 
women captured were pregnant, the violence seem invariably to have focused on the womb 
and specifically on the link between mother and child (Malkki, 1995: 92).  
These sites of violence were explicitly understood by the survivors as attempts to impede 
reproduction of their ethnic group: “The disemboweling of pregnant Hutu women was interpreted 
as an effort to destroy the procreative capability, the ‘new life’ of the Hutu people. In several 
accounts, the unborn children or embryo was referred to, simply, as ‘the future’” (Malkki, 1995: 
92).   
In this regard, the exclusive focus on killing might be misleading if we aim at a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon of ethnic violence. Kalyvas notes that “there is a general 
consensus that homicide crosses a line: it ‘is an irreversible, direct, immediate, and unambiguous 
method of annihilation’ (Straus, 2000: 7); in this sense, death is ‘the absolute violence’ (Sofsky, 
1998: 53)” (2006: 20). In the case of ethnic violence, other forms of violence such as mass 
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displacement, physical mutilations or rape may be as efficient, “absolute” and “irreversible” as 
homicide, given the aims of the perpetrators. Thus, they must be considered functionally equal to 
homicide. Mass deportations were for example the first “solution” adopted by Nazis: “before the 
war, the Nazis actively encouraged Jewish emigration, a policy that allowed over 70 percent of 
German Jews to escape. The Nazis also devoted a great deal of time, effort and resources to plans 
to deport the Jews to faraway places such as Siberia or Madagascar” (Valentino, 2000: 40).  
Moreover, due to the centrality of descent in ethnic politics, rape is maybe the form of violence 
best permits an understanding of the multiple significations that ethnic violence may take. As 
multiple cases show, rape is utilized as a systematic strategy of ethnic “cleansing” in many cases 
of ethnic conflict. The most cited ones are Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(Sharlach, 2000) where mass rape occurred during ethnic wars. The fact that it is used in a 
specifically ethnic purpose cannot be denied (Nagel, 2003; Gellately & Kiernan, 2003: 13-14). The 
aims can be multiple. In Rwanda, it was systematically used as a weapon for killing Tutsi women 
(Sharlach, 2000; Weitsman, 2008).  
The main difference between rape and murder is that it might have long-term “ethnic cleansing” 
effects since it often precludes the reproduction of the victim. In Rwanda, rape was used to 
deliberately transmit STDs to victims, thereby hindering the reproduction of the ethnic group. 
“Survivors report that Hutu men diagnosed with HIV raped Tutsi women during the civil war, then 
told the women that they would die slowly and gruellingly from AIDS” (Sharlach, 2000: 99). In a 
country where approximately 90% of Tutsi women were raped (Weitsman, 2008: 573), and where 
medication for the treatment of HIV is mostly unavailable, Sharlach argues that these practices 
must be considered as a “protracted genocide” (2000: 100). In ex-Yougoslavia, systematic rape 
and forced impregnation of Muslim and Croat women by Serbs were used with the aim of 
“diluting an ethnic community’s bloodline” (Sharlach, 2000: 101) and thus commit genocide 
(Fisher, 1996). Because, in this context, ethnic identity is believed to be transmitted exclusively by 
the father, the aim was explicitly to make these women pregnant: their children would thus have 
the ethnic identity of their enemies, the ethnic identity of a generation would be replaced by 
another42 (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 115; Weitsman, 2008). Finally, in many contexts, the social 
																																																								
42 “In Bosnia–Herzegovina, (…) the purpose of the Serb and Bosnian–Serb’s mass rapes was not merely to drive 
away and to harm non-Serb women, but (…) to ensure that they became pregnant. (…) In many cases the soldiers 
intentionally detained women until abortion was no longer possible” (Sharlach, 2000: 96-97). 
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stigma associated with rape victims makes these survivor “unmarriageable” (Weitsman, 2008: 
564). Rape is deliberately used with the goal of having effects on the long run. As Sharlach indeed 
notes, “it appears that the women and girls who are most likely to suffer rape during genocide are 
those for whom it will have the worst long term consequences – stigma, shame, and even 
expulsion from their homes and communities” (Sharlach, 2000: 101). This stigma has the effect of 
destroying communities and thus impeding the reproduction of an ethnic category. In this regard, 
the words of the young husband of a rape victim in Kosovo are striking: “I don't hate her, but the 
story is before my eyes. I feel very cold toward her […] I have no will to have children” (Bumiller, 
1999). 
Bodies as sites of violence: understanding atrocities 
A last particularity of ethnic violence is the widespread presence of atrocities.  
The large scale violence of the 1990s appears to be typically accompanied by a surplus of 
rage, an excess of hatred that produces untold forms of degradation and violation, both to the 
body an the being of the victim: maimed and tortured bodies, burned and raped persons, 
disembowelled women, hacked and amputated children, sexualized humiliation of every 
type (Appadurai, 2006: 13).  
In addition to their horrifying character, these atrocities might appear surprising. As Malkki writes,  
Hearing scores of accounts of cumbersome, difficult mutilation and killing, the listener 
eventually begins to numb to their horror and to ask grimly practical questions. For instance: 
Would the process of killing tens of hundreds of thousands of Hutu not have been more 
efficiently pursued with guns and bullets? (1995: 95).  
These atrocities can be better understood when taking into consideration the fact that ethnic 
violence does not only target the elimination of other ethnic categories, but also aims at the 
clarification of identities and the establishment of hierarchies between them: more than a 
“demographic” function, it also has clear symbolic functions. As Horowitz explains, although 
complete homogenization may be the “ideal” of perpetrators of ethnic violence, it is almost 
impossible to achieve. “Homogeneity is what rioters want, and growing homogeneity is what they 
got” (Horowitz, 2001: 438). There is thus an additional aim to ethnic violence, “degradation”: the 
establishment of hierarchies, the entrenchment of the domination of the targeted category by 
degrading its social status in the society (Horowitz, 2001: 424). This might appear contradictory 
with the aim of homogenization but it is not: “after all, if it is possible to remove the targets by a 
combination of extermination and expulsion, why bother to humiliate them? Simply because, for 
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the aggressors, living in an environment with a controlled and degraded target group is a good 
second-best to living in a homogeneous environment” (Horowitz, 2001: 437-8). 
 “Degradation” helps understand the widespread use of atrocities. When violence cannot reach 
complete extermination, it serves the purpose of clarifying ethnic identities, reducing the 
multiplicity of ethnic identities which can be activated, establishing hierarchies, and inscribing 
them in the long run. Here, the essentialization of ethnic identities, their links to bodies, blood and 
a myth of “purity” are important: following Feldman (1991) and Malkki (1995), Appadurai insists 
on the role of bodily mutilations as identity clarifiers.  
The macabre regularities and predictabilities of ethnocidal violence cannot be taken as 
simple evidence of ‘calculation’ or as blind reflexes of ‘culture’. Rather, they are brutal 
forms of bodily discovery – forms of vivisection; emergent techniques by exploring, 
marking, classifying, and storing the bodies of those who may be the ‘ethnic’ enemy (1998: 
233).  
Because ethnic identities are essentialized and understood as linked to bodies, violence is a way to 
ascribe ethnic identities and to activate them “from the outside”. “The killing, torture, and rape 
associated with ethnocidal violence is not simply a matter of eliminating the ethnic other. It 
involves the use of the body to establish the parameters of this otherness, taking the body apart, so 
to speak, to divide the enemy within” (Appadurai, 1998: 233-4). Atrocities are not merely a 
residual category of violence: they are intimately linked with ethnic identity activation; they are an 
integral part of ethnic violence and serve clear purposes.  Malkki observed that, in the 1972 
massacres in Burundi, “techniques of cruelty actually used were already symbolically meaningful” 
(1995: 94). Similarly, Feldman (1991: 64) notes that, in Northern Ireland, ethnic violence has the 
clear symbolic function of transforming the bodies of victims into “specimens” of an ethnic 
category. In this regard, the act of violence in itself is a symbolic way to activate and polarize 
ethnic categories. Feldman writes: 
The practice of torture in this instance was a production that detached the body from the self 
in order to transform the body into a sectarian artefact, an abstraction of ethnicity. 
Mutilation here is the physical erasure of individuality as a deviation from an ethnic 
construct. The ethnicity of the body is built in its dismemberment and disfigurement. 
Violence construct the ethnic body as a metonym for sectarian social space (1991: 64).  
This symbolic violence has long-term ethnically polarizing effects, first through the traumas it 
creates, and second through the recollections and the historical constructions it engenders. In her 
book on Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Malkki (1995) observes how the effects of violence, including 
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atrocities, and displacement, have contributed to the emergence of a feeling of belonging to the 
Hutu ethnic group, the construction of a mythico-history of this group, and the construction of an 
enemy to the Hutu people: the Tutsi. Post-facto narration and recollection of violence were also at 
the heart of the process: “thus, acts of atrocity are not only enacted and perpetrated symbolically; 
they are also, after the fact, stylized or narratively constituted symbolically” (Malkki, 1995: 95) 
and contribute to the long-term persistence and reproduction of the politicization of ethnicity.  
This discussion reinforces the point that other forms of violence must be considered as equal to 
murder – they may even sometimes be worse since they have long-term impacts that homicides do 
not necessarily have. While murder is an end, rape, mutilations or displacement are a beginning. 
Whereas a dead body is eliminated, a living body carries with it the physical and psychological 
pleas of the ethnic domination. Not taking this into account would not allow for a good 
understanding of the nature of ethnic violence. As formulated by Appadurai, “rape in such 
circumstances is not only tied up with special understandings of honor and shame, and a possible 
effort to abuse the actual organs of sexual (and thus ethnic) reproduction, but is additionally the 
most violent form of penetration, investigation, and exploration of the body of the enemy” (1998: 
239). 
Rape is also used to mark domination and humiliation of the enemy. As summarized by Diken and 
Laustsen, “in war, the abuse of the enemy’s women is considered to be the ultimate humiliation, a 
stamp of total conquest” (Diken & Laustsen, 2005: 118). Nagel further notes, ”sexually taking an 
enemy’s women amounts to gaining territory and psychological advantage” (2003: 181). Again, 
this is intimately tied to conceptions of honour and dishonour, purity and impurity, not only of the 
victim, but of the whole group to which she belongs. Sharlach draws an example from 
Bangladesh: “family honor is in this region and many others linked with female chastity. Woman 
symbolizes ethnic purity. A Pakistani’s sexual assault upon a Bengali girl or woman represented a 
sullying not only of her virtue, but a disgrace of her family and her community” (2000: 96).  
The aim is also to leave traces on the long run: psychological sequels contribute to the separation 
of groups, and thus the continuation of the politicization of ethnicity on the long-run. Forced 
impregnations can also be read as a way to “occupy the womb” of the victims, months after 
violence occurs (Fisher, 1996). Finally, there is evidence of deliberate marking of the bodies by 
letting scars in the skin, thereby leaving life-long marks of humiliation. This is how we must 
understand the “accounts of biting [that] pervaded the refugees' and internally displaced persons' 
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(IDPs) stories [in Kosovo]. Nurses who treated rape victims and eyewitnesses who saw women 
returning after long absences reported that many of the women had visible teeth-marks on their 
arms and exposed flesh” (Vandenberg, 2000). Rape is also intimately linked to discourses about 
“purity” an “impurity”, and its “irreversible” effects on the victims and on her ethnic group are 
hardly deniable. Indeed, “the penetration inflicts on her body and her self a mark, a stigma, which 
cannot be effaced” (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 113). Rape thus marks the body with visible and 
invisible “scars that don't fade” (Thurow, 2000). The symbolic pollution often extends to the 
victim’s kin, or ethnic group in general (Nagel, 2003: 181-2).  The spread of mutilations of both 
dead and alive bodies in ethnic violence may thus be understood as a further way to humiliate, and 
inscribe this humiliation in these bodies to ensure it will last. 
Ethnic Violence and the Politicization of Ethnic Identities 
In summary, the addition of the qualifier “ethnic” to the concept of violence seems to change the 
very nature of this violence. Because ethnic attributes are targeted, ethnic violence is 
indiscriminate, dispossessive and linked to high-levels of physical atrocities. While the violence in 
civil wars can be indiscriminate and atrocious, ethnic violence is so by definition. Because it aims 
at the elimination or the degradation of a category of people, ethnic violence does not permit any 
surrender, nor does it leave room for considerations about guilt or innocence. When its primary 
goal is not killing, ethnic violence aims to to inscribe domination on the long run, to leave scars on 
victims’ bodies and minds, in order to interfere in processes of identity activation. All of this 
sounds like good reasons to try preventing it.  
More generally, the discussion provided in this section contributed to our understanding of how 
ethnic violence contributes to the politicization of ethnicity. In the preceding section, I highlighted 
the use of violence with the instrumental purpose of politicizing ethnicity. I reviewed various 
reasons explaining this effect. Amongst them, I noted that violence tends to constructs intra-
category solidarity and aversion or antipathy toward outsiders, hyper-nationalist discourses or 
political mobilization strategies which accompany it contribute to the hardening of identities, and 
emotions created by violence create long lasting separation of the groups. This section added more 
intimate and morbid factors to the understanding of the identity polarizing effects of ethnic 
violence. The techniques of violence appear to be specifically designed (consciously or 
unconsciously) to mark ethnic separation and domination. Atrocities can be understood as a way to 
simplify a person’s complexity into an ethnic body, thus marking complete separation between 
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ethnic categories, creating ethnic certainty, and establishing social hierarchies through humiliation. 
Moreover, the scars and memories created by ethnic violence contribute to maintaining ethnic 
identities politicized. In brief, while last section stressed the group polarization effects of ethnic 
violence, this section highlighted the mechanisms of the activation of ethnic identities at a micro-
level. In both cases, violence must be understood not only as an outcome of ethnic politicization, 
but also as one of its causes.  
Preventing Ethnic Violence?  
For Kaufmann (1996), the hardening of ethnic identities as well as the security dilemmas brought 
about by ethnic war leave only one possible solution to ethnic conflicts: the territorial separation of 
the groups. “To save lives threatened by genocide, the international community must abandon 
attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states. Instead, it must facilitate and protect population 
movements to create true national homelands” (Kaufmann, 1996: 137).  
While Kaufmann’s argument that ethnic violence contributes to the creation of ethnic groups 
corresponds well to the constructivist assumptions, his conclusion is problematic. Beside problems 
inherent to partition as a solution to ethnic conflict (see Horowitz, 1985: 588-595), Kaufmann’s 
solution is problematic in theory. A first problem is highlighted by Chandra:  
The plausibility of Kaufmann’s and Van Evera’s solution depends upon the assumption that 
homogeneity, once created, is permanent. This view is inconsistent with a constructivist 
position. Constructivist advances suggest that ethnic homogeneity, like ethnic heterogeneity, 
is an artefact that can only be created and maintained under specific conditions (Chandra, 
2001: 9). 
On the other hand, the constructivist approach presented in this thesis shows that the ethnic 
cleavage may appear in any society as soon as politics starts to be organized on the basis of 
physical attributes.  
The second problem is the opposite of the first one: to paraphrase Chandra, it is the assumption 
that heterogeneity, once created, is permanent. Van Evera is explicit on that point: “individuals do 
have multiple identities, but in modern times ethnic identities tend to become paramount; and once 
they become paramount, ethnic identities tend to remain paramount” (2001: 22). Not much 
argument is provided to explain where this stability of salient ethnic identity would suddenly come 
from. On the other hand, the current and previous chapters provided some explanations for the 
stability of the politicization of ethnic identities: formal and informal institutions, violence and 
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emotions can put constraints on the repertoires of identities and force the activation of ethnic 
identities. Other factors do probably remain to be identified, but our conclusion is that ethnic 
identities are mobilized strategically within the constraints provided by these four elements. If 
sufficient incentives for the mobilization of non-ethnic identities are provided, we might well see 
another type of political cleavage emerge.  
These two theoretical problems thus transform into two practical problems. First, Kaufmann’s 
solution provides no guarantee that a new ethnic conflict will not reappear within the territorially 
isolated communities. From this point of view, the current situation in South Sudan shows that 
partition is far from being a panacea for ethnic conflict. Second, Kaufmann’s solution obscures 
another possibility: providing institutional incentives for the use of non-violent strategies, or for 
the depoliticization of ethnicity after conflicts. Indeed, although the limits on the repertoire of 
identities brought about by violence and its emotional and psychological legacies might make this 
difficult, strong incentives may theoretically succeed in turning actors away from recourse to 
violence, or even the mobilization of ethnic identities.  
The analysis conducted in this chapter and the previous one has shown that individuals activate 
their ethnic identities for strategic reasons: incentives provided by formal and informal institutions, 
or by violence. Since ethnic violence polarizes ethnic identities, its end does seem to be a 
necessary prerequisite for the depoliticization of ethnicity. But after its end, actors might react to 
incentives for the activation of non-ethnic identities. To differentiate between possible and 
impossible solutions to ethnic conflicts and ethnic violence, close attention should be placed on the 
mix of incentives that pushes individuals toward the politicization of this cleavage. Weakening 
these incentives and providing counterincentives might well be the aim of a policy of ethnic 
conflict transformation. This is the object of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5:  The Depoliticization of Ethnic Identities 
 
“To make peace with an enemy one must work with that enemy, and that enemy 
becomes one’s partner”  
Nelson Mandela, A Long Walk to Freedom.43 
 
This chapter builds on the theory of the politicization of ethnic identities described in the last two 
chapters to develop a theory of the depoliticization of ethnic identities after ethnic wars. This 
chapter thus proposes a theoretical framework, but also a normative institutional model for post-
war ethnically divided societies.  
In the first part, I explain the depoliticization of ethnicity by two factors. On the one hand, the 
lifting of the constraints which limit the repertoires of identities that can be activated to ethnic 
identities only; on the other hand, the creation of incentives for the activation of non-ethnic 
identities. The model I propose emphasizes three big principles: 1) the provision of institutional 
guarantees for the political representation of ethnic categories, 2) the provisions of institutional 
guarantees for the security of ethnic categories, and 3) the establishment of strong centripetal 
mechanisms which provide incentives for inter-ethnic integration.  
As argued in chapter 1, the environment in which power-sharing institutions are implemented has 
arguably a crucial effect on the functioning of the system. Accordingly, the institutionalization of 
the three principles proposed in the first section might vary greatly depending on contexts. In this 
thesis, I restrict the ambitions to neo-patrimonial societies. As noted in the introduction of this 
thesis, this choice is justified by the fact that this type of societies is arguably the most likely 
context for post-conflict power-sharing nowadays. Moreover, neo-patrimonial societies share 
enough common features for developing an institutional framework which might by and large 
correspond to these various societies. Consequently, the rest of the chapter focuses on the 
depoliticization of ethnic identities in post-conflict neo-patrimonial societies. Section 2 describes 
the characteristics of neo-patrimonialism, and identifies imperatives of survival (Zahar, 2003: 3) 
for three types of actors in neo-patrimonial societies: state leaders, societal elites, and citizens. 
																																																								
43 (quoted by Rothchild, 1997: 191). 
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Section 3 builds on this to evaluate the potential of three models of ethnic conflict management 
(consociationalism, ethnic amnesia, and hegemonic exchange systems) for the depoliticization of 
ethnicity. The last section identifies the risks associated with the institutional model proposed in 
this thesis when implemented in neo-patrimonial societies, and proposes some solutions.  
A General Framework for the Depoliticization of Ethnic Identities 
Three General Principles: Power-sharing, Securement, Integration 
Chapter two has defined the politicization of ethnic identities as the reduction of the set of nominal 
identities that can be activated by individuals to ethnic identities only. Conversely, the 
depoliticization of ethnic identities can be understood as the enlargement of the set of nominal 
identities that can and actually are activated by individuals to non-ethnic identities. Chapters three 
and four have argued that the principal constraints on the repertoires of identities that can be 
activated are formal and informal institutions, as well as violence and its emotional legacies. 
Accordingly, a model of depoliticization of ethnicity must necessarily include two dimensions: on 
the one hand, the removal of institutional incentives for the activation of ethnic identities, and on 
the other hand, the provision of security guarantees for the members of ethnic categories. Both are 
necessary to enable the depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage. But, even if it is rendered possible, 
the depoliticization of ethnicity is unlikely in post-war context because the memories of the war 
and the resulting distrust, resentment or hatred will most likely keep people apart. For this reason, 
incentives for the activation of non-ethnic identities should also be created to foster the 
depoliticization of ethnic identities.  
The theory therefore suggests that three principles may guide a policy of depoliticization of ethnic 
identities: the repartition of political positions,44 ensuring the security of the groups, and fostering 
the integration of the groups.  
The Dilemma of Post-war Power-sharing 
The aim of depoliticizing ethnic identities might however be difficult to reconcile with the 
conditions of the adoption of a power-sharing agreement (Horowitz, 2014). Indeed, an ethnic war 
																																																								
44 The repartition of economic resources is also important but more difficult to affect through constitutional 
design. However, since most resources are centralized in the state in neo-patrimonial societies, political power-
sharing might also entice a proportional repartition of economic resources.  
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is precisely the moment when the salience of ethnic identities is the highest. The negotiations will 
thus likely be marked by the ethnic cleavage.  
Two types of issues might be touched upon in the course of negotiations but, in both instances, 
each party’s demands are likely to be formulated in ethnic terms. The first type are negotiable 
demands which can be defined as “policy questions with tangible referents–such as goods, jobs, 
taxes, roads, and schools–and are frequently amenable to political solutions” (Rothchild, 1997: 
30). In this case, the groups are likely to demand a share of the resources for their ethnic category. 
For their part, “non negotiable demands, characteristically rigid and high-wrought, tend to cluster 
around accurate of inaccurate threat assessments or largely emotionally laden issues such as 
physical and cultural survival, group status, worth, identity, territory, and subordination” 
(Rothchild, 1997: 33). These include security issues. Indeed, as Hartzell and Hoddie  write: “given 
that groups emerging from a civil war have only recently ceased using armed force against one 
another, questions of who will exercise control over the instruments of coercion are likely to be 
central” (2003a: 320). Since former enemies identify themselves in ethnic terms, guarantees for 
security are likely to be formulated in ethnic terms too.  
In both cases, the ethnic cleavage is necessarily mobilized when answering the mutual demands of 
the belligerents. The dilemma of post-conflict peacebuilding in divided societies is thus that actors 
have true political, economic and security concerns that are defined ethnically, but that the 
establishment of a sustainable peace ideally requires the depoliticization of ethnicity and a process 
of national unity-building. Wilkinson (2001) summarizes this dilemma as follow: “how to design 
proposals that address the concerns of existing groups while providing simultaneously for the 
possibility that the groups themselves might be redefined over time?” (Wilkinson, 2001: 18). The 
question might even be how can one at the same time provide short term guarantees for group 
security and representation and foster long-term depoliticization of ethnicity? 
A solution to this dilemma is to recognise the existence of ethnic divisions and provide guarantees 
for political representation and for the security of ethnic categories without institutionalizing the 
ethnic cleavage. This can be done by establishing constitutional requirements for ethnic 
proportionality not in governmental institutions but in the organisations which structure the 
political field, notably in the political parties. The model proposed in this thesis therefore 
recognises the existence of ethnic identities, but it does so in order to foster the decrease of their 
political and social salience.  
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A General Framework for the Depoliticization of Ethnicity in Post-war Settings 
In very general terms, the three principles can be institutionalized by a power-sharing system 
which includes: 
1. Institutional guarantees for the political representation of all ethnic categories  
2. Institutional guarantees for the security of all ethnic categories (military power-sharing). 
3. Institutional dispositions (which combine a mix of constitutional obligations and built-in 
incentives) for the creation of multi-ethnic formal and informal organisations and 
networks, and, in particular, multi-ethnic political parties. 
To use Rothchild’s vocabulary, this model provides two types of “non-coercive incentives” to 
former opponents. The two first dispositions provide “insurance” of “nondefection by an 
opponent” (1997: 100). They solve problems of “credible commitment” to the peace agreement, 
which could constitute serious threats to the survival of the power-sharing agreement. They may 
be regarded as prerequisite to a depoliticization of ethnicity (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). The third 
disposition is closer to what Rothchild calls “purchase” incentives, namely, “the use of some form 
of fiscal or tangible incentive” (1997: 99). It is based on the idea that, if enough economic or 
political resources can be obtained by mobilizing non-ethnic rather than ethnic identities, actors 
are likely to do so. This model is very general and could be institutionalized in a great variety of 
ways, some of which are described hereunder. 
Guarantees for political representation  
Guarantees for political representation of all ethnic categories aim at avoiding permanent 
exclusion of some groups, and avoid the existence of “frozen” minorities and majorities 
(Horowitz, 1985; Linder, 1994). The institutional dispositions to do so are those prescribed by 
Lijphart: grand coalition government, proportional representation (or over-representation of small 
minorities), veto rights. These can be institutionalized by formal or informal agreements (although 
formal dispositions are stronger guarantees), by systems of ethnic quotas, adapted majorities, 
dispositions regulating electoral lists, or other dispositions.  
The fact that the model proposed in this thesis includes these elements of Lijphart’s 
consociationalism might give the illusion that the two models are similar. They are not. Instead 
there are three points of divergence.  
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First, the definition of success in this model and in Lijphart’s consociationalism are opposed. 
Indeed, Lijphart considered inter-group integration unlikely to succeed and dangerous. Based on 
his observation of the Netherlands, Belgium and other countries, he proposed a model which 
fosters the organization of the society in “segments” or “pillars”, and where elites only engage in 
accommodation and bargaining processes which ensure the stability of the society as a whole. 
Based on the analysis conducted in chapters 3 and 4, I defend another point of view and therefore 
join many observers who question the use of consociationalism for peacebuilding purposes 
(Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Jarstad, 2008). The previous chapters have indeed shown that the 
political dominance of the ethnic cleavages transforms the nature of political competition and 
violence in a way that hinders the functioning of a democratic system and potentially thwarts the 
prospects of sustainable peace. Accordingly, de-politicizing the ethnic cleavage is arguably a 
necessary first step which makes democratization and peace consolidation possible (without fully 
guaranteeing it). The model proposed in this thesis has radically different aims than Lijphart’s 
consociationalism. Despite sharing some of the institutional dispositions preconized by Lijphart 
and while acknowledging the importance of recognizing the existence of ethnic categories, this 
model aims at fostering a completely different logic: integration rather than pillarization.  
The other two differences with Lijphart’s model are that this model includes security guarantees, 
while classic consociationalism did not include this type of considerations, since it was not 
specifically designed for post-conflict settings. Finally, this model does not only aim at fostering 
accommodation exclusively at an elite’s level, but also amongst the citizens. Based on these three 
divergences, it can be argued that this model contributes to the centripetalist agenda of power-
sharing.  
Guarantees for security  
Security guarantees are necessary to provide a sense of security for members of the various ethnic 
categories in post-war settings. The feeling of insecurity which may persist without these 
guarantees would contribute to the persistence of politicized ethnicity. These guarantees thus make 
inter-ethnic collaboration and the formation of multi-ethnic parties possible  
Many authors have noted that the presence of a third-party enforcer tends to reinforce the stability 
of power-sharing agreements. Lake and Rothchild note that coercive or non-coercive external 
intervention can help overcome collective fears by “providing guarantees for ethnic contracts 
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between the warring parties, at least during an interim period” (1996: 67). More recently, Hartzell 
and Hoddie (2003a) and Krienbuehl (2010) have also observed that the stability of power-sharing 
agreements is enhanced by the presence of third-party enforcers.  
Some issues however suggest that the formal institutionalization of security guarantees is also 
necessary. A key issue with international intervention is the commitment of the intervening third 
party. Insufficient commitment to the intervention might “produce ambiguous policies that may, in 
the end, exacerbate rather than resolve conflicts” (Lake & Rothchild, 1996: 69). A second issue is 
that external peacekeeping interventions necessarily represent a temporary solution. As Cooper 
and Berdal write, “a military force cannot by itself establish a constitution and justice that inspire 
trust of all involved ethnic groups. Therefore, it does not make sense to make objective of this sort 
of intervention a full political settlement” (1993: 201).   
These issues suggest that, while external peacekeeping might be very useful to provide security 
guarantees in the short term, long term stability and depoliticization of ethnic identities necessitate 
the institutionalization of security guarantees for ethnic categories. A reform of the security sector 
as well as the establishment of civilian control over security forces seems to be necessary to ensure 
the ethnic neutrality of the police and the army (Höglund, 2008). Military power-sharing–
understood as the “rules regarding the distribution of the state's coercive power” (Hartzell and 
Hoddie, 2003b: 320) among ethnic categories–seems to be central. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003b), 
indeed find that successful implementation of military power-sharing enhances the prospects for 
lasting peace in power-sharing systems. According to these authors, the implementation of military 
power-sharing constitutes a strong signal of credible commitment and thus a powerful confidence-
building measure. By ensuring that physical security is equally distributed amongst members of 
different ethnic categories, military power-sharing counters one of the main incentives for the 
mobilization of ethnic identities.  
Institutional Incentives for the Formation of Multi-ethnic Parties 
Institutional engineering for the formation of multi-ethnic parties may take two main forms. A first 
one is the institutionalization of party regulations that constrain the form or composition of the 
parties. Ethnic party bans are an example of this type of regulation that is widespread in Africa. 
The aim of these dispositions is to “block” the emergence of overtly ethnic conflict (Bogaards, 
2008).  
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As noted in Chapter 3, a weakness of institutional party regulations is that they are often poorly 
enforced in neo-patrimonial societies (Reilly, 2006; Bogaards et al., 2013; Kadima, 2008). For this 
reason, the second option is a necessary complement to increase the chances of emergence of 
multi-ethnic parties. It is the utilisation of the electoral system to provide incentives for the 
development of multi-ethnic parties. Dispositions, such as constitutionally determining the 
composition of party lists, can force parties to integrate candidates from multiple ethnic groups 
(Reilly, 2006, 2008). “Vote pooling” electoral systems, which encourage leaders to campaign for 
the vote of citizens from other ethnic categories, or to form alliances with leaders from other 
ethnic groups have also been advocated by centripetalists since Horowitz (1985, 1991). Reilly 
(2001) has underlined the moderating effects of “preferential voting” systems. These systems 
allow citizens to vote not only for their first choice, but to specify their second and third best 
choices. When no candidate wins an absolute majority, the last one is eliminated and his voices are 
redistributed to other candidates depending on the secondary preferences of the electors. These 
systems foster moderate discourses, since candidates will also campaign for secondary votes of 
citizens from other ethnic groups. They also encourage alliances and bargaining between ethnic 
leaders for the second and third choices (Reilly, 2001). The last approach is to institutionalize 
“distribution requirements that require parties or individual candidates to garner specified support 
levels across different regions of a country, rather than just their own home base, in order to be 
elected” (Reilly, 2006: 822). These can also foster moderation in discourses and depoliticization of 
ethnicity.45  
In this chapter, I try to make the point for further nuance in the study of institutional centripetalist 
incentives. As argued in chapter 1, a power-sharing system necessarily takes place in an 
environment where other formal and informal institutional systems co-exist. A close attention to 
the incentives provided by these environmental institutions is important for two reasons. First, it is 
necessary to understand the actual behaviour of individuals in power-sharing systems. Second, 
pre-existing institutions might provide individuals with incentives which are opposed to, or, on the 
other hand, which reinforce the ones created by power-sharing system. Paying attention to them 
might thus allow scholars to better understand the success or failure of power-sharing in different 
																																																								
45	An	 interesting	 path	 for	 future	 research	 would	 be	 to	 study	 the	 potential	 centripetalist	 effects	 of	
alternative	 systems	 such	 as	 federalism,	 direct	 democracy	 or	 democratic	 sortition	 (see,	 Dowlen,	 2015;	
Delannoi	&	Dowlen,	2015;	Sintomer,	2014;	Rancière,	2005).	Berg-Schlosser	(2007)	has	argued	that	direct	
democracy	 in	 consociations	might	have	positive	 impacts.	Federalism	and	direct	democracy	also	 seem	 to	
have	created	centripetal	dynamics	in	Switzerland	(Linder,	1994).	
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context. Maybe more crucially, it might also allow constitutional engineers to anticipate actors’ 
behaviour and design systems which are adapted to the institutional context and have greater 
chances of success.  
The potential for research around this question is large because the institutional contexts in which 
power-sharing systems might be institutionalized vary greatly. In this thesis, I restrict the focus on 
neo-patrimonial societies because they are arguably the most probable context in which nowadays 
power-sharing systems could be implemented. The next section develops a theory of the incentives 
and imperatives which orient actors’ behaviour in neo-patrimonial societies.  
The Politics of Survival in Neo-patrimonial Societies 
Neopatrimonialism 
I have used the term “neo-patrimonialism” without elaborating much on this concept. At this point 
of our development, more details are however required. The theory of neopatrimonialism has been 
developed to acknowledge the important differences in the organisation of states and politics in 
many African and more broadly post-colonial countries as compared to the “weberian” western 
state (Eisenstadt, 1973; Médard, 1982; Clapham, 1985, Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Erdmann & 
Engel, 2007; Bach & Gazibo, 2012).  
The classification finds its origin in Max Weber’s ideal types of political authority: traditional, 
charismatic, or legal-rational (Weber, 1968). In neo-patrimonial societies, two of these forms of 
authority are mixed. The bureaucratic structure of the “modern” (legal-rational) state is infused by 
a patrimonial (traditional) logic (Bratton, 2011; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997) Neo-
patrimonialism can be defined as “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly 
patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on 
rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are 
formally defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public service but 
private property” (Clapham, 1985: 48). Thus, “the state is simultaneously illusory and substantial. 
It is illusory because its modus operandis is essentially informal, the rule of law is feebly enforced 
and the ability to implement public policy remains most limited. It is substantial because its 
control is the ultimate prize for all political elites: indeed, it is the chief instrument of 
patrimonialism” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 9).  
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As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) observe, the linkage between citizens and elites in neo-
patrimonial systems is not so much based on political programs as it is based on clientelism. 
“Clientelistic accountability represents a transaction, the direct exchange of citizens’ vote in return 
for direct payments or continuing access to employment goods, and services” (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson, 2007: 2). Political legitimacy in these systems rests on the ability of the leaders to 
redistribute resources through vertical clientelist networks. In resource-scarce contexts, the main 
source of resources is the State and its fiscal revenue (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 15). The resources 
redistributed are as much monetary as they also concern positions in the civil service or in the 
army. As a result, clientelist networks take root directly at the top of the state, and resources are 
redistributed to lower ladders of the social hierarchy (Berman, 1998: 336). To summarize with van 
de Walle, “it is analytically useful to think of neo-patrimonialism as having three constituent 
components. First, such regimes are characterized by presidentialism, in which both formal and 
informal rules place one man – usually the president – largely above the law (…). Second, such 
regimes rely on systematic clientelism by the president and his immediate followers to maintain 
the status quo and ensure political stability. Third, and unlike more traditional patrimonial regimes, 
neo-patrimonial systems rely on the fiscal resources of a modern state to provide the resources that 
are distributed following a clientelist logic” (Van de Walle, 2012: 112). 
Three Types of Actors: State Leaders, Elites, and Citizens 
Neopatrimonial societies include three types of actors. This is acknowledged by various scholars. 
Radnitz differentiates between “the regime, independent elite and impoverished communities” 
(2010: 21). De Mesquita et al. (2003: 38) make the distinction between the “leadership”, the 
“challenger” and the “selectorate”. Beck (2008) studies the relation between “State leaders”, “local 
brokers”, and the population. In this thesis, I use the terms of state leader(s), elite(s) and citizen(s).  
State leaders are the incumbent to power. Elites can be defined as “those who wield power and 
influence on the basis of their active control of a disproportionate share of society’s resources” 
(Eva Etzioni-Halevy, quoted by Radnitz, 2010: 17). Elites are a heterogeneous category which can 
be either allied with the state leaders or independent. When elites are allied (or clients) of the state 
leaders, they can act as brokers and create a link between the state and the population.46 When 
elites are independent, on the other hand, they may act as challengers to the regime (Radnitz, 
																																																								
46 Brokers are individuals who “stand guard over the critical junctures and synapses of a relationship which 
connect the local system to the larger whole.” (Eric Wolf, quoted by Beck, 2008: 6). 
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2010: 17-20). Finally, the citizens (or the electorate) is the set of actors who are entitled to vote. 
Even though it might not be the real source of power in practice, it is at least the most legitimate 
one. For this reason, state leaders are likely to seek their support, at least to ensure international 
legitimacy.  
These three levels are tied together by dyadic clientelist relations (Landé, 1977). Two sets of 
relations should thus be studied: the relations between state leaders and elites, and the relations 
between elites and the subset of electors who are their clients. The electorate is thus divided in two 
subsets. One subset is tied to a state-linked elite and thus have access to clientelist networks of 
redistribution of state resources, while the other subset is formed by the clients of the autonomous 
elite, and thus have access to the resources provided by this elite, but not by the state.  
Imperatives of Survival 
In neo-patrimonial systems, the reliance on informal institutions instead of formal ones is a way of 
gaining security and protection in environments marked by resource scarcity, insecurity and 
uncertainty (Landa, 1981). As Landé puts it, these networks  imply “aid in times of need”, and 
“mutual exchange of favours” (1977: xiv-xv). These networks thus provide protection to 
vulnerable populations and legitimacy to elites (Berman, 1998: 336). If actors rely on these 
networks rather than on state institutions, it is in part because of affective ties, but also mainly 
because they have strong incentives to do so. These incentives center around what can be called 
the imperative of survival (Zahar, 2003: 3). Additionally, each actor develops “strategies of 
survivals” to answer these imperatives. In the words of Migdal, “all people combine available 
symbols with opportunities to solve mundane needs for food, housing, and the like to create their 
strategies of survival – blueprints for action and belief in a world that hovers on the brink of a 
Hobbesian state of nature” (Migdal, 1988: 27). The imperatives and strategies of survival are 
different for the three types of actors due to their different positions in the social ladder and the 
different means at their disposition. 
State Leaders 
For state leaders, survival can be simply defined as “retaining power” (Zahar, 2003: 3; Radnitz, 
2010; de Mesquita et al., 2003; Migdal, 1988). The main goal is thus political. As Chabal and 
Daloz observe while focusing on Africa, state leaders seek to attain this objective by the political 
instrumentalization of disorder. State leaders are in fact not so much engaged in a struggle against 
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society for social control of the populations, as Migdal (1988) suggests. On the contrary, state 
leaders have often made little efforts to implement a “western” model of state, because they find 
advantages in the neo-patrimonial system (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 13). Migdal recognizes this 
logic when noting that while the development of a strong state is a necessity, it can threaten a 
leader’s survival in power, leaders thus have incentives to act against the strengthening of the state 
(1988: 208). Chabal and Daloz go further and show that “the very weakness and inefficiency of 
the state has been profitable to African political elites. The development of political machines and 
the consolidation of clientelist networks within the formal political apparatus has been immensely 
advantageous. It has allowed them to respond to demands for protection assistance and aid made 
by the members of their constituency communities in exchange for the recognition of the political 
prominence and social status which, as patrons, they crave” (1999: 14).  
Relying on a clientelist pyramid to remain in power however creates three types of problems: 
“controlling the required means”, or resources necessary to sustain the clientelist redistribution; 
“credit claiming” for the distribution of goods; and “contract enforcement” of the clientelist 
relationship, in other words, monitoring clientelist networks to ensure that followers indeed follow 
(Müller, 2007: 258-9). To solve these three problems, state leaders have three types of leverage: 
clientelist redistribution, repression, and identity politics.  
As de Mesquita et al. (2003) note, state leaders have three types of “clientelistic” leverage as 
regards redistribution: the determination of a tax rate to raise funds, the spending of this tax 
revenue, and the delivery of a certain mix of public and private goods (2003: 8). Following 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, we can add a third type of goods to this classification: “club goods” “that 
provide benefits for subsets of citizens and impose costs on other subsets” (2007: 11). 
State leaders have a second type of leverage: repression. This includes what Migdal calls “dirty 
tricks” including “illegal imprisonment and deportation, strange disappearances, torture and death 
squads” (1988: 223), as well as “illegal methods or quick changes of the law to remove key state 
figures, pre-empting the emergence of competing power centers, and weakening or destroying 
groups in agencies already powerful enough to threaten the ruler’s prerogatives” (1988: 223).  
A last leverage is recourse to identity as a way to mobilize clients, to obtain clientelism “at a 
discount” (Lemarchand, 1988: 151-154; Beck, 2008). Lemarchand notes that some patrons can 
rely on traditional loyalties or religious status to reinforce the loyalty of their followers without 
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spending too much. “Political support may come at a discount where rural notables are cast in the 
role of saintly figures (as in Senegal) or retain enough legitimacy and trust to inspire respect and 
affection” (Lemarchand, 1988: 151). In an ethnically polarized context, ethnic violence can also be 
read as a way of obtaining clientelism at a discount. As we have seen in chapter 4, ethnic violence 
has the effect of reinforcing communities and making interaction with ethnic others impossible. 
When an ethnic category is targeted by ethnic violence, the loyalties toward their ethnic leaders is 
likely to increase without regard to the resources redistributed (Wilkinson, 2006).  
Leaders thus define a mix of clientelism, repression and identity politics to maintain themselves in 
power. The composition of this mix is influenced by resources at their disposition, the strategic 
interaction with rivals, but also by institutional incentives. They are likely to try to pay the 
minimal price in order to form a sufficient coalition to win the elections and to maintain 
themselves in power (de Mesquita et al, 2003).  
Elites 
Elites are in a middle position: on the one hand, they are the patron of a subset of the population; 
on the other, they are client of state leaders. Elites are thus engaged in a two-level game (Putnam, 
1988). They are located at the intersection of two relations of interdependence. On the one side, 
state leaders need elites to mobilize support amongst the population and elites need support to gain 
access to state resources. This access is a necessity since, on the other side, elites need the support 
and the votes of the population, and the population needs the resources redistributed by this elite. 
Their imperative of survival is to keep their position; to accomplish this, they need to satisfy both 
sides of the relationship. The elite is likely to try to gain as much resources as possible from the 
state, and redistribute as few as possible to the followers, thus keeping a part for personal 
enrichment (de Mesquita, 2003). Elites can also find alternative sources of resources (foreign aid, 
economic activity) which can increase their independence toward the state. An independent elite 
can put pressures on state leaders to influence their politics or even act as challengers and try to 
replace the current state leaders (Beck, 2008; Radnitz, 2010)  
In addition to this two-level game, elites are engaged in a horizontal competition among 
themselves for the control of clients (Lemieux, 1977). Mobilizing ethnicity might be a way to 
decrease the number of potential rivals since people will vote for their co-ethnics only. Intra-ethnic 
competition is however possible (Horowitz, 1985). Multi-ethnic coalitions of elites are also 
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possible, including coalitions with the purpose of challenging the state leaders, as often seen 
during revolutionary movements (Radnitz, 2010).  
Citizens  
The meaning of survival for the population is more straightforward: in contexts marked by poverty 
as well as resource and job scarcity, survival can be understood in very economic (and physical) 
terms. Survival is not a matter of retaining a position in the social hierarchy, but a matter of life 
and death. Gaining access to networks of redistribution of state resource and to positions in the 
civil service and in the army are thus the main objectives of the members of the electorate. To do 
so, the population has one main leverage: the vote.  
Indeed, many authors note that the introduction of elections gave the population an important tool 
to influence clientelist networks. Lemarchand notes that “the vote emerged as a critical political 
resource in the hands of the masses, a resource which could be traded for material rewards of all 
kinds, ranging from schools and piped water to scholarships and jobs” (1988: 152). By contrast, 
when countries returned to authoritarianism, or when political participation and democracy have 
declined, the reciprocity of clientelist networks has tended to diminish, and patrons redistributed 
fewer resources, preferring self-enrichment. “What must be stressed is the rapid spread of 
cynicism and corruption that has accompanied the decline of electoral politics” (Lemarchand, 
1988: 153). To say it briefly, when clients have nothing to trade, “patrons have ceased to 
patronize” (Lemarchand, 1988: 155). The correlation seems to hold over time; thirty years later 
Van de Walle concludes: “As a system democratize and political competition grows more lively, 
one can expect clientelism to become more overtly redistributive in nature” (2007: 66).  
However, the vote is not completely relevant in itself, it depends on the presence of competition 
amongst the elites. The existence of a multiplicity of potential patrons gives the population a 
certain autonomy vis-à-vis their current patron. Here again, in contexts where ethnicity is 
politicized, the number of patrons in competition might be reduced as voting for others than co-
ethnics is impossible for security reasons.  
In sum, the three types of actors identified in this model have specific imperatives for survival, and 
leverage at their disposition. Put briefly, these imperatives are of three types: electoral, economic, 
and security. Actors are expected to act instrumentally and develop strategies to minimize their 
costs and increase their benefits. Electoral institutions and party systems provide incentives and 
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constraints on actors’ behaviour which will influence their strategic calculations. Consequently, 
actors will build different strategies of survival in different institutional structures. These strategies 
might lead to the activation of ethnic or of non-ethnic identities. Building on this basis, the next 
section studies the functioning of three models of ethnic conflict management in neo-patrimonial 
societies and their effects on the politicization of ethnic identities. 
Institutions in Context: Three Models of Ethnic Conflict Management  
Beside radical solutions such as the territorial separation of ethnic groups and the partition of 
states advocated by Kaufmann (1996), three main models of ethnic conflict management have 
been identified in the literature. The first one, consociationalism, was discussed at length in 
chapter one of this thesis. The second can be called “enforced ethnic amnesia” (Lemarchand, 
2008a: 73), it consists in the implementation of a majoritarian democracy, with rules prohibiting 
reference to ethnicity. The third is the “hegemonic exchange model”. In this system, the ruling 
elites form a broad multi-ethnic coalition by co-opting the leaders of the main segments of society 
in order to stabilize their rule (Rothchild & Foley, 1988; Rotchild, 1997). This section studies how 
these three institutional models create a structure of incentives that affects the formation of party 
systems, as well as actors’ behaviour toward mobilization of ethnic identities. I highlight the 
effects of these three systems on the triangle of ethnic conflict, to draw mostly pessimist 
conclusions about the ability of consociationalism and ethnic amnesia to foster conflict 
transformation and inter-ethnic reconciliation in post-conflict settings (also see Jarczewska, 2013). 
Consociationalism and the Persistence of the Ethnic Cleavage 
The four components of consociational democracy–a grand coalition, segmental autonomies, 
proportional representation and minority vetoes–purposefully provide incentives for the political 
mobilization of ethnicity. As Lijphart notes, “it is in the nature of consociational democracy, at 
least initially, to make plural societies more thoroughly plural” (1977 : 42). Consociationalism 
aims to use societal “pillarization" or “segmentation”, to allow representation of the various ethnic 
groups and accommodation at an elite level. This segmentation of society also implies that 
political parties are ethnic. As Maurice Duverger notes, “on the whole [proportional 
representation] maintains almost intact the structure of parties existing at the time of its 
appearance” (Horowitz, 1985: 645). Thus, in post-ethnic war contexts, both elites and citizens 
have strong institutional incentives for politically mobilizing ethnic identities. 
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At an elite level, leaders of all major groups are represented in the “grand coalition”. In the classic 
“corporate” version of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1991), the distribution of seats for each 
group is pre-determined. This configuration provides strong incentives for leaders to mobilize 
ethnicity in their discourses and politics. Indeed, in this system, competition for access to power 
does not take place between ethnic groups, but between co-ethnics. Leaders need to form a 
winning coalition among the limited subset of their co-ethnics. Since leaders seek to minimize 
their costs, distributing public goods tends to be irrational since electors from other ethnic groups 
are necessarily not members of their winning coalition. On the other hand, the candidate or party 
which promises and indeed redistributes the most benefits to its co-ethnics will be the most likely 
to succeed. At an elector level, access to clientelist networks will be conditioned on ethnic 
identities, since the parties and the informal networks of redistribution are organized ethnically. 
Electors thus have economic incentives for the mobilization of their ethnic identity. 
Placed in the context of the conflict triangle, consociationalism thus has three effects. 
Consociational democracy, by allowing for proportional representation of groups, may induce a 
more equal structure of society and distribution of resources. This structure, however, continues to 
be ethnically divided. As a result, the strategies adopted by actors may be peaceful rather than 
violent. However, no strong guarantee against a return to violence is provided and actors may well 
turn back to a violent strategy, for example if they come to put into question the power-sharing 
formula (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005). Finally, the dominant cleavage remains ethnicity. 
Consociationalism does not allow for the transformation of the hierarchy of cleavages in these 
societies. It provides incentives at both elite and citizen’s level which reinforce the political 
mobilization of ethnicity. As Deschouer concludes, “the pillarization did not only provide for a 
clear system of voter alignments, but also for a fixed language of politics. This has in the 
consociational countries produced a deeply frozen cleavage structure” (2003 : 221). 
As highlighted in this analysis, this system provides incentives for the delivery of private or “club” 
goods and against the delivery of public goods. It therefore contributes to the perpetuation of 
ethnically-based clientelism. This analysis can be supported by empirical evidence. Haaß and 
Ottman (2015) identified a correlation between power-sharing and clientelism in their study of 
Liberia and Aceh, Indonesia. They argue that “power-sharing reinforces patterns of corruption and 
patronage, which are detrimental to sustainable peace and development in the long run” (2015: 1). 
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The example of Lebanon also illustrates the dynamic relationship between consociationalism, 
clientelism, and the politicization of ethnicity. Hamzeh shows how clientelism was developed and 
persisted in the country after the second world war. “To be sure, consociational democracy 
confessional representation provided access since 1943 to governmental patronage; and, in order 
to maintain a large clientele, it became essential for the zu‘ama to be regularly elected as deputies 
and appointed as ministers” (Hamzeh, 2010: 171). These networks were soon linked to sectarian 
political parties to form a system of “party-directed clientelism” (Hamzeh, 2010: 173). While 
rightist parties were directly sectarian and based on vertical clientelist channels, multi-ethnic leftist 
parties invoking ideologies also emerged. However, these “leftist political parties who have 
derived much of their support from heterogeneous urban masses failed to move to the public 
arena” (2010: 173). This can be explained by our model: as access to state resources was tied to 
ethnic clientelist networks, the electorate, the elite and state leaders had more economic and 
political incentives to mobilize ethnic rather than other identities. This dynamic also led to the 
development of a sectarian civil society, which in turn contributed to the reproduction of 
sectarianism in Lebanon (Clark and Salloukh, 2013; Kingston, 2013). In sum, the incentives 
provided by consociationalism for the formation of ethnic parties and informal networks in 
Lebanon, explain the persistence of the mobilization of ethnic identities despite the recurrent calls 
for the abolition of political sectarianism in the country.47 
In neo-patrimonial societies, the effect of consociationalism and the segmentation of society are 
therefore arguably far from “relatively mild” as Lijphart described it (1977: 224). Lijphart’s 
assumption that “an extended period of successful consociational government may be able to 
resolve some of the major disagreements among the segments and thus to depoliticize segmental 
divergences, and it may also create sufficient mutual trust at both elite and mass levels to render 
itself superfluous” (1977: 228) seems rather dubious in post-conflict neo-patrimonial societies. 
The politicization of ethnicity is at best likely to remain constant, at worst likely to increase. This 
segmentation of society turns politics into a zero-sum game, which can lead to eruptions of ethnic 
violence (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005). The persistence of clientelism over time also hinders the 
development of efficient public services and, in the end, contributes to the weakness of the state. 
																																																								
47 The Lebanese consociational system, defined by the 1989 Taef agreement which ended the Lebanese civil war, 
was indeed, from the beginning and at least on paper, described as seen as a transitory solution. The Taef 
agreement clearly stated that “abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective. To achieve it, 
it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan.” (Chapter 1, art. 2G) 
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The Illusions of “Ethnic Amnesia” 
The opposite approach to ethnic conflict management has been the attempts to “erase” ethnicity 
from the public sphere. While consociationalism explicitly acknowledged ethnic divisions, this 
approach denies their existence and tries to enforce and “ethnic amnesia” (Lemarchand, 2008a: 
73). This approach is often based on the assumption that ethnic divisions are a construction of the 
colonizers aimed at dividing communities. The solution to this problem is the complete erasing of 
all reference to ethnicity. “The rationale behind this is that ethnicity in politics inevitably leads to 
group-based antagonism, and is therefore likely to provoke political instability and violence. What 
is needed, therefore, are institutions (…) that ban or strongly reduce the impact of such ethnic or 
other segmentation on politics.” (Vandeginste, 2014: 267).  
In societies marked by a long history of ethnic divisions, this system will however more plausibly 
mask ethnic divisions than make them disappear. Pre-existing incentives and informal institutions 
make a change in the politicization of ethnicity unlikely. Elites have incentives to maintain their 
pre-existing ethnically-exclusive clientelist networks, and citizens will continue to mobilize their 
ethnic identities to access these resources. Moreover, the elimination of reference to ethnicity also 
precludes both the establishment of guarantees for security and the undertaking of transitional 
justice processes or “truth and reconciliation” commissions, which may make inter-group 
reconciliation more difficult (Jarczewska, 2013). In sum, “ethnic amnesia” does nothing to change 
the structure of the society, or regulate the strategic interactions between belligerents. Although 
change in the dominant cleavage may occur on the long-run, it appears unlikely in a neo-
patrimonial system and after ethnic violence. 
In fact, the stability of an “ethnic amnesia” policy is only possible if the state is sufficiently strong 
to maintain stability. State leaders’ goodwill may increase the chances of success of this policy, 
but it is far from guaranteed. Rather, Kagame’s Rwanda or Buyoya’s Burundi show that this 
policy is often used to mask the domination of an ethnic minority. In Rwanda, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) imposed a policy of ethnic amnesia after the 1994 genocide, reference to 
ethnicity was criminalized and ethnic party bans were adopted and recurrently used. However, 
these were mainly used to repress or forbid opposition parties, and mask ethnic domination 
(Lemarchand, 2006b; Niesen, 2013; Buckley-Zistel, 2006). As a result, although not overtly 
politicized since the regime is sufficiently strong to maintain itself in power, ethnic divisions are 
latent and the future is hard to predict. As Vandeginste diplomatically summarizes, “while the jury 
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is still out, most scholars are sceptical about the success of the promotion of Rwandanicity, even 
among urban youth” (Vandeginste, 2014: 274). In any case, this system has proven to be 
difficultly conducive to democracy.  
Informal Intra-elite Power-sharing: the Hegemonic Exchange Model 
A third model of ethnic conflict management, has been identified in the literature, the “hegemonic 
exchange” regimes. This type of system is characterised by informal elite power-sharing in a 
broadly inclusive ruling coalition. The politics of inclusion or cooptation of leaders from all 
segments of society typically lead to dominant or singly-party systems, which base their stability 
on accommodation of ethnic demand and “ethnic arithmetic” (Rothchild & Foley, 1988; Rotchild, 
1997). Although state leaders’ goodwill play a role in the emergence of such systems, they are also 
based on more pragmatic calculations (Rothchild, 1997: 43). Due to the institutional weakness of 
the state, leaders recognise that the inclusion of opposition figures in a grand coalition is the best 
way to consolidate their rule (Rothchild & Foley, 1988: 238). “Unable to control and unwilling to 
accept the limitations of formal consociational model, ruling elites in a hegemonial exchange 
situation are ready to negotiate as necessary with the representatives of various local interests in 
order to accumulate power at the political centre” (1988: 249). In other words, state leaders adopt 
the politics of inclusive coalition as a strategy of survival: their neo-patrimonial imperatives of 
survival are the source of their accommodative behaviour. Communal elites, for their part, take 
advantage of this cooperation since it gives them access to state resources which can be used to 
sustain their clientelist networks (Beck, 2008). The people, finally, have economic incentives to 
adhere to the system since it gives them access to clientelist networks of redistribution. At the 
three levels, neo-patrimonial incentives act in favour of the mobilization of non-ethnic identities 
and the depoliticization of ethnicity.  
In relation to ethnic conflict, this system has arguably positive impacts on the three tips of the 
triangle. The strategy adopted for the interaction between groups is cooperation and negotiation. 
As Rothchild observes, this strategy is likely to have self-reinforcing effects: “elite power sharing 
tends to make conflict more manageable by drawing the representatives of key interest groups into 
the decision-making circle. The effect of this inclusion is to encourage face-to-face encounters, 
thus breaking down the distance and promoting reciprocity among rival group leaders” (1997: 48). 
Regarding the structure of society, “ethnic arithmetic” and elite compromises are likely to lead to 
a fairer share of state resources, and structural grievances may thus decrease. Finally, the salience 
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of the ethnic cleavage may decrease over time. A durable shift in the hierarchy of cleavages is 
however not ensured so long a political liberalization has not occurred. As noted earlier, 
hegemonic exchange systems are typically dominant or single party systems. The transition to 
multi-party politics may well see the re-emergence of ethnic parties. However, if a multi-ethnic 
political opposition appears, the cleavage between this opposition and the ruling party may 
become prevalent and ethnicity might be sustainably depoliticized. Overall, although such an 
evolution is not guaranteed, the nation-building legacy of hegemonic exchange systems has the 
potential to be positive on the long run: “to the extent that cooperative behaviour is rewarded, such 
a structure of incentives can lead to the development of linkages and negotiation practices that will 
carry over into the phase of full political liberalization” (Rothchild, 1997: 48).  
Examples of this type of informal power-sharing are numerous, but a particularly eloquent one is 
Senegal. Although Senegal counts a variety of ethnic groups, ethnicity is not polarized and ethnic 
groups do in general cooperate peacefully48 (Beck, 2008: 50). This can be explained by the politics 
of inclusion led by Senghor’s party after independence. 
Léopold Senghor developed his party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), which then 
became the Socialist Party (PS), by building nation-wide clientelist networks, reaching all regions 
and sections of society in Senegal. To do so, Senghor developed close ties with the powerful 
marabouts, heads of Islamic brotherhoods49 as well as with civil society organizations. He also 
conducted series of mergers with other important political parties (Beck, 2008: 53). This strategy 
of inclusion led to a party system that was heavily dominated by Senghor’s party, and finally 
became a de facto single party system. The single party, however, permitted the integration of all 
major segments of the population at two levels. At the elite level, it formed a “grand coalition” 
with leaders of the different groups. In the PS, the accommodation between divergent interest 
happened internally, although it sometimes led to important internal factional rivalries (Dahou & 
Foucher, 2004: 16). At the citizen level, this system permitted the integration of rural citizens to 
the central state, through their leaders, but also through Sufi symbolism, which was used as a 
“language” for integration (O’Brien, 1975; Villalon, 1995). Clientelist networks also created a 
																																																								
48 Except for the Casamance region, which needs not be developed here 
49 Senegalese Islam is organized around Sufi brotherhoods, and most Senegalese belong to one of these 
brotherhoods. The three major ones are the Muridiya, the Tijaniya, the Qadiriya. These brotherhoods are 
organized hierarchically and act as powerful clientelistic networks with close links to the state. They also 
controlled the peanut culture, which was of central importance to the Senegalese economy (Beck, 2008: 50). 
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linkage between citizen demands and the central state. Marabouts’ position, as indispensable 
partners of the state, gave them a certain leverage, which they sometimes used to defend rural 
interests against the state, as during the peanut economy crisis in 1968-69 (O’Brien, 2003: 37). 
Overall, this created a political system where ethnicity is not politicized. The system later 
gradually democratized despite remaining clientelist, to form a “clientelist democracy” where 
political cleavages are not ethnic (Beck, 2008).  
Potential for Conflict Management 
In conclusion, in a post-ethnic war neo-patrimonial context, the prospects for both 
consociationalism and ethnic amnesia to succeed in managing ethnic conflicts appear to be limited. 
Consociationalism may create a fairer structure of society and distribution of state resources, and 
allow for a stable political system, which were the objectives of Lijphart (1977). This system, 
however, has the disadvantage of maintaining the politicization of ethnicity and fostering 
clientelism, which carry bad prospects for long term stability, democratisation and economic 
development. “Ethnic amnesia” has limited chances of building a feeling of national belonging in 
the long-term as it hinders the reconciliation process and can be used to mask structural 
domination of an ethnic group. Long term depoliticization of ethnicity is thus not guaranteed by 
this system either.  
Hegemonic exchange regimes, on the other hand, emerge from the joint neo-patrimonial 
imperatives of survival of state leaders, elites and citizens. They hold the potential of creating a 
favourable environment for further democratization by creating habits of inter-ethnic cooperation 
and depoliticization of ethnicity. It should be underlined, however, that the dominant party system 
is problematic from the point of view of democracy, and may also degenerate into autocratic rule. 
Spears (2013) has argued that these instances of “African informal power-sharing” may have the 
best chances to succeed in establishing peace in divided societies because they emerge from 
African leaders themselves. He argues against the third-party interventions: 
The objective in this article, then, is not to explain how the international community can or 
should be more proactive in the mediation of African conflict. Rather it is the opposite: to 
allow inclusion to happen on its own. African leaders know that in order to secure and 
sustain power, they will need to build genuine authority. Insofar as it is necessary, they will 
also, necessarily, engage in political bargaining with both allies and adversaries to enhance 
their political base (Spears, 2013: 50). 
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The example of Senegal illustrates the appropriateness of Spears’ observation of the potential of 
success held by informal power-sharing. However, Spears’ conclusion is not completely 
convincing for post-conflict peace and democracy building in divided societies. Indeed, his 
assumption that “the kind of power-sharing in evidence in Africa is more likely to emerge through 
incremental and indigenously inspired bargaining than to be planned by outsiders” (Spears 2013: 
43) can be questioned.  
In post-conflict settings, there are many reasons to believe that, in most cases, informal power-
sharing will not be established without external intervention. A first reason is that, when they hold 
sufficient resources to ensure the party domination, state leaders have no incentive to share power. 
Second, as observed by Horowitz (1985), even in cases where power-sharing would be beneficial 
to the society, post-conflict emotions might hinder the pragmatism necessary for ethnic 
accommodation. As Chabal and Daloz (1999) note, elites might also have interests in the 
perpetuation of instability and benefits in the “instrumentalization of disorder”. This is even more 
true in protracted conflicts where some actors take advantage of the continuation of war and 
sustain violence for greedy reasons (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). As advocated by the promoters of 
centripetalism, careful institutional engineering might instead be necessary to shape the incentive 
structure in a way that encourages leaders to adopt a conciliatory attitude. While intra-party 
power-sharing might have the best chances for changing the cleavage hierarchy after an ethnic 
war, its emergence might need a little help from the outside.  
Centripetalism in Neo-patrimonial Societies 
The power-sharing model for the depoliticization of ethnic identities presented in this chapter 
might provide this external input. If successfully implemented, it appears to have the most chances 
to succeed in neo-patrimonial societies. Indeed, multi-ethnic parties provide incentives at all level 
for the depoliticization of ethnic identities. State leaders and the elite must campaign for a multi-
ethnic electorate, since their parties are multi-ethnic. And citizens have incentives to mobilize non-
ethnic identities to gain access to parties’ clientelist networks. As the next chapter will illustrate, 
the successful adoption and implementation of this model also appears to be dependent upon the 
compatibility of incentives provided by the electoral system and neo-patrimonial imperatives. In 
Burundi, the ethnic quotas, the ethnic party bans and the neo-patrimonial imperatives have 
provided mutually reinforcing incentives for party leaders to de-ethnicize their parties. This 
suggests that neo-patrimonial imperatives should be taken into consideration while designing 
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power-sharing systems in neo-patrimonial contexts. These same imperatives of survival however, 
might also be the source of some risks for the system.  
Risks and Weaknesses 
This framework does not offer a panacea to ethnic conflict. It only aims at establishing an 
institutional framework which allows for and fosters the depoliticization of ethnicity. This section 
highlights two risks associated with the implementation of this framework. First, given that 
politicization can come from non-institutional factors such as violence, this framework cannot 
guarantee that ethnic politics will not re-emerge. A second risk is that this framework, in neo-
patrimonial systems, may lead to the emergence of dominant parties, which may threaten 
democracy. A close examination of these two problems allows me to argue that they depend on 
factors which are not related to the institutions and that close monitoring of power-sharing 
agreements and long-term engagement in the peacebuilding process is needed to address them.  
Power-sharing and Democracy 
The question of the compatibility of power-sharing with democracy has been controversial in the 
literature on consociationalism from its beginning (Lijphart, 1999). The framework developed 
above introduces a new risk: it may provide incentives for the formation of dominant parties which 
may become authoritarian. This is because incentives are oriented toward centralization of votes in 
one party. State leaders are presented with incentives for the integration of candidates with various 
ethnic backgrounds. In a system where parties do not present strong ideological programs and 
where parties are multi-ethnic, elites are not tied very strongly to a party and may tend to change 
their allegiance toward the party which is the most likely to win in order to access state resources. 
Citizens, for their part, also tend to vote for the party which they expect will win in order to access 
clientelist networks.  
In other words, once a party takes ascendance, it tends to centralize votes and become dominant. 
This suggests a causal mechanism for Horowitz’s empirical observation that “systems involving 
multiethnic parties are generally of two types. The multiethnic party either competes with ethnic 
parties on one or more flanks, as in the case of the Congress Party in the Punjab (…); or else the 
multiethnic party moves to a single-party position, as the PDCI and a number of other multiethnic 
parties in Africa have” (Horowitz, 1985: 304). Kadima (2008) confirms this problem in his study 
of ethnic party bans in Africa. 
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Although cooperation between different political parties has contributed tremendously to 
nation-building50 in African plural societies, it has, at the same time, affected party systems 
by contributing to the emergence of entrenchment of dominant party systems and weakening 
the junior partners in alliances and coalitions, often in favour of ruling parties (2008: 214).  
There is no easy solution to this problem but three comments are needed. First, as Arian and 
Barnes remind us, a dominant party system is not in essence non-democratic: “in a sense, it is a 
competitive system in which electoral results are held constant” (1974: 613). That the dominant 
party later takes an autocratic turn is possible but so is a return to more electoral competition. In 
fact, the dominant party system is at a crossroad and its evolution toward democracy or 
authoritarianism depends on external factors. As Rothchild writes, “gradual movement from 
partial hegemonic regime to greater political liberalization, even full democracy, can take place–
but it is certainly not a given” (1997: 47).  
Second, a phase of domination of the political system by a multi-ethnic party may have a positive 
legacy in terms of nation-building and democratization. Dominant party have the advantage of 
being extremely stable; they allow for the reinforcement of institutions (which is central to a 
successful peacebuilding process according to Paris, 2004) and may contribute to the 
depoliticization of ethnicity. “The dominant party is a microcosm of a partially plural society. Its 
factions reflect the divisions of the society; its internal decision-making processes are, in effect, 
identical with those of the polity, and since they are, the close identification between party and 
polity is reinforced in the public mind” (1974: 602). As we have seen in the last subsection, such 
types of “hegemonic exchange” systems, with elite power-sharing can lay the basis for – but not 
ensure – democratization by reducing the divisions of the society. But, as Rothchild notes, 
“clearly, in the absence of an overriding agreement regarding norms and values, democratic 
regimes have been difficult to create and, once launched, have inevitably involved risks” 
(Rothchild, 1997: 48). Jarstad also acknowledges this reality: “successful democratization requires 
a minimum level of security and consensus on which territory and people constitute the state: 
without a defined demos, how can you have a democracy?” (Jarstad, 2008a: 28). The dominant 
party can create the unity that is necessary for a successful functioning of multi-party democracy.51  
																																																								
50 “Nation building can be defined as the process of constructing a nation by using state power with the aim of 
unifying the various communal groups within a state and ensuring political cohesion and stability, social harmony 
and a sense of common (desired) destiny” (Kadima, 2008: 202). 
51 The case of Senegal described in the last subsection illustrates this process. Another example is the formation 
of the state in Israel. Migdal (1988: chapter 4) notes that despite a great heterogeneity among the Jews in Israel, 
these ethnic difference “did not become highly politicized” (1988: 167). He explains this by aggregative effects 
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The question is thus: what are the factors that allow for a return to a more competitive democratic 
system and prevent an authoritarian turn of the dominant party? In neo-patrimonial societies, Beck 
(2008) and Radnitz (2010) suggest that the emergence of an independent elite, sufficiently 
autonomous from the state leaders might be the key. Beck (2008) studies the role of the marabouts 
in Senegalese democracy. Paying attention to the variations in types of clientelism, she notes that 
the power of the elites depends on the social authority they have on their followers, and the 
political autonomy they have toward state leaders. Depending on these two variables Beck 
differentiates between “limited”, “autonomous”, “dependant”, and “influential” brokers (Beck, 
2008: 17). In brief, her argument is that the more independent a broker, the more influential. 
Democratic alternation in Senegal, can indeed be explained by the pressures and shifts in loyalties 
of influential mourid marabouts (Galvan, 2001a, 2001b; Fatton, 1987; Beck, 2008).  
Because state leaders in hegemonic exchange regimes are dependent on the clientelist networks of 
the elite, the elite which is not very dependeant on state leaders’ resources can act as a challenger. 
Radnitz (2010) also focuses on the emergence and strategies of this type of “independent elite”, 
although he tries to explain mass mobilization and revolutions in central Asia. He shows that the 
political autonomy of the brokers depends in great part on their ability to mobilize resources from 
other sources than the state. When an elite is sufficiently independent and has resources at its 
disposition, it can develop autonomous clientelist networks. “By maintaining a revenue base apart 
from the state, autonomous elites are able to disburse some of their personal fortunes as charity, 
performing a vital function–provision of welfare–that the state is unable or unwilling to perform” 
(Radnitz, 2010: 28). These networks can be utilized in a strategy of “subversive clientelism”: 
mobilizing these networks against state leaders either while voting or in mass protests. “If an elite 
has made sufficient investments–symbolic and material–in cultivating a base, he can count on a 
local network of activists and a reliable voting block if running for office or, if necessary, as a 
resource to be mobilized as a last line of defense against a predatory state” (Radnitz, 2010: 29). 
The theories of Beck (2008) and Radnitz (2010) suggest that the emergence of a strong 
independent elite may allow for democratic alternation and prevent an authoritarian turn of multi-
ethnic dominant parties. The dominant party system is at a crossroad and can become either 
																																																																																																																																																																														
of the period of dominance of the labour party in the country. (It should of course be noted that other factors such 
as continuous confrontation with Palestinians must also be taken into consideration to explain the low salience of 
ethnic identities amongst Jews).  
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democratic or authoritarian. From the point of view of the international community, close 
monitoring, and possible pressures or sanctions (Rothchild, 1997) can help accompanying the 
process of democratic consolidation. A subsequent issue of importance is the form of the 
opposition parties that may emerge at the flanks. As underlined by Arian and Barnes, “the 
[dominant] party tends to take on some characteristics of a catchall party in a two-party system. Its 
competitors, however, are more likely to behave like the sectarian, group-specific parties often 
associated with a multiparty electoral system” (1974: 610). Ethnic parties bans and other 
regulations may provide institutional defense against the emergence of ethnic opposition. Here 
again, the international community can provide assistance for the effective enforcement of these 
institutional dispositions. In any case, the emergence a strong, independent, and multi-ethnic 
opposition is important for the consolidation of democracy in post-war settings. The development 
of such an opposition could be the object of fruitful future research in the field of ethnic conflict 
management (Olukoshi, 1998). 
Risks of Re-emergence of the Ethnic Cleavage 
While the institutional framework presented in this thesis leaves room for and fosters the 
depoliticization of ethnicity, it does not pretend to make ethnic identities disappear. Although 
ethnic party prohibition might be an important safeguard against the re-politicization of ethnicity, 
this process cannot be fully prevented. This is for two reasons. On the one hand, the memory of 
conflict and the traumas associated with violence are deep and lasting in post-conflict settings. 
Even if the institutions foster depoliticization of ethnicity and inter-ethnic cooperation, the 
reconciliation process is likely to be difficult and to take decades (Sluzki, 2003; Chayes & Minow, 
2003; Charbonneau and Parent, 2012). On the other hand, politicizing ethnicity may still be an 
attractive strategy of mobilization for opportunistic leaders (Wilkinson, 2006). When the system is 
subject to a stress, which can, for example, be an election, mass mobilizations, the departure of a 
peacekeeping mission, or a conflict in a neighbouring country, politicians might try to use the 
remaining ethnic resentment and fears to mobilize supporters. Groups of ethnic hardliners may 
also try to create ethnic violence and spoil the peace for ideological reasons.  
Although institutional guarantees for security and the regulation of political parties might help 
reduce the probability of return to ethnic politics, they may not always be sufficient. This 
underscores the importance of the effective implementation of the peace accord (Horowitz, 2014). 
It can also be noted that, in this regard, psychological approaches to reconciliation, transitional 
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justice and “bottom-up” peacebuilding might usefully complement institutions and allow their 
optimal functioning and survival (Chayes & Minow, 2003; Charbonneau and Parent, 2012). 
Finally, a hypothesis which will be further discussed in the next chapter is that the development of 
a multi-ethnic associational network may decrease extremism amongst the population and hinder 
the re-emergence of ethnic conflict.  
The Necessity of Long-term Monitoring 
In summary, this chapter proposed a theoretical framework for understanding the depoliticization 
of ethnicity in neo-patrimonial post-conflict hybrid systems. After modeling the behaviour of 
actors at state leaders, elite and citizen’s levels, I demonstrated that neither consociationalism nor 
the “ethnic amnesia” policy held great prospects for the depoliticization of ethnicity over time. 
Hegemonic exchange regimes have a higher nation-building potential but are unlikely to emerge in 
post-ethnic war settings. The theoretical framework I propose is based on the assumptions that, in 
post-war settings, individuals will need strong guarantees for their security and their political 
representation, but that they may accept to be represented by multi-ethnic parties, if they derive 
benefits from so doing. The framework I propose thus includes security guarantees, guarantees for 
political representation and institutional provisions fostering the emergence of multi-ethnic parties. 
This model can be institutionalized in various ways and is bound to allow for a depoliticization of 
ethnicity. It however does not provide a complete guarantee against the re-emergence of 
politicized ethnic identities and may lead to the establishment of dominant party systems. 
However, efficient implementation of the model as well as international monitoring might help 
overcome these weaknesses. Both of these risks depend on non-institutional factors and call for a 
long-term engagement by third parties – state or NGOs. These risks also show that other processes 
such as economic development are important factors influencing the success of power-sharing 
agreements. In any case, this discussion shows that peacebuilding and democratic consolidation 
processes that follow the adoption of power-sharing accords must be understood as a long-term 
process which necessitates support and monitoring from the international community.  
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Chapter 6: Politicization and Depoliticization of Ethnicity in 
Burundi 
 
“We are all Barundi”. 
President Pierre Buyoya, 198852.  
 
However unpredictable the future might be, the fundamental change that has been witnessed in the 
Burundian political dynamic since the end of the war is striking. While Burundi’s post-
independence history has been marked by ethnic domination and exclusion as well as high-
intensity ethnic violence, the salience of the ethnic cleavage has decreased in a “remarkably rapid 
fashion” (Reyntjens, 2005: 132) after the Arusha Peace Agreement established a power-sharing 
political system in 2000. Today, the political game takes place between multi-ethnic political 
parties (Lemarchand, 2006a, Tobolka, 2014, Alfieri, 2016a), and the social salience of ethnicity 
has diminished (Berckmoes, 2014; Alfieri, 2016b; Schraml, 2011). As an observer has recently 
reported, in today’s Burundi, people consider that ethnicity “distinguishes, but does not divide”53 
(Lema Landu, 2015).  
The depoliticization of ethnicity in Burundi and its fast pace constitute a particularly puzzling 
enigma (Lemieux, 2011). Indeed, this rapid shift is surprising with respect to the expectations of 
the literatures on consociationalism,  on post-war reconciliation and on emotions in ethnic conflict, 
all of which would suggest that ethnic divisions are likely to remain politically and socially salient 
in the long term, especially after high levels of violence. From its first formulation, consociational 
theory predicted that power-sharing should increase the political salience of ethnic identities 
(Lijphart, 1977: 42).  This point has later been underlined by both proponents as well as critics of 
the approach (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006a, 2006b; Rothchild and Roeder, 2005; Jarstad, 2008). 
For its part, the literature on reconciliation suggests that deep psychological traumas render 
reconciliation between former adversaries a long and difficult process (Charbonneau & Parent, 
2012; Chayes & Minow, 2003; Sluzki, 2003). This is even more true for ethnic conflict, since 
																																																								
52 (Quoted by Lemarchand, 1994: 132) 
53 Translated by the author  
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violence fosters ethnic identity formation (Fearon and Laitin, 2000a; Appadurai, 1998), group 
separation, the development of extremist discourses (Kaufmann, 1996; Horowitz, 2001) as well as 
the emergence of “mythico-histories” (Malkki, 1995) and deeply rooted emotions (Petersen, 2002; 
Schlee, 2002) which might strain inter-group relations even after peace agreements are signed. In 
brief, “the high level of violence during the war coming after decades of accumulated exclusion, 
mistrust, and resentments would seem to make [Burundi] a hard setting for quota-based integration 
policies to succeed” (Samii, 2013: 560). Yet, it did.54  
This chapter investigates this enigma. By doing so, it conducts a plausibility probe of the theory 
developed in the preceding chapters. As explained in the introduction to the thesis, this plausibility 
test is reinforced by the fact that Burundi can be considered a “crucial case” for this theory. It is 
indeed a “least-likely” case for the depoliticization of ethnicity and the success of power-sharing 
(Eckstein, 2000).  
I argue that the power-sharing agreement adopted in Burundi corresponds more closely to the 
institutional framework for the depoliticization of ethnicity presented in chapter 5, than to the 
classic consociational model. Indeed, the power-sharing dispositions of the 2005 constitution 
introduce strong guarantees for the political and military representation, and for the security of 
ethnic categories, as well as dispositions which ban ethnic parties and provide incentives for multi-
ethnic parties to emerge (Vandeginste, 2015; Lothe, 2007). I explain both the survival of this 
power-sharing system and its success in depoliticizing ethnicity by the incentives it provided to 
citizens, elites and state incumbents alike.  
I proceed as follows. The first part of the chapter retraces the history of politicization of ethnic 
identities in Burundi from the pre-colonial period to the civil war. In this process, I argue that 
formal and informal institutions as well as violence played a major role. This allows me to place 
the current period in historical context, and to provide a plausibility probe for the theory of the 
politicization of ethnicity proposed in chapter 2, 3 and 4. The second part focuses on 
consociational explanations for the relative success of power-sharing in the post-war period in 
Burundi. After describing the power-sharing institutions and their effects, I argue that the 
consociational approach experiences much difficulty in explaining these developments because the 
dynamics at play are in fact not the ones expected by Lijphart. In the third part, I argue that the 
																																																								
54 At least between 2005 and 2015, and if we define success as the depoliticizaiton of the ethnic cleavage. 
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model follows instead the centripetal logic of integration described in chapter 5. I use the theory of 
incentives to explain the survival of the power-sharing system and the depoliticization of ethnicity 
in Burundi. In conclusion, I evaluate the plausibility of my theory with respect to the Burundian 
case and comment on recent developments in the country. Amongst these I note that the dynamics 
of system had the negative effect of fostering the emergence of a dominant party system, which 
clouds the prospects for democratic consolidation in Burundi. 
The Politicization of Ethnicity in Burundi 
The Precolonial Period: the Multiplicity of Identities 
Burundi is often presented as a small and poor country of the Great Lakes Region, with a 
population of 11 million people reportedly composed of 85% of Hutus, 14% of Tutsis and 1% of 
Twas (CIA World Factbook, 2016; Lothe, 2007: 14). The origin of these categories, however, is a 
matter of historical controversy (Lemarchand, 1970; Lemarchand & Martin, 1974; Vansina, 1972; 
Weinstein, 1976; Malkki, 1995: chapter 1; Chrétien, 1993). Briefly summarized, the debate 
opposes a Franco Burundian school, led by Jean-Pierre Chrétien (1993) to a Belgian Burundian 
School, led by René Lemarchand (1970) and Philip Reyntjens (1994). Noting the absence of 
cultural, language or physical differentiation between Hutu and Tutsis, the French School argued 
that ethnic differences were not real but that they were invented during the colonial period. For its 
part, the Belgian school acknowledges the existence of these categories and traces them back in all 
likelihood to different migration waves (Lothe, 2007: 47). The debate was not purely academic; 
the two theoretical positions were instrumentalized by ethnic leaders: the first by Tutsis and the 
second by Hutus. Both positions are described by Reyntjens as “vues de l’esprit” “which translate 
a justification, a defense reflex, a well as hope55” from these groups (Reyntjens, 1994: 10). 
Historical data does not help in solving the debate since “oral traditions are silent” on these 
questions (Chrétien, 1993: 316).  
Most observers, however, acknowledge that these categories existed before colonization. When 
German, and then Belgian colonizers arrived in Burundi,56 they found a kingdom, which already 
existed as an independent political unit, and is often referred to as a “nation-state” (Reyntjens, 
																																																								
55 « Ces deux versions sont des vues de l’esprit, traduisant une justification, un réflexe de défense et un espoir » 
(Reyntjens, 1994: 10). 
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1994: 17). The population was however, “classified” in four pre-existing amooko: ganwa 
(baganwa), tutsi (batutsi), hutu (bahutu), and twa (batwa). Interestingly, the Kirundi word amooko 
does not mean “group”, but rather “category, kind, specie”, “a unit in a system of classification” 
(Chrétien, 1993: 316). The Ganwa were members of the royal family, the Hutu and Tutsi formed 
the majority of the population, and the Twa, a small minority, were regarded as inferior by the 
others (Malkii, 1995: 21-22).  
These categories can be considered ethnic since their membership is transmitted by descent 
(Trouwborst, 1961). However, it is necessary to mention that they contained a degree of fluidity. 
The difference between Hutus and Tutsis is often considered a professional specialization, Tutsis 
being pastoralists and Hutus agriculturalists (Daley, 2006: 664). These occupational statuseswere 
far from rigid. Tutsis also had cultivations, and Hutus had cows (Chrétien, 1993: 317; Malkki, 
1995: 20-21). More importantly, it was possible to change ethnicity: “passages from one group to 
another (that is, from the status of Hutu to that of Tutsi, the opposite being virtually unheard of) 
was not uncommon”, Lemarchand notes (1994: 8). The Ganwa category also shows the relative 
fluidity of identities; princes “lost their princely status and became Tutsis whenever a king bearing 
their dynastic name ascended to the throne–a phenomenon know as gutahira, loosely translated as 
‘social demotion’” (Lemarchand, 1994: 8).  
Arguably more important than this limited fluidity of ethnic identities is the fact that ethnicity was 
neither the only nor the principal political and social cleavage in pre-colonial Burundi. Trouwborst 
notes that “the relations between superiors and inferiors in Burundi were determined by at least 
three structures, a political structure, a clientship structure and a caste structure” (1962: 9). A same 
individual, Trouwborst explains, could have different roles in each of these structures and be 
considered superior, inferior or equal to the same other individual depending on the structure 
activated in specific situations (1962: 10-11). Lemarchand underlines the necessity to distinguish, 
in pre-colonial Burundi, between social status and ethnicity. Complicating the matter, however, is 
the fact that the same terms (Hutu and Tutsi) are utilized to designate both phenomena:  
In Kirundi, the term has two separate meanings: one refers to its cultural or ethnic 
underpinnings, the other to its social connotations. In the latter sense, Hutu refers to a 
“social subordinate” in relation to somebody higher up in a pecking order. (…) Thus a Tutsi 
cast in the role of client vis-à-vis a wealthier patron would be referred to as “Hutu,” even 
though his cultural identity remained Tutsi. Similarly, a prince was a Hutu in relation to the 
king, and a high ranking Tutsi was a Hutu in relation to a prince (1994: 10). 
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In addition to clientelist and political roles, other identities such as clans, kinship affiliations, 
regional affiliations or intra-ethnic categories (the Tutsis were divided between Tutsi-Hima and 
Tutsi-Banyaruguru) played important roles in defining social hierarchies. By no mean was 
ethnicity the only determinant of social status (Lemarchand, 1994: 11-13; Berckmoes, 2014: 59-
62; Kadende-Kaiser & Kaiser, 1997: 31). 
Prior to colonization, political conflict in Burundi was therefore not ethnic. Although “pre-colonial 
Burundi had a long tradition of war”, these wars were motivated by either territorial conquest or 
defense (Alfieri, 2016b: 237); they could also be were wars of succession (Trouborst, 1961) which 
resulted from competition for power between Ganwa clans (the principal clans being the Batare 
and the Bezi) (Berckmoes, 2014: 60). “However, everyday political life was not marked by 
physical violence, and violence was not an ordinary way to rule” (Alfieri, 2016b: 237). This 
absence of ethnic conflict can be explained by the multiplicity of politically and socially relevant 
identities.  
The multiplicity of cleavages was expressed in political institutions, but also in informal 
institutions, which are identified in the literature as a major source of stability and unity beside 
royalty. Clientelist relationships were widespread in pre-colonial Burundi. Known as ubugabire or 
bugabire, dyadic clientelist relationships were based on asymmetry, but also on reciprocity and 
mutual benefits. The patron would most often give his client a cow (sometimes land or other 
goods), in exchange for loyalty and various services (Trouwborst, 1961; Chrétien, 1993: 318; 
Maquet, 1961). Although hierarchical, these contracts created links of solidarity, loyalty, 
interdependence and even strong friendship between patrons and clients (Trouwborst, 1961: 68). 
These networks were typically multi-ethnic. They “functioned at all levels of society and 
associated Bahutu and Batutsis” (Gahama & Mvuyekure, 2003: 309). As such, these informal 
institutions were central in maintaining social cohesion and stability in Burundian society 
(Lemarchand, 1994: 12-13). In fact, “through the institution of clientship (bugabire) Hutu and 
Tutsi were caught in a web of interlocking relationships extending from the very top of the social 
pyramid to its lower echelons, with the Mwami [the king] acting as the supreme Patron–which in 
turn underscores the unifying aspects of the monarchy as a symbol and an institution” 
(Lemarchand & Martin, 1974: 7).  
In brief, multiple cleavages existed in pre-colonial Burundi and were expressed in formal and 
informal institutions, which contributed to social cohesion in the country (Daley, 2006: 666). To 
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use the vocabulary developed in this research, the repertoire of identities that could be activated 
was far from being restricted to ethnicity. This contrasts with the situation 60 years later when 
ethnicity became the dominant identity that could be activated politically. The process is 
summarized by Lemarchand: “from a society characterized by complex socio-political hierarchies, 
Burundi has now [1994] become greatly simplified, consisting of separate and mutually 
antagonistic ethnic aggregates” (1994: 14).  
The rest of this section traces the process by which individual identities that can be politically 
activated were narrowed down, in other words, the politicization of ethnic identities. For clarity 
purposes, I somewhat artificially discuss institutional factors and the role of violence separately. 
The discussion also allows for a brief overview of the history of Burundi.  
Institutional Factors of Politicization 
The arrival of Europeans in the Great Lakes region dates back to the end of the 19th century. After 
a bloody conquest, Germany established a colony in the Kingdom of Burundi in 1903. After 
World War I, Belgium occupied these territories and was attributed the mandate over the ‘Ruanda-
Urundi’ area in 1924 (Berckmoes, 2014: 56-7). Given the strength of pre-existing political 
structures and the lack of resources, Germans decided to apply indirect rule (see Mamdani, 1996; 
Young, 1994) in Burundi. Belgium continued with this policy (Reyntjens, 1994: 17).  
The sources of politicization of ethnicity can be traced back to this period as Europeans applied 
their racialist preconceptions to determine political hierarchies in their colony. According to the 
“Hamitic myth”, which guided European policies in the region, “everything valuable in Africa had 
been brought there by Hamites” (Reyntjens, 1994: 18). The Tutsis were supposedly “hamitic” 
populations, descendants of Cham, and originating from Egypt or Caucasus (Malkki, 1995: 29), 
while the Hutus were “bantous” local populations. The stereotypes attributed physical and moral 
qualities to both groups. The Tutsis were considered “faux nègres”, white people with a dark skin, 
and thus “naturally superior” to Hutus and adapted for ruling (Chrétien, 1993).  
In the 1930s, Belgian colonizers undertook a wide administrative reform. Based on the Hamitic 
myth, they adopted a policy of “tutsification”. As per the data (see table 3) provided by Chrétien 
(1993) , although the Ganwa had historically represented most the chiefs, by 1929, Hutus and 
Tutsis had respectively 20 and 23% of the chiefdoms. Hutu chiefs were however progressively 
replaced until all political power was removed from Hutu hands. In 1945, Tutsis occupied 10 out 
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of 35 chief positions while Hutus occupied none. The monopolization of power is still more 
striking if we consider the fact that, since the end of the monarchy in 1966, Ganwa are generally 
classified as Tutsis (Reyntjens, 1994: 21). There were also important inequalities in education. The 
system was indeed designed to build a Tutsi elite and access was difficult for Hutus. The latter 
were thus less educated and, therefore, less eligible (Daley, 2006: 665).  
The colonial period has undeniably established the basis of a politicization of ethnicity. However, 
while some ethnic tensions apparently already existed (Kadende-Kaiser & Kaiser, 1997: 333), the 
political sphere was not ethicized under colonization and in the first years of independence. When 
the country gained independence on July 1st, 1962, it was still a constitutional monarchy and the 
political game was organized around the two main Ganwa clans, Batare and Bezi. The UPRONA 
(Union pour le Progrès National, pro-Bezi party), led by the charismatic Prince Louis Rawagasore, 
won the first elections in 1961 (Lemarchand, 1994). At the time, it was still a multi-ethnic party. A 
few months later, however, Rawagasore was assassinated and ethnic tensions arose amongst 
UPRONA members. The then recent revolution in Rwanda, where Hutus had become politically 
dominant, created fears amongst Tutsis that the same model would be applied in Burundi. The 
answer of Tutsis to these fears seems to correspond to the “security dilemma” theory: preemptive 
action guaranteed that they would not be dominated (Uvin, 1999). In 1965, a coup led by Tutsi-
Hima officer Michel Micombero, put an end to the monarchy and, by the same token, to the 
political participation of Hutus (see table 4).  
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Table 3: Chiefdom Repartition in Burundi (1929-1945) 
 
Source: Chrétien, 1993; Gahama & Mvuyekure, 2003. 
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Table 4: Ethnic Composition of Governments in Burundi (1961-1993) 
 
Source: Ndikumana: 2005: 416 
Table 5: Classification of Provinces according to their “Privilege Index” 
 
Source: Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 383 
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From then until the end of the 1980s, power was centralized in the single party, UPRONA, which 
has been described as a vehicle for the monopolization of power and resources by a small rent-
seeking clique of Tutsi-Hima from the southern province of Bururi (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 
2000). Bloodless coups succeeded one another but, in terms of ethnic background and regional 
belonging, the identity of leaders57 did not change. In 1979, Micombero was overthrown by 
Bagaza, who would himself be deposed by Pierre Buyoya in 1987. Tutsis progressively 
monopolized power in the army, in political positions, and in the civil service (see Lemarchand, 
1994; Reyntjens, 1994; Kadende-Kaiser & Kaiser, 1997). Under the Bagaza regime (1976-87), the 
reference to ethnic identities was officially forbidden (Berkmoes, 2014: 108; Lemarchand, 1994: 
10) as Tutsis emphasized “national unity” and denied the existence of ethnic divisions  so as to 
legitimate their domination (Lothe, 2007: 47). Despite this policy, the ethnic monopolization of 
resources is attested by data.  
Politically, a vast majority of leadership positions were attributed to Tutsis, although “cosmetic 
cooptation” (Reyntjens, 1994:49) of Hutu politicians happened. Data provided by Reyntjens 
indicate for example that in 1985, Hutus represented “4 out of 20 ministers, 17 out of 65 
representatives in the National Assembly, 2 members of the central committee of the UPRONA, 2 
provincial governors out of 15, 1 ambassador out of 22, 10 teachers out of 90, and about 20% of 
graduate students” (1994: 41). On the military side, the army was progressively purged of all Hutu 
elements, especially amongst the officers (Daley, 2006: 669; Lemarchand, 2006a). Finally, since 
state resources represented most economic opportunities in the country, their distribution was 
ethnically and regionally biased (Ndikumana, 2005). Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000) find 
significant discrepancies in the territorial repartition of public investment. For instance, the 
southern provinces, including Bururi, were favoured in terms of investments in education (2000: 
382-3) (see table 5). The use of public employment as a resource redistributed through clientelist 
networks, as well as the fact that “almost all large private firms belonged to former high-ranking 
civil servants” (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 387-8) allow for a good understanding of the 
limited economic opportunities open to Hutus during this period.  
The instrumentalization of the state by this Tutsi clique led to a reorganization of clientelist 
networks on an ethnic basis (Lothe, 2007: 60; Nimubona, 2010). Indeed, as the data show, state 
resources were distributed through UPRONA’s clientelist networks, which were ethnically 
																																																								
57 Almost all of them were Tutsi, officers at the time of the coup and from the province of Bururi. 
	134	
exclusive. A “segmentarity of political clienteles” progressively developed (Chrétien, 1993: 315) 
and ethnic clientelism soon became the “hegemonic form of solidarity” in Burundi (Chrétien, 
1993: 486; Nimubona, 2010). Beyond clientelist networks, at least an important share of informal 
organizations was under state control: “the state also hijacked civil society organizations to 
consolidate state ideology. Youth and women’s associations and labour unions were branches of 
the single party, and were used as propaganda instruments” (Ndikumana, 2005: 417). This 
provided both formal and informal incentives for the mobilization of ethnic identities on the Tutsi 
side (Nimubona, 2010). Moreover, this contributed to the framing of politics as a zero-sum game 
of resource distribution played by Tutsis against Hutus.  
As Hutus were de facto excluded from state-linked formal and informal networks of redistribution, 
they developed their own networks which became Hutu-exclusive. Daley notices the links between 
ethnic extremism, Belgian clericalism and informal networks: “as social mobility was largely 
dependent on political patronage, young Hutus, without access to state elites, embraced the 
patronage of younger Belgian clerics, fresh from the Walloon/Flemish factionalism in their home 
country. Hutus were schooled and politicized in such a way as to see the Tutsi, and not the colonial 
state, as their oppressors” (2006: 667). But the most important Hutu informal networks were of a 
different nature: politico-military organizations. The principal ones were FRODEBU (Front pour 
la démocratie du Burundi) and Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces 
nationales de libération Palipehutu). FRODEBU was founded in the 1980s in Rwanda by exiled 
Burundians. It defended a pacific struggle for democracy and equality (Alfieri, 2016b: 240-241). 
In 1994, CNDD-FDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la 
démocratie) split from FRODEBU. It would become one of the major actors in the country’s 
wartime and post-accord politics. More radical was Palipehutu, a Hutu political party with a 
military wing, the FNL. They were founded respectively in 1980 and 1983 in the Mishamo Hutu 
refugee camp in Tanzania (Wittig, 2016: 145-146). Palipehutu’s founder, Remy Gahutu, won the 
confidence of the population by teaching them agriculture, quickly transforming the poor refugee 
camp into exporters of crops in the area. Part of the revenues was given to the party at every 
harvest (Alfieri, 2016a: 6-7). Through the infiltration of Palipehutu in Burundi, the movement 
developed Hutu political networks across the country (Alfieri, 2016a: 10-11). These Hutu 
movements built informal networks which provided incentives for mobilizing ethnic identities and 
played an active role in the spread of Hutu extremism in Burundi.  
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Whereas political conflict in pre-colonial Burundi was not ethnic, in the post-colonial period, the 
structure of society was ethnically organized, the strategic interaction between actors was 
understood in ethnic terms, and the dominant cleavage was ethnicity. However, most observers 
note that ethnicity was not the only cleavage in this period. Regional and sub-ethnic divisions 
(between Tutsi-Hima and Tutsi-Banyaruguru) were also politically salient. In fact, Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza note that this “can be represented as concentric circles: the chances of social success 
are higher for Tutsi than for Hutu. However, among the Tutsi ethnic group, those chances are 
higher for those originating from the southern province of Bururi, and are highest for military 
Tutsi originating from this province” (2000: 382). However, ethnicity was clearly the dominant 
cleavage, which was particularly observable during violent episodes. Intra-Tutsi divisions, rather 
than attenuating inter-ethnic tensions, seem to have contributed to their exacerbation, following the 
“ethnic outbidding” logic identified by Horowitz (1985) (Daley, 2006).  
In brief, the transformations that occurred in the colonial and post-colonial periods led to a deep 
reorganization of formal and informal institutions in a way that provided strong incentives for 
Tutsis to mobilize their ethnic identity. From a diverse but cohesive society, Burundi became a 
deeply divided country, and ethnicity became the major fault-line around which politics, 
understood as a zero-sum game, was organized. As Lemarchand summarizes:  
The hardening of Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy presumably rules out alternative forms of social 
identity, including those born of the reciprocities that once formed the core of clientage 
relations and ran through the entire social pyramid holding it together in a seamless web of 
mutual rights and obligations. […] Unlike in the traditional society, where one type of 
identity did not necessarily coincide with the other, in [1994]’s society, the two meanings of 
the term [Hutu] have become almost interchangeable. With few exceptions, in the urban 
sectors most Hutu are in a position of social and economic inferiority vis-à-vis Tutsi 
elements. Furthermore, the Tutsi–more specifically the Hima–are preeminent power-holders. 
And because their privileged access to the social and economic benefits of power, their 
collective self-awareness as Tutsi is inextricably bound up with their politically socially, and 
economically dominant position (1994: 15).  
 
The Polarizing Effects of Violence 
Beside this institutionalization of ethnic violence in the process of state formation, recurring cycles 
of ethnic violence have strained the country’s history. Series of interethnic massacres started in 
1962, continued in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, and 1991 culminating in a decade-long civil war 
which began in 1993. Amongst these massacres, the 1972 episode, known as Ikiza, can be 
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considered a defining moment in Burundi’s history (Uvin, 1999: 258). Following a Hutu coup 
attempt and massacres of Tutsi, the political leadership answered in the form of widespread 
repression by the Tutsi-dominated army, targeting Hutu elements and most particularly the 
educated ones. In a few days, between 150’000 and 300’000 people were killed in the massacres. 
A systematic purge of Hutu elements in the army, in the police, in schools and universities, and 
even in churches followed. This process played a major role in the monopolization of power by 
Tutsi58 (Lemarchand, 2008b; Chrétien & Dupaquier, 2007). 
The 1972 “événements” were followed by recurring violent episodes, the most important of which 
happened in 1988. As Ngaruko and Nkurunziza observe, “from the first violent episode of the 
conflict in 1965, the country has fallen into a ‘conflict trap’, whereby a subsequent episode of 
violence has its roots in the previous” (2000: 379). The episodes indeed followed “the same 
pattern: in response to rumours and fear, Hutu peasants attacked and killed local Tutsi, power-
holders and even ordinary people. The army was then sent in to restore order and indiscriminately 
killed vastly more [Hutu] people in retaliation” (Uvin, 1999: 259). Although it has never been 
officially recognized by the United Nations as such, the genocidal character of these events is 
acknowledged by most observers (Lemarchand, 1974).  
It is interesting to note that the motives of perpetrators were not exclusively ethnic. Chrétien thus 
notes that “lists of suspect were established across the country and many people have been victims 
of personal vengeance. One or another Hutu family (which means thousands of people) were 
executed because their Tutsi neighbour coveted their land, was their debtor, or had lost a trial 
against them” (1993: 424-5). Similarly, Lemarchand notes that “in the countryside, anti-Hutu 
violence stemmed from a variety of motives, some of a personal nature, others rooted in crassly 
material calculations. The anticipation of material gain from seizure of the victim’s property (…) 
appears to have been a major inducement to violence” (1994: 102). Therefore, “to impute 
genocidal intentions to all Tutsi is clearly unwarranted.” However, “whether or not intentions 
made a difference is another matter” (Lemarchand, 1994: 102).  
Violence reflected the three characteristics of ethnic violence identified in chapter 4. It was mostly 
dispossessive, since it aimed not only to coerce victims, but to explicitly eliminate them. It was 
indiscriminate, since membership in an ethnic category replaced any judgment of guilt or 
																																																								
58 It should not be obscured however, that Tutsis, although representing a small fraction of the victims, were also 
targeted (Lemarchand, 2008b; Chrétien & Dupaquier, 2007). 
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innocence. For example, one of Berckmoes’ interviewees reports that some areas of Bujumbura 
(Kamenge and Kinama) were emptied of all Tutsis during the war so that indiscriminate killings 
could be facilitated: “the Burundian army participated in the evacuation and had made available 
trucks to move Tutsis who did not have their own means [of transport]. As such, the army came to 
have free range to systematically kill without having to worry about victimizing even a single 
Tutsi” (Berckmoes, 2014: 85). The “selectivity” described in the last paragraph was indeed only 
applied inside an ethnic category. Guilt did not matter, the first criterion of selection was thus 
category membership; further selection only determined who would be killed first in a given 
category. These vengeances were in fact made socially acceptable by the fact that the ethnic 
cleavage was the dividing line for violence. Thus, mass violence resulted from an alignment of 
politicians and local actors’ aims around the ethnic cleavage, as theorized by Kalyvas (2006: 365). 
Finally, the violence was manifestly atrocious, with the use of multiple techniques of mutilations, 
including impalement on bamboo poles and rape59 (Malkki, 1995: 89-96; HRW, 2003; AI, 2004). 
Violence displayed not only the will to exterminate, but also the will to mark and to kill in highly 
symbolic ways. 
While ethnic self-awareness and interests in preserving or modifying the institutional structure of 
the society were certainly a crucial factor for certain groups of politically active ethnic extremists, 
other mechanisms were also conducive to ethnic violence in the country. Daley notes that “in 
Burundi, ethnic extremists appeal to ethnic sentiments by emphasizing the threat posed by the 
other group” (Daley, 2006: 670). The fear of being the target of ethnic violence (which does not 
necessitate any pre-existing feeling of group belonging) was indeed one of the main triggers of 
preemptive violence, and the source of nearly all violent episodes in the country (Uvin, 1999). In 
Burundi, violence was therefore not only an outcome of ethnic conflict but also fully contributed 
to identity formation and the exacerbation of ethnic tensions, which culminated in civil war.  
The identity formation effects of this ethnic violence were indeed strong, and left traces for the 
long run. In her book Purity and Exile, Malkki brilliantly describes how the recollections of 1972 
violence in Hutu refugee camps in Tanzania created strong feelings of Hutu self-awareness as a 
																																																								
59 Although the evidences of “intra-ethnic” rape are also widespread (Nduna & Goodyear, 1997) a report by 
Amnesty International suggests that rape was also used specifically as a “technique” for marking ethnic 
domination: “while many cases of rape and sexual violence appear to be indiscriminate and due to lack of 
discipline and accountability among troops, in some instances it appears that rape is used more systematically to 
ill-treat, humiliate and degrade the population as well as to promote the dominance of the perpetrating group, be 
it government or opposition” (2004: 11).  
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victimized people. Central in this process was the constitution of a Hutu “mythico-history” which 
“represented not only a description of the past, nor even merely an evaluation of the past, but a 
subversive recasting and reinterpretation of it in fundamentally moral terms” (Malkki, 1995: 54).  
This version of the past was thus at the basis of the Hutu extremism.  
As political institutions contributed to the process of politicization of ethnic identities in Burundi, 
so did violence. As Chrétien emphasizes:  
What is being a Hutu or a Tutsi? Neither is it being Bantu or Hamite, nor serf or lord! It is to 
recall who killed one of your relatives fifteen years ago, or ask yourself who will kill your 
children in ten years, every time with a different answer. Ethnic identification in this 
country, instead of being cultural or marked on [identity] papers are inscribed in the hearts 
in terms of reminded or dreaded violence (Chrétien, 1993: 330).60  
From Hope to Hell 
In sum, the combination of two processes, the alignment of formal and informal institutions with 
ethnic divisions and ethnic violence, resulted in a high politicization of ethnicity. In the early 
1990s, all elements were in place for the outbreak of an ethnic confrontation. The times, however, 
were a period of political opening and democratization, which allowed certain authors to formulate 
a cautious optimism for the future (Lemarchand, 1994; Chrétien, 1993; Reyntjens, 1993). After 
three decades of ethnic exclusions, the dilemma of democratization was well present, and Chrétien 
formulated the problem in terms very similar to the concerns expressed earlier in this thesis:  
The weight of the historical legacy of the last thirty years put the civil societies in Rwanda 
and Burundi in a sort of dilemma that needs to be weight carefully: the necessity to take into 
account the belonging to the Hutu, Tutsis or Twa components in order to ensure the absence 
of professional discrimination and the effective ethnic pluralism of political parties, without, 
on the other hand, having recourse to systematic ethnic affiliation which could fix and 
exacerbate the cleavages61 (Chrétien, 1993: 492).  
																																																								
60 Translated by the author from French: “Qu’est-ce qu’être hutu ou tutsi ? Ce n’est ni être bantou ou hamite, ni 
être serf ou seigneur ! C’est se rappeler qui a tué un de vos proches il y a quinze ans ou se demander qui va tuer 
votre enfant dans dix ans, chaque fois avec une réponse différente. L’identification ethnique dans ce pays, à 
défaut d’être culturelle ou marquée sur les papiers se fait dans les cœurs en termes de violences remémorées ou 
redoutées” (Chrétien, 1993: 330). 
61 Translated from French by the author. “La pesanteur de l’héritage historique des trente dernières années met 
donc les sociétés civiles au Rwanda et au Burundi dans une sorte de dilemme qu’il faut bien peser : la nécessité 
de tenir compte (…) de l’appartenance aux composantes hutu, tutsi ou twa afin de veiller à l’absence de 
discrimination dans la vie professionnelle et au pluralisme ethnique effectif des partis politiques, sans pour autant 
recourir à des fichages systémiques, qui figent les clivages et les envenimement” (Chrétien, 1993: 492). 
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The 1990’s attempts to solve this dilemma, however, were not successful (Sullivan, 2005; 
Vandeginste, 2009; Lothe, 2007).  
After the violent events of 1988, the Buyoya government, which was subjected to considerable 
international pressure, started a process of democratization and transition to multipartism. In 1992, 
a new constitution was adopted (Reyntjens, 1996; Vandeginste, 2009). Emphasis was put on 
“national unity” in the constitution and a “Charter of National Unity” was adopted. Ethnic parties 
were also banned (Reyntjens, 1994: 78-84). But democratization represented a risk for Tutsis since 
they were a small demographic minority. During the campaign for the 1993 elections, UPRONA 
contributed to the politicization of ethnicity by accusing its rival, FRODEBU of ethnic 
favouritism, and by putting pressure on Tutsis to vote for UPRONA (Travanglianti, 2014: 18). 
Apart from that, the campaign was not held in ethnic terms.  
FRODEBU won the 1993 elections and Melchior Ndadaye was democratically elected president. 
The results indicate that the vote did not follow a purely ethnic logic: “in ethnic terms, the 
breakdown in the membership of the new assemblée nationale […] is as follows: 69 (about 85 per 
cent) are Hutu, and 12 (about 15 per cent) are Tutsi. Of the latter, eight are FRODEBU and four 
are UPRONA, which means that about 12 per cent of FRODEBU's members are Tutsi, compared 
to 25 per cent of UPRONA's” (Reyntjens, 1993: 572). However, the election resulted in the 
reversal of Tutsi domination of the political system. Most importantly, “even across party lines the 
Tutsi do not have a blocking minority of 20 per cent, should they feel that a proposed 
constitutional amendment were to threaten their vital interests” (Reyntjens, 1993: 572). Tutsis 
quickly expressed feelings of fear (Sullivan, 2005: 87-89, Vandeginste, 2009: 68). The vote, if not 
completely an ethnic census, has been interpreted as such (Reyntjens, 1993: 577). Although 
FRODEBU’s program was not ethnically biased, and Ndadaye treaded carefully, trying to appease 
Tutsi fears, ethnic appeals from extremists on both sides ruined his attempts to stabilize the 
country. On October 21st, 1993, a Tutsi-led coup attempt resulted in the assassination of the 
President. Moreover, for the first time, Hutus were organized and ready to retaliate (Berckmoes, 
2014: 89). Quickly, massive inter-ethnic violence erupted in all parts of the country. This was the 
beginning of a decade long civil war (Reyntjens, 1993).  
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Burundi in the Light of Consociationalism 
Following several failed negotiation attempts, peace negotiations started in earnest in June 1998 in 
Arusha, with Julius Nyerere, and Nelson Mandela (as of 1999) as mediators. After a difficult 
process, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed on August 28th, 
2000 (Wolpe, 2011; Weissman, 1998; Lemarchand 2009: chapter 10). The success of this accord 
has surprised many. Indeed, at the time of its adoption, observers were deeply sceptical about its 
success for at least three reasons: “(i) the important reservations expressed by several signatories, 
(ii) the important matters that were left unresolved, and (iii) the absence of the (predominantly 
Hutu) rebel groups CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL among the signatories” (Vandeginste, 
2009: 72). What Reyntjens has called a “non-accord” (2005: 118) moreover had almost no effect 
at the time of its signature, since fighting with the Hutu rebel movements continued across the 
country (Vandeginste, 2015: 6).  
Despite this early scepticism, ceasefire agreements were later signed with CNDD-FDD (November 
16th, 2003) and Palipehutu-FNL (September 7th, 2006) (Vandeginste, 2009: 73) and power-sharing 
is today widely acknowledged as the main explanatory factor for the relative success of the peace 
transition in Burundi. Most of the observers would agree with Vandeginste that “more than 
anywhere else on the African continent, power-sharing played a central role in Burundi’s political 
transition serving the dual purpose of war termination and of more inclusive political governance” 
(2015: 6). The successes brought about by this agreement are twofold. First, it established a 15-
year period of stability in the country, which, despite being threatened today, remains an exception 
in Burundi’s post-independence history. Second, and probably more importantly, it has led to an 
“unprecedented [ethnic] de-polarization of the political arena” (Lemarchand, 2006b: 11). 
Vandeginste called the longevity and the relative success of power-sharing in Burundi a “miracle – 
an event that is not explicable by natural or scientific laws” (2015: 6). This section argues that this 
success cannot be easily explained by consociational theory, because the logic of power-sharing in 
Burundi differs radically from the logic developed by Lijphart.  After describing the power-sharing 
system as established by the 2005 Constitution and the subsequent elections, this section reviews 
the consociational literature on power-sharing in Burundi and underlines its weaknesses. I then 
show that Burundi’s case corresponds far better to the centripetalist model described in chapter 5.  
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The 2005 Constitution and the Post-war Elections 
After a five-year transition period, a new constitution was adopted on March 18th, 2005. It 
established a complex power-sharing system. Its main dispositions are summarized hereunder.62 
Executive power is held by of a President, two Vice-Presidents and the government (art. 92). The 
President is elected in a two round (or run-off) system, for a five-year mandate which can be 
renewed once (art. 96). The Vice-Presidents are appointed by the President. Power-sharing 
dispositions are introduced in this regard: article 124 stipulates that the Vice-Presidents shall 
belong to two different ethnic categories and two different political parties.63 The government is 
nominated by the President (in consultation with the Vice-Presidents). The constitution introduces 
strong power-sharing guarantees in government. First, the government must be composed of 60% 
Hutu and 40% of Tutsi, with a minimum 30% women (art. 129). Second, power-sharing between 
political parties is ensured since parties that succeed in garnering more than 5% of the seats in the 
National Assembly are allocated a proportional share of governmental positions (art. 129). Third, 
since the security sector was a particularly sensitive issue, the constitution states that the Defense 
Minister and the Minister of Public Security should be of different ethnic categories (art. 130).  
Legislative power is held by a bicameral parliament composed of the National Assembly and the 
Senate (art. 147). The National Assembly must respect the proportions of 60% Hutu, 40% Tutsis, 
and 3 Twa, as well as a minimum of 30% women. Should these quotas not be reflected in the 
result of elections, a mechanism of cooptation appoints additional deputies to respect these 
proportions (art. 164). The electoral system is proportional representation (art.164) by closed party 
lists (art. 168), “the country's 17 provinces64 being equal to 17 electoral districts” (Tobolka, 2014: 
3). These lists must themselves be multi-ethnic: of every three candidates, a maximum of two can 
belong to the same ethnic category (art. 168). The Senate, for its part, is based on the principle of 
ethnic parity. It is formed by two delegates by province (one Hutu and one Tutsi), who are elected 
by provincial (multi-ethnic) electoral colleges composed of members of the Communal Councils.  
																																																								
62 I mainly base this description on the text of the Constitution itself, but the following secondary sources have 
been consulted: Reyntjens, 2005; Lemarchand, 2006b ; Vandeginste, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2015; Manirakiza, 
2011; Lothe, 2007; Tobolka, 2014, 2015. The 2005 Constitution as well as all previous constitutions of Burundi 
can be found on the University of Anwerp’s Institute of Development Policy and Management’s webpage: 
https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/rg/iob/centre-great-lakes/dpp-burundi/constitution/aper-u-hist-const/.  
63  Interestingly, the paragraph notes that the selection must also take into account the dominant ethnic 
composition of their respective parties (Vandeginste, 2009: 74). 




The members of the Senate also include three Twas and the former Presidents. A minimum of 
30% women is also required (art. 180).  
The constitution imposes power-sharing in various other bodies. The most important are the 
security forces which must respect strict ethnic parity (art. 257). Dispositions also ensure (although 
in vague terms) the ethnic representativity of the local and provincial bodies (art. 138 and 260). 
Art. 260 specifies that no more than 67% of communal administrators must belong to the same 
ethnic group. Power-sharing dispositions are also institutionalized in the judiciary (art. 208 and 
217). Finally, public administration and public enterprises must also respect the quotas of 60% 
Hutu and 40% Tutsis amongst their employees (art. 143).  
Two elements can be underlined: on the one hand, the presence of strict dispositions for the 
power-sharing between ethnic groups, but also between political parties; on the other hand, the 
repeated emphasis put on national unity, which principally took the form of ethnic party bans. The 
constitution thus renders multi-ethnic lists compulsory. The Law on Political Parties, voted on 
June 26, 2003, further emphasized this disposition since it stipulates that political parties cannot be 
formed with more than 75% of members belonging to the same ethnic group (Nindorera, 2012: 
26).  
The first post-accord elections were held in 2005. Amongst a myriad of small parties, the main 
opponents were FRODEBU, the former Hutu-rebel movement CNDD-FDD and the former single-
party UPRONA. Although electoral violence occurred, the elections were mostly held in a calm 
atmosphere, and there were few minor irregularities (Reyntjens, 2005: 122-123). Ethnicity was not 
the main issue during the campaign, although there were some references to it (Reynjens, 2005: 
122), and ethnic voting was “by no means general” (Reyntjens, 2005: 124). CNND-FDD 
registered an overwhelming victory receiving 62.6% of the votes in the municipal elections, while 
its closest competitor, FRODEBU, only received the support of 20.9% of the electors (see table 6). 
These results were confirmed in the parliamentary elections, and the CNDD-FDD leader, Pierre 
Nkurunziza was elected President65 on August 19th (Lemarchand, 2009: 170). The composition of 
the government more or less respected the ethnic quotas (in fact, the Tutsi minority was even more 
represented than required by the Constitution, since 55% of the ministers were Hutu and 45% 
																																																								
65 The president was not elected in a popular consultation, “as the constitution provides that the first post-
transition president is indirectly elected by the national assembly and the senate sitting in joint congress” 
(Reyntjens, 2005: 129).  
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Tutsi). However, the proportionality that the Constitution guaranteed to the political parties was 
not closely respected; the CNDD-FDD was overrepresented whereas UPRONA and FRODEBU 
were under-represented (Reyntjens, 2005: 130). 
As the 2005 composition of the National Assembly shows (see table 7), the formerly Hutu-
dominated rebel groups had succeeded in integrating Tutsi candidates on their lists and Tutsis were 
widely represented in their parliamentary block. UPRONA failed to have Hutu elected, but this is 
not necessarily a proof that the party was mono-ethnic. Rather, this can be explained by the fact 
that “in no province did UPRONA secure more than one seat: as [the] first-placed candidates were 
Tutsi, only Tutsi were elected” (Reyntjens, 2005: 126). In general, the effect of these elections 
appeared to have been positive since ethnicity was less salient and “the more extremist forces on 
both sides of the ethnic divide” had been marginalized (Reynjens, 2005: 131).  
The 2010 elections may nuance the view of Burundi as a peacebuilding “success story”. Indeed, 
the electoral process was marked by voter intimidation and political violence, although it should 
be noted that the ethnic cleavage was not mobilized and the competition took place mainly 
between (multi-ethnic) parties (Travaglianti, 2014) Despite this depoliticization of ethnicity, “in 
the range of hybrid regimes between fully authoritarian and liberal democratic, Burundi has taken 
a step backwards” (Vandeginste, 2011: 325). The elections were generally deemed “free and fair” 
by the international community, but the opposition reacted to its defeat at the communal elections 
by boycotting the rest of the electoral process (Vandeginste, 2011: 317-19) (Table 8). Despite 
pressures from the international community, UPRONA was the only important opposition party to 
participate in the national assembly elections (Vandeginste, 2011: 320), which allowed the party to 
have a small number of ministers (Table 9). President Nkurunziza was re-elected without 
competition.  
The 2015 elections confirmed the increasingly authoritarian bent of the ruling party. After 
Nkurunziza was endorsed candidate for a third mandate judged unconstitutional by many 
opposition parties and members of his own party, protests erupted in Bujumbura and a violent 
repression ensued. A coup attempt failed on May 13th 2015. The following repression allowed 
Nkurunziza to crush criticisms inside his own party, in the security forces, and amongst the 
opposition. Despite international criticism, elections were held, boycotted by the opposition, and 
generally deemed not free and fair by the United Nations (Daley & Popplewell, 2016: 1-3). 
Although ethnicity does not appear to have been mobilized during the crisis (except in a few 
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instances), these events are worrying for the future of Burundian democracy and the stability of the 
country (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2016: 214).  


























Power-sharing in Burundi has been mainly approached through the lenses of consociational 
theory. These contributions (principally those of Stef Vandeginste and René Lemarchand) are 
invaluable for our understanding of the functioning of power-sharing in Burundi. I however argue 
that their arguments do not really fit the theory of consociationalism as developed by Lijphart, for 
the simple reason that the dynamic of power-sharing in Burundi is radically different than that 
identified by Lijphart in the Netherlands, Belgium, Lebanon or other countries. Instead of using 
consociationalism, these contributions tend to (i) emphasize contextual factors, (ii) use arguments 
from the centripetalist or peacebuilding literature, (iii) explain the failures of the peace process by 
highlighting discrepancies with Lijphart’s model, which opens the gate to logical inaccuracies.  
First, research on Burundi’s power-sharing tends to explain the adoption and survival of power-
sharing by external, contextual factors. Lemarchand is not alone into thinking that “more than the 
technicalities of constitutional provisions, contextual factors are the key to an understanding of 
what the future may hold in store” (2006b: 9). Vandeginste (2015) links the adoption of the power-
sharing agreements to the “ripeness” of the conflict (Zartman, 1989), the configuration of power 
between opponents (Horowitz, 2014) and the presence of international pressure (Vandeginste, 
2015: 12-13). He also explains the survival of power-sharing by referring to contextual factors: the 
existence of overarching loyalties, cross-cutting cleavages and common threats (2006: 198-203), 
as well as previous experiences with power-sharing in Burundi (2009) or the presence of the 
South-African peacekeeping mission during the transition phase (2015: 15). For his part, 
Lemarchand notes that the widespread poverty, the persistence of Tutsi and Hutu extremism, as 
well as the regional situation with the threat of neighbouring Rwanda are potentially dangerous for 
the stability of power-sharing in Burundi (2006b: 12). As for the successes of the agreement, he 
notes that “one may (…) wonder whether the relative stability so far achieved is the result of 
consociational engineering or a reflection of the generally favourable societal circumstances” 
(2006b: 16). These explanations, while probably true, say little about the specific impact of 
consociational mechanisms.  
Rather paradoxically, a second tendency is to explain the positive aspects of the transition using 
arguments drawn from the peacebuilding literature on power-sharing or from the centripetalist 
literature. The main explanation for the stability of power-sharing in Burundi is thus its 
centripetalist dimension, namely the existence of multi-ethnic parties which allowed for a 
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depoliticization and depolarization of the political arena (Vandeginste, 2015: 15). Other 
institutional factors are also deemed important, such as military power-sharing (Lemarchand, 
2006b: 12; Vandeginste, 2006: 186) and the institutional guarantees for credible commitment 
(Walter, 2002) provided by the consociational dispositions of the agreement (Vandeginste, 2015: 
15). While relevant, these are not the exact same factors identified by Lijphart although 
institutional guarantees of credible commitment could be said to be functionally equivalent to 
minority vetoes.  
A third set of arguments is closer to consociational theory. These link the failures of the peace 
process to the gaps in implementation of Lijphart’s model. The logic of these arguments can be 
summarized as follows. 1–Negatives aspects of the situation are identified; 2–Discrepancies 
between Burundi’s power-sharing system and Lijphart’s model are identified; 3–A causal link is 
implied between 2 and 1 (Vandeginste, 2008; also see Sullivan, 2005; Manirakiza, 2011). The 
argument is not wrong per se. In his analysis of the 1993 events, Sullivan (2005) develops 
precisely the causal mechanism between 2 and 1. For him, it is the threat on the Tutsi “minority 
vetoe” which prompted the failure of power-sharing in Burundi in 1993. Manirakiza (2011) also 
convincingly links minority vetoes and the immobilism of the system. However, the argument 
rests on a relatively shaky implicit counterfactual, namely the assumption that if Lijphart’s 
consociational formula had been perfectly institutionalized and implemented, the peace transition 
would have been optimal. A number of critics of consociationalism put into question the validity 
of this counterfactual (see chapter 1; Roeder & Rotchild, 2005; Jarstad, 2008; Horowitz, 1985). 
For example, governmental instability has been identified as a problem in the post-war period. 
Vandeginste suggests that this may result from the absence of ethnic parties which “constitutes a 
handicap from the consociationalist point of view” (2008: 68). However, nothing guarantees that 
pillarization would have provided a better outcome (I actually argue that the opposite is true). On 
the other hand, this instability might result from other factors, which have nothing to do with the 
consociational institutions. Vandeginste indeed notes that institutional instability results mostly 
from intra-party instability which is due to neo-patrimonialism and politicians’ individualism 
(2008: 69).  
A related problem rests in the “inadequate specification of consequences” of power-sharing 
(Horowitz, 1985: 570-1); in other words, the lack of a definition of the expected successes of 
power-sharing. Vandeginste for example notes that “by and large, when measured against the 
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objective of war termination, the use of power-sharing can – so far – be considered to be a success 
story in the case of Burundi. At the same time, when measured against more ambitions state-
building purposes (rule of law, human rights, democracy, effective and accountable governance), 
Burundi clearly has a very long way to go and consociational power-sharing has so far not been 
able to make a difference” (2009: 81; also see Vandeginste, 2008: 73). The problem is that the 
consociational model was initially aimed mainly at establishing stable democracies; it was never 
said to provide guarantees for state-building, especially “effective and accountable governance”. 
Uvin and Bayler (2013) link the governance deficit to the neo-patrimonial constraints of state 
incumbents.  
In sum, the causal link between consociationalism and the success or failure of the peace process 
is never fully made explicit. This can be understood by the fact that the Burundian power-sharing 
system, despite being close to Lijphart’s model, functions according to a radically different logic.  
Integration, not Pillarization? 
Most authors follow Lemarchand in considering that “measured by the extent to which it 
approximates Lijphart’s consociational formula, Burundi today stands as a unique case. No other 
state anywhere on the continent offers a more faithful image of the ideal consociational polity” 
(2006b: 3). The approximation, it is true, is very close. The system of quotas provides for the 
grand coalition and the proportionality requirements, while the combination of majority 
requirements and quotas ensures vetoes rights to the Tutsi minority (Manirakiza, 2011; 
Vandeginste, 2006; Lothe, 2007). The main difference with Lijphart’s model is the absence of 
segmental autonomies. This absence, however, is most often not deemed problematic. Because 
there is not cultural difference between Hutus and Tutsis, many authors note that these “segmental 
autonomies” are simply irrelevant or unnecessary (Sullivan, 2005: 84-85; Lothe, 2007: 70).  
Big differences are sometimes hidden in details. Not only is the absence of segmental autonomies 
unproblematic, it is the very aim of Burundi’s power-sharing system. The addition of ethnic party 
bans, through the requirement of multi-ethnic electoral lists, changes the dynamic of the whole 
system. Indeed, the explicit aim of power-sharing in Burundi was to counter the segmentation of 
the society, as testified by the multiple references to national unity made in the 2005 Constitution. 
Segments (which are a defining characteristic of “plural societies” and central in consociational 
theory) appear in fact to be disappearing in post-war in Burundi. Vandeginste already noted in 
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2006 that segments were hardly identifiable in Burundi (2006: 178-180) and that politicians did 
not really represent particular segments (2006: 187). Two years later, he further notes that political 
parties themselves do not represent segments and that politicians are not connected with other 
segmental (e.g. ethnic) networks (2008: 68). This absence of segments indicates that the dynamic 
at play in Burundi is very different than the dynamic envisioned by Lijphart. Indeed, “the final 
objective [of power-sharing in Burundi] is not to perpetuate segmentary divisions, but to alleviate 
the antagonisms and reduce the violent potential of the political exploitation of segmental 
divisions” (2006: 204-205). This objective is at odds with the consociational model. Indeed, as 
shown in chapter 5, Lijphart (1977: 24) considered this objective both risky and unlikely to 
succeed. He instead recommended a model that fosters the pillarization (or segmentation) of 
society, and where bargaining and accommodation happen only at an elite level. In Burundi, 
instead, the accommodation takes place at the societal level, and in the parties, rather than 
exclusively amongst elites. 
The difficulty of explaining the success of power-sharing in Burundi with consociational 
arguments arguably comes from the fact that Burundi does not correspond to the model imagined 
by Lijphart. The importance of multi-ethnic political parties, the depoliticization of ethnicity and 
parity in the security forces are instead acknowledged by the authors studying power-sharing in 
Burundi. This suggests that the model may better correspond to the one proposed in chapter 5. 
Hence, “ironically, [Burundi’s case] provides substantial ammunition on the side of 
[consociationalism’s] critics” (Lemarchand, 2006b: 16). The next section examines this hypothesis 
and explains the depoliticization of ethnicity as well as the survival of power-sharing in Burundi 
by the theory of incentives developed in the last chapter.  
Political Institutions and the Depoliticization of Ethnicity  
Despite common features with consociationalism, I argue that the logic of power-sharing in 
Burundi is much closer to the centripetalist logic and model described in the last chapter. Indeed, 
the system corresponds to the three points listed in our model. First, guarantees for the security of 
both ethnic categories are present since the constitution imposes parity in the security forces. 
Second, strong guarantees for political representation, and by way of consequence, economic 
distribution of state resources, are present under the form of ethnic quotas. Finally, ethnic party 
bans are in place and the constitution underlines the obligation of presenting multi-ethnic lists. 
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Moreover, incentives are arguably provided at both party leaders and electors’ levels to become 
multi-ethnic, through the system of ethnic quotas.  
In this section, I explain the depoliticization of ethnicity in Burundi by three factors. First, 
institutional and neo-patrimonial incentives have allowed for the creation of multi-ethnic parties, 
which have countered the incentives for the political mobilization of ethnicity. Second, security 
and political representation guarantees have countered a good share–but not all–of the inter-ethnic 
fears resulting from the civil war. Third, the literature suggests that multi-ethnic parties, multi-
ethnic security forces and informal networks of multi-ethnic associations have created “bargaining 
arenas” which have had a positive impact on the depoliticization of ethnicity. In conclusion, I 
argue that the institutional framework has played an undeniable role in the depoliticization of 
ethnicity in Burundi, but that external, contextual factors must also be taken into consideration. 
The current situation in the country shows that power-sharing is not a panacea for building peace 
after civil conflicts in neo-patrimonial societies.  
Incentives for the Creation and Survival of Multi-ethnic Parties 
The depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage in post-war Burundi is widely attributed to the presence 
of multi-ethnic parties (Vandeginste, 2009: 75). The existence of these parties results from a 
process of deethnicization of formerly ethnically-dominated political parties or rebel movements 
(Alfieri, 2016b). This process cannot be straightforwardly explained by the constitutionally 
enforced ethnic party bans. Indeed, and as noted in chapter 5, such bans exist in a wide range of 
countries across the continent, but often fail to be fully implemented (Kadima, 2008; Bogaards et 
al., 2013). In post-war Burundi, both state weakness and emotions render the success occurrence 
of the process even more surprizing.  
Reasonable doubts can be expressed about the capacity of the Burundian state to enforce those 
bans during the transition period, especially when it comes to big parties and powerful rebel 
movements such as the CNDD-FDD. In fact, close attention to the Burundian party landscape 
shows that the bans were not fully implemented. Small ethnic (mainly Tutsi) parties do in fact 
continue to exist. Their political marginalization appears to result from the dynamics of the 
electoral process more than from a strict application of the bans (Reyntjens, 2005)66. Moreover, 
																																																								
66 Reyntjens notes after the 2005 elections that « although ‘ethnic voting’ was by no means general, about 9 
percent of the electorate voted for ‘Tutsi’ parties, but these votes were scattered over ten parties. » (2005: 124). 
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the post-war period was characterised by widespread interethnic mistrust. In these conditions, the 
fact that Tutsi candidates decided to join–and were successfully integrated–in previously Hutu-
dominated parties (and to a smaller extend vice versa) is puzzling in more than a way. Even more 
critical is the existence of cross-ethnic voting.67 Only five years after the signing of the Arusha 
Accord and less than two years after the CNDD-FDD had laid down its arms, it would not have 
been unexpected that the vote followed ethnic lines. Instead, cross ethnic voting happened widely, 
and numbers of Tutsis voted for the CNDD-FDD. This deserves a more sophisticated explanation.  
This puzzle can be solved by the theory of incentives in neo-patrimonial systems elaborated in 
chapter 5. In this subsection, I argue that the imperative of survival of both politicians and citizens 
provided them with incentives for deemphasizing their ethnic identity, even if they may have had 
an ethnic bias. In this regard, the neo-patrimonial context in which power-sharing has been 
implemented in Burundi is key in understanding the logic of the actors during the transition period.  
The fact that Burundi corresponds well to the neo-patrimonial model is well acknowledged in the 
literature (Tobolka, 2015; Lothe, 2007). Uvin and Bayer (2013) observe that neo-patrimonial 
logics have survived the war and that “the new political economy [is] a perfect copy of the old” 
(2013: 274). They explain this by the “political imperatives of the new government”: 
The post transition government was weak on almost all fronts: militarily threatened by the 
FNL, by militias of other parties, and by possible dissent within the army; politically 
challenged by disgruntled elements everywhere (including inside its own party); presiding 
over one of the world’s poorest economies, with few opportunities for economic security 
and advancement except through the office of the state; and in charge of a state that was 
little more than an empty shell, a network of personal allegiances rather than a collection of 
functioning institutions. To establish control and strengthen their position, what else could 
leaders effectively do but return to the practices that were known to work? (…) Doing 
differently (…) would have seemed suicidal from the perspective of Burundi’s new rulers. 
And in doing so, they of course recreated the system they fought and promised to change 
(Uvin & Bayer, 2013: 275). 
Curtis (2012) notes that these neo-patrimonial logics have infused the peacebuilding process–and 
by way of consequence the power-sharing system–in Burundi. She shows that the peacebuilding 
process has been deeply affected by the “complex interplay between outside ideas and interests, 
and multiple Burundian ideas and interests”. The institutions and practices brought in Burundi by 
																																																																																																																																																																														
This proves that small ethnic parties existed. However, none of these parties achieved the minimal threshold of 
2% necessary to be represented in the National Assembly (Reyntjens, 2005: 123).  
67 If we follow Horowitz’s view, cross-ethnic voting may be the most critical element in the transition since “the 
test of an ethnic party is simply the distribution of support” (1985: 291).  
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international peacebuilders were “renegotiated and reinterpreted” by Burundian politicians (Curtis, 
2012: 3). In the light of this observation, the fact that the strategic choices of individuals in the 
electoral processes were influenced by constitutional rules but also ethnic preferences and neo-
patrimonial imperatives sounds almost obvious.  
Two periods should be distinguished when thinking about the mix of incentives in post-war 
Burundi. The first one is before CNDD-FDD reached power as the outcome of the 2005 elections. 
In this first period, it can be considered that there was no state incumbent since no party had a 
sufficient hold on the state to monopolize its resources and control its repressive apparatus. 
However, given the growing control of the CNDD-FDD on the state resources, from 2005 onward, 
the party can be considered the state incumbent in the second period. The difference between these 
two periods is that, in the 2010 and 2015 elections, the CNDD-FDD had many more “options” to 
influence the result of the elections. The 2010-2015 period, which illustrates the dangers 
associated with a model of ethnic integration in neo-patrimonial systems, will be quickly discussed 
in conclusion. For now, I mainly discuss the 2005 period, which is central in explaining the 
emergence of multi-ethnic parties. This period was critical since it is during the early phases of the 
transition, and mainly the first election, that the actors took strategic decisions which then shaped 
the dynamics of the peace-process in the long-run (Shvetsova, 2002: 56). I first discuss the interest 
of the parties to integrate candidates from other ethnic categories in their ranks. I then turn to the 
motivations for the candidates to present themselves on the lists of parties that were formerly 
dominated by members of other ethnic categories. Finally, I discuss why citizens engaged in cross-
ethnic voting.  
Integrating ethnic minorities in ethnically dominated parties 
While the will to respect the constitution and the goodwill associated with the recent signing of the 
peace agreement (Paris, 2004) undeniably played a role in the transformation of ethnically-
dominated parties to multi-ethnic ones, the presence of specific incentives must also be taken into 
consideration. The system of quotas established by the 2005 constitution not only provided 
guarantees for political representation of the ethnic categories, it also created incentives for 
integrating candidates from all ethnic categories. Indeed, parties were required to present 
candidates from a certain ethnic category to access the seats which were reserved for this category. 
Presenting Tutsi candidates was, for example, the only mean for the CNDD-FDD to place some of 
its deputies on the seats reserved for Tutsis. In other words, remaining mono-ethnic would have 
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limited the possibilities of expansion of the CNDD-FDD to 60% of the National Assembly. This 
was even more critical in the Senate, since this chamber works on the principle of ethnic parity: 
had they not presented Tutsi candidates, formerly Hutu-dominated parties should have shared 
between themselves a mere 50% of the seats. The results of the 2005 elections in the National 
Assembly show that this principle of inclusion was beneficial to formerly Hutu-dominated parties: 
the CNDD-FDD occupied 54% of the seats and FRODEBU 25% (Reynjens, 2005: 127), which 
totals far more than the 60% of seats reserved for Hutus.  
That this logic was well understood by the party leaders is proved by the fact that this had been the 
matter of important disagreements between the Hutu (G-7) and Tutsi (G-10) coalitions during the 
Arusha negotiations (Vandeginste, 2009: 75). As Lemarchand reports, “although the principle of 
minority overrepresentation met with broad-agreement among Hutu and Tutsi, the critical issue 
during the constitutional debates hinged upon the political affiliation of Tutsi representatives. 
Could any Tutsi qualify, irrespective of party affiliations, or only those Tutsi who belonged to all-
Tutsi parties, that is the G-10 parties?” (2009: 169). As Reyntjens explains, Tutsi-dominated 
parties “feared that Tutsi aligned with ‘Hutu’ parties would take up most or all functions in 
government and parliament allotted to Tutsi, and they insisted on taking into account political–
ethnic affiliations, i.e. that Tutsi would have to belong to ‘Tutsi’ parties” (2005: 119). Insistence of 
the G-10 coalition can also be interpreted as the will to institutionalize guarantees for the leaders 
of small Tutsi party to remain in power after the transition (Vandeginste, 2006: 190). The G-7 and 
the mediator refused the option proposed by the G-10 and imposed multi-ethnic parties. While the 
result of the 2005 election shows that this mechanism has indeed clearly worked against Tutsi-
dominated parties, it is arguably one of the most important centripetalist elements of the 
Constitution. It provided electoral incentives for both Hutu- and Tutsi-dominated parties to 
integrate candidates from the other ethnic group. In this case, electoral incentives are closely tied 
to neo-patrimonial imperatives, as described in chapter 5, since access to governmental positions 
also means access to a share of state resources which are crucial for sustaining political parties’ 
clientelist networks.  
Joining ethnically dominated parties 
A second question is why candidates would join parties which were formerly dominated by 
another ethnic category than their own? More specifically, why would so many Tutsi politicians 
join the formerly Hutu rebel movement CNDD-FDD, especially so soon after the end of the war? 
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The weight of neo-patrimonial imperatives, here too, seems to be necessary to take into 
consideration. The fact that Burundian parties are not programmatic is indeed well acknowledged 
(Vandeginste, 2008: 68). Political parties are thus in great part a vehicle for politicians’ access to 
political positions and the resources that go with them. As one of Schraml’s interviewees states 
explicitly, “the biggest recourses, be it in Rwanda or in Burundi… the safest and the quickest way 
of accessing resources, is politics”68 (2011: 15). Although personal greed is certainly not absent of 
politicians’ considerations, these resources are most importantly necessary to sustain politicians’ 
clientelist networks. From this neo-patrimonial nature of the political parties results a certain 
“flexibility in political loyalties” (Lothe, 2007: 101) since some politicians shift their allegiance to 
the anticipated winner to maximize their chances of being elected. This mechanism explains that 
many Tutsis joined the ranks of the CNDD-FDD in 2005. Indeed, as Reyntjens points out, due to 
the widespread discredit of FRODEBU and UPRONA which ruled the country during the war, 
“the handsome victory of the CNDD–FDD did not come as a surprise” (2005: 123). In this 
context, “many Tutsi supporters (…) at the last minute switched from the notoriously pro-Tutsi 
Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) to join the Nkurunziza bandwagon” (Lemarchand, 
2006b, 8; see also Lemarchand, 2009: 170). The ethnic quotas also meant that, as Tutsi candidates 
in a dominantly-Hutu party, their chances of being elected increased:  
For reasons of political opportunism rather than out of political conviction, many Tutsi in 
Bujumbura adhered to the CNDD–FDD. They anticipated its victory and hoped to capture 
positions thanks to the ethnic quota. They realised indeed that they stood a better chance in a 
winning ‘Hutu’ party than in a losing ‘Tutsi’ party (Reyntjens, 2005: 122).  
Hence, here again, the neo-patrimonial imperatives of survival acted in favour of the de-
ethnicization of political parties.  
Voting for formerly ethnically-dominated parties 
The last question concern electors’ incentives for cross-ethnic voting. Alfieri’s work (2016a, 
2016b) shows that reasons for political engagement are very diverse in Burundi. By no mean can 
ideology be completely cast aside. However, neo-patrimonial logics also often strongly weigh in 
individual strategic decisions, which may explain a good share of the cross-ethnic voting. 
Lidewyde Berckmoes’s Elusive Tactics (2014) is invaluable to help us understand these logics in 
																																																								
68 Translated by the author from French : “La plus grande ressource, [...] que ça soit au Rwanda ou au 
Burundi...le chemin le plus sûr et le plus rapide d’avoir accès aux ressources, c’est la politique” (Schraml, 2011: 
15). 
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Burundi. Her extensive field work with Burundian youths–a critically significant category of the 
Burundian population (Somers & Uvin, 2011)–sheds lights on the dynamics of voting decisions 
for citizens in Burundi (Berckmoes, 2014: chapter 5; Berckmoes, 2015).  
Confronted with the scarcity of economic opportunities, youth in Burundi were preoccupied daily 
with ‘searching for life’: “in local parlance, chercher la vie referred simultaneously to the 
economic dimension of looking for sources of income – long-term wage labor – and the social and 
existential dimension of what kind of adult, spouse, parent, and person one could become through 
stable employment or a good economic position” (Berckmoes, 2015: 9). This issue is directly tied 
to politics since the employment opportunities are commonly perceived to depend on personal 
connections with politicians. As one of her interviewees put it: “if you are not in the political party 
that is in power, you will not find a job” (Berckmoes, 2015: 9; 2014: 151-154). Most of the young 
people do not have such connections, but see the electoral period as an opportunity to create them, 
a “critical moment” to develop patronage relations with party leaders (2015: 13; 2014: 150). Doing 
so not only implies voting, but also extensively displaying loyalty for a party. Youths are 
conscious that this provides no guarantee for success, but this offers a minimum chance to find a 
position after the elections (2015: 13).  
Evidence indeed shows that the CNDD-FDD built a patronage system based on the “distribution 
and allocation of key political positions, jobs, and financial contracts to ruling party members” 
(Wittig, 2016: 152; Tobolka, 2014: 4-5). These patronage practices are not limited to the CNDD-
FDD. Alfieri for example notes that many youths engaged with the FNL with the hope of 
receiving a professional position (2016b: 246). She also notes that the economic prospects 
associated with the demobilization programs were another reason for many youths to join the FNL 
(2016a: 16; Berckmoes, 2014: 152). One of Berckmoes’ interviewees suggested, in 2009, that all 
parties tried to engage in clientelist distribution of goods–but the CNDD-FDD seems to be the one 
who had the most to offer. Asked if propaganda had already started, the interviewee answered: “A 
little; but only small meetings. For instance, across the street (…) three political parties passed 
already. They promised a lot of things. CNDD-FDD says: ‘We will give you a phone, 100.000 
Burundian francs (about 75 euro’s)’ They [youth] say: ‘Okay, come and give’” (2014: 153).  
The chances of getting a job (or other benefits) after the elections depends, of course, on election 
results and whether patronage connections were developed with the “right” party. Who to vote for 
is thus a delicate decision, which does not only imply ideology, but also neo-patrimonial 
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considerations.69 Youths engage in what Berckmoes calls “judicious opportunism” (Berckmoes, 
2014: 133) while making this decision, and neo-patrimonial imperatives often overrule ideological 
preferences. They try to anticipate the winner and create links, or display loyalty towards this 
party. Indeed, although not socially valued, “the practice of shifting [political loyalty] was very 
common” (Berckmoes, 2015: 17). Once again, since the CNDD-FDD’s victory was expected in 
2005 (as well as in the following elections), part of the votes for this party may result from 
opportunistic strategic decisions. This may particularly well explain the fact that a high number of 
Tutsis voted for this party despite probable feelings of resentment against this formerly Hutu-
dominated rebel movement. Just like Tutsi candidates who joined the CNDD-FDD, many Tutsis 
electors must have favoured survival imperatives over ethnic preferences.  
Another explanation for the depoliticization of ethnicity in Burundi is worth mentioning briefly. 
The argument is that the confrontation between the two main Hutu-dominated armed groups – the 
CNDD-FDD which signed the Arusha Agreement, and the FNL which did not – has proven to the 
Burundians that ethnic cleavages were not “real” but instrumentalized by elites (Alfieri, 2016a, 
2016b). In other words, according to this argument, the cleavage hierarchy had already changed 
during the civil war (Vorrath, 2009). This factor is certainly an important explanation for the 
depoliticization of ethnicity in Burundi. However, there are reasons to think that it cannot 
completely  account for this depoliticization. Indeed, this interpretation focuses on the ideas and 
beliefs of voters, but the analysis developed in this thesis has shown that ethnic identities are not 
mobilized only for ideological reasons. Rather, the interests of the actors (which are shaped by the 
institutions and by violence) also play a decisive role in their decision to mobilize ethnic or non-
ethnic identities. The analysis provided by this chapter may thus shed light on these other, non-
ideological, explanatory factors and thus allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
dynamics at play. 
This analysis does not deny the fact that ideology plays a role in the political decisions made by 
Burundians (Alfieri, 2016a; Tobolka, 2015). By no mean do I want to suggest that African voters 
are exclusively driven by neo-patrimonial considerations. The fact that the CNDD-FDD generated 
a positive image, popular enthusiasm and hopes for a real change toward peace and good 
governance is undeniable (Nindorera, 2012: 27). This is also a reason that has pushed some Tutsis 
to join the party. For example, Alfieri reports the words of Desirée, a Tutsi, who is now a former 
																																																								
69 As well as personal security issues (Berckmoes, 2014: 162; Travaglianti, 2014) 
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CNDD-FDD member: “I decided to join CNDD-FDD because I believed that it would be a 
change. This party had included all ethnic groups, religions, tendencies. It represented the break 
with the past” (2016b, 248). Without denying this dimension, however, my argument is that these 
ideological preferences were confronted with survival imperatives, and that, in Burundi’s harsh 
economic context, neo-patrimonial considerations often overrule ideological or ethnic preferences 
(Tobolka, 2014: 12). This confrontation is also acknowledged by Berckmoes who notes that it is 
the source of many “moral dilemmas” amongst young Burundians (2014: 161). The exact extent to 
which ideology or neo-patrimonialism respectively oriented the vote is hard, if not impossible, to 
measure. However, the fact that the results of the CNDD-FDD have not decreased in the following 
elections despite widespread acknowledgement that the promises of change had not been kept 
suggests that neo-patrimonial incentives were not negligible.70  
Tobolka goes in the same direction when trying to explain the survival of the opposition in 
Burundi’s context, which is marked by both monopolization of state resources by the CNDD-FDD 
and widespread repression. He observes that opposition parties are maintained alive by a small 
core of members who are committed to an ideology (which may be ethnic or not) but “do not 
profit from their political engagement in any tangible way, rather the opposite” (Tobolka, 2014: 9). 
His analysis thus suggests that, in Burundi’s resource scarce and violent environment, few citizens 
have the luxury of voting according to their ideological or ethnic preferences. Neo-patrimonial 
logics, on the other hand, have a decisive impact: “There are politically minded and morally driven 
individuals that are deeply committed to practising opposition politics. However, given the harsh 
circumstances, they are only few” (Tobolka, 2014: 12).  
In sum, the emergence of multi-ethnic parties in Burundi is arguably explainable by two factors 
whose relative importance is difficult to establish: post-conflict goodwill and institutional 
incentives. Amongst this last set of factors, I underlined that electoral incentives for the integration 
of “ethnic others” in ethnically dominated political parties were created by the system of ethnic 
quotas. It has been necessary to take neo-patrimonial imperatives into account to explain that 
many Tutsis joined the ranks of formerly Hutu-dominated parties in a context that was still marked 
by strong inter-ethnic mistrust, as well as the fact that extensive cross-ethnic voting was observed. 
																																																								
70 Widespread repression is also a factor that enters into consideration. However, if Travaglianti (2014) is correct, 
pre-electoral violence was mostly committed toward Hutu citizens, while my main interest in this subsection was 
to explain Tutsi cross-ethnic voting. It should also be acknowledged that the credibility and reliability of the 
official election results is difficult to determine. 
	158	
Another factor might also be taken into consideration, not so much as a cause of the establishment 
of multi-ethnic parties, but as an enabler of this process: the presence of strong political and 
security guarantees in the 2005 Constitution.  
Security and Political Guarantees 
The fact that political and security guarantees have had a huge impact on the pacification of 
Burundi is well established. Ethnic quotas have guaranteed each group will have a say in the 
decision-making, and Tutsis have sufficient veto points to guarantee no political decision would 
threaten their existence. Equally important, the over-representation of Tutsis in the army and the 
simultaneous integration of Hutu rebels in the security forces provided guarantees for both groups 
that the army and the police would not undertake genocidal violence as was the case in the past.  
Amongst others, Nindorera notes that:  
The CNDD-FDD insisted on its crucial role in reforming the defence and security forces, 
and on its ability to defend its electoral gains and any possible sabotage attempt like that on 
the 1993 democratic experiment. These two messages were meaningful to the Hutu majority 
who, after that traumatic experience, understood that control of the security forces was 
indispensable for governing. Hutus viewed the integration of the former rebel forces into the 
army and the police as a guarantee against any usurpation of the democratic process. […] 
The Tutsi community, for its part, reacted with indifference or resignation to the CNDD-
FDD’s victory. A large number of Tutsis had joined the party, serving to tone down its 
radical image. Tutsis were also reassured by constitutional guarantees regarding their 
participation in State institutions (2012: 27; also see Lemarchand, 2009: 169; Reyntjens, 
2005; Vandeginste, 2006).  
These guarantees have also worked to dissuade certain actors to spoil the peace process by 
resorting to violence. As Lemarchand notes, “what appeared both feasible and desirable in 1993, 
from the perspective of Tutsi interests, today seems so fraught with dangers as to be almost 
impossible to contemplate” (2006b: 15).  
That these guarantees have also paved the way for the depoliticization of ethnicity can be 
understood by the fact that violence and exclusion (and the emotions it creates) have been one of 
the major factors contributing to the politicization of ethnicity in Burundi. The best way to 
demonstrates that this process has indeed happened in Burundi is perhaps to pay attention to the 
portions where it is still unachieved. Indeed, despite the end of the war, violence has not fully 
disappeared in Burundi. Rather, the country has been described as stuck in a “no-peace, no war” 
situation (Wittig, 2016), and marked by enduring “indeterminacy”, “unintelligibility” and 
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“unpredictability” (Berckmoes, 2014: 23). In fact, guarantees for political representation and 
security do exist, but the fear that they may fade away is still present amongst many Burundians. 
This has had the effect of decreasing the importance attributed to ethnicity, without allowing it to 
disappear completely as a subject of preoccupation.  
Here too, Berckmoes’ fieldwork provides important data for demonstrating the existence of this 
dynamic.71 She observed that ethnicity was not a day-to-day worry for her interlocutors and the 
subject was almost never brought into the conversations, and was often referred to as a thing of the 
past (2014: 109). However, what results from her analysis is that the preoccupation about ethnicity 
was still present, not as a matter of self-identification, but as the fear that members of other ethnic 
categories would use these identities for negative purposes. In fact, “standpoints on ethnicity differ 
not per person or environment, but per moment” (2014: 111), arguably depending on the level of 
fear experienced by these persons in specific circumstances. “What was questioned and feared 
were not the categories as such, but their potential for being employed by others: the 
treacherousness of ethnic identification depended on other persons potentially using an ethnic 
frame for exclusion and violence” (2014: 129, emphasis added). This backs the hypothesis put 
forth in this research: ethnic violence contributes to the activation of ethnic categories not by 
perpetrators but by potential victims who feel threatened (Chapter 4).  
This is particularly well illustrated by an episode of Berckmoes’s fieldwork (2014: 111). She 
reports her discussions with Sylvère, a Tutsi taxi-men. Although repeatedly insisting on the non-
relevance of ethnicity in today’s Burundi, Sylvère holds a radically different discourse on one 
occasion.  
In the evening I called a taxi to take me to town. As Sylvère picked me up, he seemed to 
head toward Quartiers nord. I jokingly said that it was too late for me to go to my 
																																																								
71 It could be noted that Schraml (2012, 2014) also worked on the perception of ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi. 
However, her work tends to homogenize perception of ethnicity in three ways: within the countries, between the 
two countries, and across time. On the other hand, my concern here is precisely with these variations in the 
salience of ethnicity. Moreover, the general “primordialist” or “constructivist” perception of ethnicity of the 
locals is probably not the key issue, since Berckmoes’ analysis seems to show that the main concern of the 
Burundians were not with how they perceived ethnicity than how others perceived it, and more importantly how 
they may perceive it in an undetermined and unpredictable future. “My interlocutor hardly ever questioned the 
existence of ethnicity and they paid little attention to the veracity of differences in character traits or bodily 
aspects ascribed to Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Their attention was directed in the first place at actual and potential 
effects of people thinking and acting on the basis of ethnic differentiation” (2014:108). For these reasons, 
Berckmoes’ work seems to be more adapted to the purpose of this chapter. 
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interlocutors for research. He faked a surprised look. ‘Ah,’ he exclaimed: ‘so you are just 
like me, scared to be there. Scared for the people of Kamenge!’  
He continued, saying that he was always scared to go to that part of town. ‘Because at the 
moment of change, ‘they’ can suddenly change. Just like when the war broke out. They 
forget about all the lending hands (services) given over the years and the friendships built.’ 
‘Only people from Kamenge,’ I carefully elicited: ‘or Hutu in general?’ 
‘In general,’ he answered without hesitation (2014: 111).  
What emerges from this conversation is that while Sylvère does not consider ethnicity relevant in 
everyday life, he is still concerned by the risks that members of the other category “change” and 
return to the war logics of ethnic confrontation. Fear due to the uncertain context is central in 
explaining this residual persistence of the relevance of ethnicity.  
The same dynamic is also illustrated by the fact that youth engage in “mapping practices” 
(Berckmoes, 2014: chapter 3). They create “mythical-maps” which attribute moral or ethnic 
qualities to the inhabitants of the various areas of Bujumbura. When meeting strangers, the 
question “where do you live?” (2014: 99) was commonly asked to localize them on this map. 
These practices, notes Berckmoes, “can be viewed in light of an anticipation of violence as an 
ever-present possibility. (…) Through mapping practices potential allies and adversaries can be 
identified” (2014: 106).  
In sum, both examples illustrate that, from the point of view of Burundians, “the negative potential 
of ethnicity still loomed threateningly. The actualization of this potential depended largely on how 
others could and would employ ethnicity now or in the future, rather than on their own ideas and 
practices. The salience of ethnicity depended on the people around oneself” (2014: 122). This can 
be attributed to the remaining gaps in political and physical security, and the perceived 
unpredictability of the future. However, the fact that these preoccupations are not considered 
relevant in permanence but only in contexts when the risks and fears are higher, and mostly seen 
as a potentiality for the future rather than a threat in the present, shows that the political and 
security guarantees provided by the 2005 Constitution have already greatly reduced these fears, 
and, by way of consequence, the activation of ethnic identities.  
Informal Networks, Bargaining Arenas & Discourses 
Despite these remaining fears, what transpires from Berckmoes’ observations is that Burundians 
mostly consider that ethnicity has lost relevance since the end of the war. While the subject is not 
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often discussed, Berckmoes identifies three ways in which ethnicity is referred to: “in expressing 
that ethnicity is disappearing or has already disappeared as a relevant category for meaning in 
Burundi; by disapproving all relationships based on ethnic similarities and dissimilarities; and by 
expressly avoiding the topic of ethnicity” (2014: 112). It can be concluded from this analysis that 
not only the political but also the social salience of ethnicity has decreased in Burundi (Posner, 
2004).  
In this subsection, I argue that this phenomenon is an indirect effect of the power-sharing system. 
More precisely, the literature identifies two factors for explaining the de-emphasis of ethnicity in 
everyday life. First, discourses held by politicians and multi-ethnic political parties strongly 
condemn reference to ethnic antagonisms; they are reverberated in the population. Second, “arenas 
of bargaining” (Reilly, 2001) have been created by the power-sharing system and contribute to the 
decrease of inter-ethnic tensions. These arenas include the army and the security forces, the 
parties’ informal networks, and civil society’s informal networks. For both, limited empirical data 
make the confirmation of the causal link difficult. However, I judge them sufficiently plausible to 
deserve a short discussion.  
Discourses 
Just like the CNDD-FDD political parties have shifted to an anti-ethnic discourse since the end of 
the war (Reynjens, 2005: 132; Lemarchand, 2009: 171). This is a direct consequence of both the 
fact that Hutus and Tutsis are integrated in the political bodies, and the fact that the parties 
themselves have become multi-ethnic. Alfieri (2016a), for example, shows that the FNL’s ethnic 
discourse dramatically lost in relevance when Hutus were integrated in the institutions, and that 
the de-ethnicization of its discourse in 2009 was in fact a way to gain new popular legitimacy.72 A 
particularly telling example of this disappearance and condemnation of ethnic discourses in the 
political arena is an episode of the 2010 electoral campaign. “FNL dissident Pasteur Habimana, 
who campaigned calling upon all Hutu to vote for Hutu candidates in order to prevent a Tutsi 
return to power, was immediately and unanimously condemned by all political parties, including 
those siding both with the government and with the opposition” (Vandeginste, 2011: 329).  
																																																								
72 The process is illustrated by the quote of a militant: “they used to tell us to hate the Tutsi, they used to tell us 
our history, that a Tutsi was a criminal. But they couldn’t tell us this as Hutu and Tutsi studied together, and as 
we had realized that their ideologies were not true. They told us that Hutu had not power at all, but yet 
FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD were there” (Alfieri, 2016b: 244). 
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The decrease in social salience of ethnicity in Burundi can partly be explained by the spread of this 
anti-ethnic discourse at all levels of society. Vandeginste notes that it was quickly endorsed by the 
medias (2006: 185). Indeed, “major public-interested independent news outlets appeared on the 
scene in the early 2000s, and most had missions aimed at promoting dialogue and supporting the 
peace process.” (Jobbins & Ahitungiye, 2016: 211). Berckmoes (2014) shows that using ethnicity 
as a criterion for forging relations or social interactions is widely condemned and criticized 
amongst youths in Bujumbura. Interestingly, this rejection of the activation of ethnic identities is 
not limited to the Hutu/Tutsi divide but extends to other identity categories such as religion. When 
asking an interlocutor if he was Protestant, she was answered: “You should not say that! Don’t say 
‘I am Catholic,’ ‘I am Protestant.’ The most important thing is to believe, read the bible, accept 
Jesus Christ… Otherwise you’ll get the same sort of things like ethnicity” (2014: 115).  
Informal networks as arenas of bargaining  
A second explanatory factor is that the power-sharing agreement created many “arenas of 
bargaining” which put into contact members of different ethnic categories and therefore 
contributed to the creation of links of friendship, solidarity, or interdependence, as well as the 
decrease of tensions and stereotypes (Reilly, 2001).  
A first set of arenas results from the “security guarantees”, namely military integration. As Samii 
demonstrates, this process has generated close, personal contacts between Hutu and Tutsi soldiers. 
The integration has indeed been conducted down to the lowest level: soldiers’ barracks. “Given 
that soldiers in the same barracks live and train together, integration down to this level would 
require regular and intense interethnic contact” (2013: 561). This process has resulted in a 
cohesive institution which could be deployed for peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia 
without reports of inter-ethnic tensions (2013: 562). Moreover, Samii’s quantitative analysis 
suggests that the integration has indeed reduced prejudice, although other factors might enter into 
consideration (2013: 568).  
A second set of bargaining arenas is constituted by the multi-ethnic political parties and their 
informal networks. Political parties have developed wide networks across the country. This is 
especially true for the CNDD-FDD. Tobolka notes that this “party’s territorial penetration is very 
deep in most provinces. (…) CNDD-FDD structures do exist, they are not imaginary: regular 
meetings are held, attendance sheets signed, minutes taken, reports written and archived, small- or 
	163	
large-scale activities organized” (2014: 5). Other major parties also have nation-wide structures. 
For example, Alfieri reports having assisted to the creation of FNL structures across all provinces 
of the country. She observed that FNL offices in Bujumbura were opened on an ongoing basis and 
that militants engaged in various activities including awareness-raising and recruitment campaigns 
(2016a: 4). Politicians’ clientelist networks can also be added to these structures, since (as noted in 
the first section of this chapter) clientelist networks have historically played a big role in ensuring 
social cohesion in Burundi. All these networks have political functions, but they can also be 
considered as arenas were Hutus and Tutsis interact, which may contribute to the decrease in inter-
ethnic divisions. Due to the lack of empirical research on these questions, I can only mention this 
as a hypothesis. However, it would certainly be a fruitful direction for future research.   
A third set of arenas of bargaining is formed by the civil society (Putnam, 1993). Berckmoes 
mentions a few multi-ethnic associations. For example, the Centre Jeunes Kamenge, which aims at 
uniting young people “despite their differences” (2014: 76). She also reports that many 
associations devote particular efforts to describe their membership in inclusive terms, in order not 
to be perceived as exclusionary (2014: 120-1). Given these elements, it sounds plausible that 
associational networks are widely multi-ethnic in Burundi, but the lack of empirical data does not 
allow us to precisely determine whether multi-ethnic organisations are widespread or not 
(Berckmoes, personal communication, September 13th, 2016). The potential for associational 
networks to build “civic capital” and foster peacebuilding has been acknowledged by many NGOs 
that develop trust-building projects at many levels (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2016: 215). The 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars led The Burundi Leadership Training Program 
to build trust and cooperative behaviour amongst Burundian elites (Wolpe and McDonald, 2012). 
Search for Common Ground also led various activities aiming at uniting youth in multi-ethnic (and 
multi-party) events. This included support for a multi-ethnic radio channel which promoted peace, 
or the creation of “Peace festivals” which were organised by young leaders and brought together 
members of different parties and ethnic groups.73 These associational networks might well have 
																																																								
73 Many thanks to Katrin Wittig for the suggestion. See for example: Search for Common Ground, “Youth 
inspired: now and tomorrow”, https://www.sfcg.org/youth-inspired-now-and-tomorrow/, “Mobilizing Burundi’s 
Youth for peaceful elections” https://www.sfcg.org/mobilizing-burundis-youth-for-peaceful-elections/, consulted 
on September 21st 2016. 
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acted as “bargaining arenas” and contributed to the decrease of social relevance of ethnicity. This 
is also a potentially fruitful topic for further research.74  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a plausibility test of the theory developed in the last chapters. The first 
section has described the process of politicization of ethnic identities in Burundi. From a pre-
colonial period where ethnicity was not the unique cleavage, formal and informal institutions as 
well as violence have led to a situation where ethnicity became the only identity that could be 
activated (with regional identity for a small part of the population). This process fits closely with 
the theory of politicization of ethnicity developed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The literature however 
shows that an additional factor participated in this process: the influence of ethnic tensions in 
neighbouring Rwanda. In this regard, it can be noted that I did not pretend that the two factors 
highlighted in this thesis are the only explanatory factors for the politicization of ethnicity, I just 
identified them as the two principal factors emerging from the literature. The identification of 
additional factors and their mechanisms is left to further research, and the influence of 
neighbouring countries is probably one of these.  
The second and third sections focused on the power-sharing institutions and the depoliticization of 
ethnic identities after the war. In section 2, I argued that the consociational literature on the 
question has difficulties explaining the success of power-sharing in Burundi for the main reason 
that the dynamic at play is not the one identified by Arendt Lijphart. Rather than a consociational 
system, I argued that Burundian power-sharing is much closer to the centripetal model presented 
in chapter 5, since it includes political and security guarantees as well as ethnic party bans and 
institutional incentives for the creation of multi-ethnic parties. In other words, power-sharing in 
Burundi did not aim at the “pillarization” of the society but instead aimed at the integration of 
Hutus and Tutsis.  
The analysis developed in section 3 seeks to answer the central question of this thesis, namely: 
how can one explain the depoliticization of ethnic identities? In Burundi’s context, I argued that 
the principal explanation was the emergence of multi-ethnic parties. I explained this phenomenon 
by the behaviour of individuals in the power-sharing institutions at three levels: 1–party leaders 
																																																								
74 The direction of the causal relationship between depolarization of ethnicity and the emergence of multi-ethnic 
informal networks would also need to be clarified. The question of whether these networks have the potential to 
hinder processes of ethnic re-polarization would also be interesting to explore.  
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integrating members of other ethnic categories; 2–candidates joining parties previously dominated 
by the other ethnic category; and 3–cross-ethnic voting by citizens. While neo-patrimonial 
imperatives are not the only motor of Burundians’ political actions, nevertheless, given the harsh 
economic circumstances, a significant number of actors has apparently had to favour neo-
patrimonial imperatives over their ideological or ethnic preferences. Second, the strong guarantees 
for political representation and security of both groups have enabled a depoliticization of ethnicity 
by alleviating fears. This process, however, has not been fully completed since violence never 
fully disappeared and uncertainty about the future remains. Third, I noted the probable impact of 
discourses and arenas of bargaining created by informal networks in the decrease of the social 
salience of ethnicity. These factors were suggested by the literature and I considered them 
sufficiently plausible and interesting to discuss at least briefly.  
This analysis fits quite well with the theory of depoliticization of ethnic identities developed in 
chapter 5. Most importantly, the analysis demonstrates that an exclusive focus on formal 
institutions is not sufficient for understanding the dynamics of power-sharing in context. Close 
attention should be given to individual behaviours, which are also influenced by the pre-existing 
informal institutional order. In Burundi, the imperatives of survival associated with the neo-
patrimonial environment appear to have deeply influenced the functioning of the power-sharing 
system. This conclusion echoes Curtis (2012) or Spears, who noted that “Burundi (…) is the 
exception that still proves the rule that, despite the best efforts of the international community, 
peace in Africa continues to revolve around issues of resources and patronage rather than 
institutions” (Spears, 2013: 49). The main difference is that–however unsettling this conclusion 
might be–evidence seems to suggest that neo-patrimonial logics, and individual opportunistic 
calculations have not only had negative effects on the Burundian peace transition. They are also 
central in explaining the successes of this transition, the main one being the depoliticization of the 
ethnic cleavage.  
Paradoxically, though, these neopatrimonial logics do also carry with them the seeds of the further 
degradation of the situation. In 2005, Reyntjens had noted that “the temptation of authoritarian rule 
[would] need to be resisted by the CNDD-FDD” (2005: 132). That the temptation of authoritarian 
can actually be resisted in these conditions, however, remains to be proved (Uvin & Bayer, 2013). 
Indeed, once arrived in power in 2005, and even more since it reinforced its hold on state 
institutions in 2010, the CNDD-FDD controlled nearly all the means available to a state 
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incumbent. These include the control of state resources and employment as well as the control of 
the security forces, including the powerful secret services. These two elements have been used 
respectively to sustain the party’s clientelist networks and to exact heavy repression on the parties’ 
opponents (Tobolka, 2014). Taken together, they have led to the centralization of the votes by the 
ruling party, and growing authoritarian tendencies which led to the current crisis (Daley and 
Popplewell, 2016). These events are well summarized by Jobbins and Ahitungiye: 
The current crisis erupted in April 2015 after the president announced that he would run for 
a third term, as opposition protesters took to the streets of Bujumbura claiming this violated 
the term limits clause of the constitution. In May, army officers launched a coup d’ etat 
while the president attended crisis talks in Tanzania. While the coup was eventually 
controlled, many of the nations’ media outlets were damaged. (…) Parliamentary, 
presidential, and local elections were held throughout the summer, with the boycott of many 
opposition candidates. President Nkurunziza was successful, with the only opposition 
coming from longtime FNL leader Agathon Rwasa. Since President Nkurunziza’s 
reelection, the country has experienced dozens of targeted assassinations of government, 
opposition, and civil society figures in apparent reprisal attacks, the coalescing of an 
opposition in exile, and at the time of writing, escalating rhetoric and rumors of armed 
activity (2016: 212-213).  
These dynamics, however, appear to be less a consequence of the power-sharing system than of 
the neo-patrimonial context and the legacy of the wars (Wittig, 2016). Rather, because power-
sharing allowed for the participation of the opposition in both the legislative and the executive, it 
has acted as a “safety valve in [these] times of electoral turmoil” (Vandeginste, 2009). This safety 
valve has been weakened, however, by the fact that the opposition has at times proven to be a 
“poor loser” (Reyntjens, 2005: 124). Its decision to boycott the 2010 elections although “probably 
also based on a genuine conviction that the game had been rigged from the start – was inspired by 
a strategic speculation that a boycott would encourage the international donor community to call 
for a rerun of the elections” (Vandeginste, 2011: 319). This strategy turned out to have 
catastrophic long-run consequences. Rather than dismissing power-sharing as a peacebuilding tool, 
the tragic developments of the situation in Burundi do thus in fact confirm that power-sharing is 
not a panacea, and should be accompanied by other peacebuilding measures and a close 
monitoring in the long run (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2016). Amongst these measures, growing 
importance should be attributed to the development of opposition parties that are multi-ethnic, 
strong and independent, but also genuinely committed to democratic principles.  
Amongst the clouds of the current crisis, three positive points have however been noted by 
observers. First, paradoxically, the crisis shows that democratic reflexes have emerged amongst 
	167	
the population in Burundi, which is a positive development in a country marked by decades of 
authoritarianism. “The key word of the protest movement against the third mandate of the 
outgoing president was Sindumuja (we are not slaves), the expression of a claim for social justice 
and the will to set limits to his exercise of power. In fact, top-down authoritarian repression by the 
government is met by increased willingness of the grassroots to confront authority and to become 
involved in politics, despite the risks” (Alfieri, 2016b).  
Second, as most observers agree, and with the exception of a few cases (HRW, 2016) ethnicity has 
not been re-politicized during the crisis (Chrétien, 2016, Daley & Popplewell, 2016: 6; Alfieri, 
2016a: 19): “Apart from isolated cases, six months into the political crisis, we have not seen 
widespread ethnically motivated hate speech, mobilization, or violence. (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 
2016: 224). The stabilizing effect of the power-sharing system may well be one of the causes of 
this success. An important factor being that the opposition parties, as well as the CNDD-FDD, are 
multi-ethnic.  
Third, a direct consequence of this second point is that the logic of violence has considerably 
changed since the end of the war and this remains mostly true in 2015. In 2010, Travaglianti found 
that, instead of ethnic violence, “in several instances, violence was ‘selective’ and targeted specific 
political actors and almost none of the violence targeted the masses” (2014: 20). This is also 
observed by one of Berckmoes’ interviewee: “Violence today is against particular, targeted people, 
like the chef de colline that was killed the other day” (2015: 5). Remarkably, the United Nations 
reported in March 2015 the death of 474 people since the beginning of the 2015 crisis.75 The tragic 
character of these events should be fully acknowledged, but it can be noted that this number is a 
far cry from the thousands of deaths which used to follow the Hutu-rebellions during the pre-war 
period (Uvin, 1999). As Jobbins and Ahitungiye write, “it would have been unthinkable ten or 
fifteen years ago in Burundi that the country would experience a crisis marked by urban protests, a 
coup attempt, and a political impasse, and that there would not be ethnic overtones” (2016: 214). I 
would add ethnic massacres. Much of the credit for these three positive trends is owed to the 
power-sharing system. 
Risks of re-politicization of the ethnic cleavage are however sadly growing, as the CNDD-FDD 
appears to be ready to do almost anything to remain in power, including coming back to the ethnic 
																																																								
75 UN, “Senior UN official warns Burundi's tensions could fuel violence throughout Great Lakes region”, 22 
March 2016: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53522#.WGqDd6N7Su5. 
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rhetoric that had almost fully disappeared from the Burundian political landscape, and reviving 
ethnic rivalries in an attempt to mobilize Hutu supporters (Daley and Popplewell, 2016: 6). The 
recurring declarations and actual attempts of the incumbents to change important dispositions of 
the constitution–therefore threatening the very system that allowed for the depoliticization of the 
ethnic cleavage in the country–are also worrying (Vandeginste, 2009).  
For these reasons, there are risks that the current crisis may re-activate ethnicity, since this 
cleavage has not fully disappeared in Burundi. This is true for the political parties, where internal 
ethnic hierarchies have never completely faded. “There are party members and there are party 
owners, it’s different”, a CNDD-FDD member told Wittig (2016: 15). This is also true for the 
army. The failed 2015 coup and the purges which have followed have indeed instilled much fear 
of the reappearance of ethnic divisions in the army. The same also holds true for the society where 
residual inter-ethnic fears remain. During the crisis, the opposition has recurrently drawn the 
attention of the international community to the potential risks of genocide. While the actual risks 
are difficult to evaluate, these calls are at least testimonies of the dramatic increase in inter-ethnic 
fears in the country. Although the CNDD-FDD’s attempts to instrumentalize ethnicity appear to 
have failed until now (Alfieri, 2016a: 18), the risks of a re-politicization of ethnicity–and the 
dramatic consequences it could have–must be taken seriously. 
All of this finally goes in the same sense as the definition of success proposed in the introduction 
of this thesis: well-designed ethnic power-sharing can lead to the depoliticization of ethnic 
identities, which facilitates democratic consolidation and the diminution of violence but by no way 
guarantees it. If there is one last lesson to be learned from power-sharing in Burundi, it is thus 





“Que voulez-vous? Nous ne sommes pas maîtres de certains réflexes. Il m’est 
facile de penser désormais aux uns et aux autres avec une égale pitié.” 
Georges Bernanos, Les grands cimetières sous la Lune, 1938 
 
Theory and practice, I wrote earlier, are never very far from each other when it comes to power-
sharing. Despite its wide acceptation amongst academics and practitioners as the favoured option 
for peacebuilding in multi-ethnic societies, power-sharing’s capacity to establish sustainable peace 
has been put into question by an important literature. Moreover, as observed by Horowitz (2014: 
7), power-sharing has a poor record in practice; few countries which have been subject to ethnic 
conflicts have adopted this system and there are even fewer cases of successful implementation.76 
“Only a handful–between four and six, depending on how one chooses to count–could be said to 
have achieved a reasonable degree of sustained power sharing, and even among these there are 
some serious political pathologies” (Horowitz, 2014: 8).  
This thesis began from the intuition that these practical inefficiencies are related to weaknesses in 
the theoretical underpinnings of power-sharing, notably an implicit primordialist conception of 
ethnicity, an a-contextual approach of institutional design, and an elite-bias. Instead of rejecting 
power-sharing out-of-hands, this thesis attempted to address these theoretical weaknesses, which 
may in turn help formulating solutions to some of the practical problems of power-sharing. This 
conclusion summarizes the theoretical specifications proposed in the thesis and then tries to 
evaluate their potential practical contribution. 
Theoretical Contribution and Main Arguments 
The main contribution of this thesis is its attempt to approach power-sharing theory through (1) the 
lenses of a constructivist theory of ethnicity which leaves room for change in ethnic politics, and 
(2) a neo-institutionalist approach of institutions, which pays attention to the interaction of 
institutions with their environment and to citizen-elite linkages. This approach, the theoretical 
																																																								
76 According to Horowitz’s count, out of the “78 countries [which] experienced one or more serious ethnic-
conflict incidents between 1980 and 2010” only 20 adopted power-sharing agreements (2014: 7). 
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foundations of which were discussed and defined in chapters 1 and 2, has led me to  break with the 
traditional literature on power-sharing.  
First, I have argued that ethnic cleavages haves a specificity as compared to other types of 
cleavages. This specificity is due to the “stickiness” of ethnic identities and to the fact that these 
identities are “descent-based” (Chandra, 2012): when ethnicity is the dominant cleavage in a 
society, politics becomes a zero-sum game, and the fluidity of political affiliations which is 
necessary for the good functioning of a democratic system disappears. Moreover, as argued in 
chapter 4, the logic of violence across ethnic lines tends to be indiscriminate, dispossessive and 
associated with widespread atrocities. Based on this analysis, I developed an answer to the 
sometimes neglected and often ambiguous question of the goal of power-sharing in post-conflict 
settings. I argued that “success” of power-sharing after ethnic conflicts can be defined as the 
depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage. While it does not fully guarantee the establishment of 
peace and democracy, reaching this objective appears a necessary pre-requisite for the 
establishment and consolidation of sustainable peace and democracy.  
Second, understanding how to reach this objective required a prior understanding of the process of 
politicization of ethnic identities. In chapter 2, building on Chandra (2012), I conceptualized the 
politicization of ethnicity as the reduction of the set of nominal identities that can be activated by 
individuals to ethnic identities only. In chapters 3 and 4, I identified factors which play a key role 
in the politicization of ethnic identities. I argued that formal and informal institutions, as well as 
violence and its emotional legacies can provide constraints on the repertoires of identities and 
incentives for the mobilization of ethnic identities. The Burundi plausibility case study conducted 
in chapter 6 has suggested that these factors have played a major role in the politicization of ethnic 
identities in Burundi, but that additional factors–such as the influence of ethnic conflicts in 
neighbouring countries–could be identified. More generally, this case study has proved that this 
conceptualization can be applied successfully for the analysis of ethnic politicization process in 
context.  
Third, in chapter 5, I built on this analysis to propose general principles for the depoliticization of 
ethnic identities. The general rationale is that constraints on identity repertoires must be removed 
in order to enable the depoliticization of the ethnic cleavage, and incentives for the mobilization of 
non-ethnic identities should be provided, in order to foster cleavage shift. Constitution- and 
electoral-system design may arguably achieve these two objectives. I argued that a power-sharing 
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system which combines 1–Institutional guarantees for the political representation of all ethnic 
categories, 2–Institutional guarantees for the security of all ethnic categories, and 3–Incentives for 
the creation of multi-ethnic parties, may be able to foster the depoliticization of the ethnic 
cleavage. The study of power-sharing in Burundi suggests that this model may indeed contribute 
to the depoliticization of ethnic identities in post-war settings, but also carries some risks of 
authoritarianism. More generally, this case study proved that the model has theoretical value: 
while Burundi’s power-sharing is often considered to follow the consociational model, 
consociational theory does not allow for a good understanding of its functioning and its success. 
The proposed model arguably corresponds more to the case of Burundi and allows for a better 
understanding of its functioning. This might be the case for other power-sharing system, such as, 
for example, the Swiss one, which also includes political and security guarantees for ethnic 
categories, and multi-ethnic parties (Linder, 1994).  
These last incentives however, can only be understood in context, since individual calculations not 
only depend on the incentives provided by constitutional dispositions and electoral institutions but 
also by the environment and pre-existing institutional order. For this reason, specific institutional 
design can only be determined in context. In this thesis, I only focused on one specific context: 
neo-patrimonial societies. I built a three-level model of individual actors’ behaviour which 
identified imperatives and strategies of survival for the state leaders, the elites, and the people. 
This model may help understand actors’ behaviour in power-sharing institutions established in 
neo-patrimonial contexts. The explanation of the adoption and functioning of power-sharing in 
Burundi has shown that including neo-patrimonial imperatives in the analysis is necessary to fully 
understand why the implementation of power-sharing agreements might be more or less successful 
in different contexts. 
Limits and Prospects for Further Research 
As noted in the introduction, this thesis can be considered as “theory-proposing” research. 
Although the study of the “crucial case” of Burundi suggests that the arguments developed are 
plausible, the theory of the politicization and (more crucially) of the depoliticization of ethnic 
identities needs further rigorous testing. This could be done either by expanding the number of 
case studies, or by conducting quantitative research (Lijphart, 1971). As the number of available 
cases appears to be limited, I would favour the first option.  
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The theoretical developments proposed in this thesis suggest interesting areas for further research. 
First, the question of the specificity of the ethnic cleavage is one of the most important for a 
constructivist analysis of ethnicity. This thesis has not provided a definitive answer to this 
question. This is because answering it necessitates, in my opinion, a deep reflection on the bonds 
that unite a community, and how different cleavages might disrupt these intra-societal linkages. 
This question emerged during my research, and it grew in importance as I reflected on ethnicity. I 
now consider that this may be one of the richest fields for further research on post-conflict 
reconciliation and positive peacebuilding. Research in this field would require a re-integration in 
conflict studies of contributions and methods of disciplines such as (micro-)sociology and 
anthropology, which are neglected particularly in North American academe. For example, I 
recently identified elements in the works of Marcel Mauss (1923, 1969), such as the concept of 
reciprocities, that may provide a promising foundation for such research. 
Second, the identification of additional factors of politicization of ethnic identities is needed. The 
Burundian case study suggested that the regional environment might be an important one. Close 
attention should be paid to causal mechanisms. More generally, I have focused on external 
constraints on the politicization of ethnic identities. A question is whether internal constraints 
might also exist. By internal constraints, I mean factors that do not depend on the environment but 
on the content of ethnic categories. For example, religions or cultures might carry internal rules 
and values which could contribute to the politicization of ethnic identities. My intuition is that 
most of the time internal constraints are not as important or as external ones. In countries where 
religion is politicized, such as Lebanon, religious principles appear to have less causal importance 
than the organization of political institutions, political parties and clientelist networks. However, it 
might be an interesting area for further investigation.  
Third, the question of the role of informal networks appears as another very interesting area for 
further research on the politicization and depoliticization of ethnic identities. The role of multi-
ethnic informal networks needs further clarification. Many questions would deserve to be 
investigated: can multi-ethnic informal networks foster the depoliticization of ethnic identities? Or 
are they only a consequence of such depoliticization? On the other hand, can multi-ethnic 
networks hinder processes of politicization of ethnic identities? And can the existence of strong 
multi-ethnic networks increase the chances of success of power-sharing systems? In brief, linking 
	173	
studies of ethnicity and power-sharing to the “social capital” literature (Norris, 2002; Putnam, 
1993) appears to be a particularly promising field for future research.  
Fourth, the model for the depoliticization of ethnic identities that I proposed is mainly suited for 
neo-patrimonial societies. In an era of globalization, where all societies are becoming increasingly 
diverse, developing the reflection on the depoliticization of ethnic identities in other types of 
societies is important. This cannot be limited in scope to what used to be called “third world” 
countries at the time power-sharing theory appeared. Emerging ethnic tensions in Europe and 
North America show that the study of ethnic conflict and institutional engineering for its 
management in the West is not only necessary, but increasingly urgent. 
Potential Practical Contributions 
In sum, there remains much to be researched, and much to be debated in this field. But to 
conclude, I would like to attempt to evaluate if the theoretical developments proposed in this thesis 
might help address some of the practical weaknesses of power-sharing. One way to do so is to 
examine the potential answers to the “three big problems” of power-sharing identified by 
Horowitz in 2014: the adoption problem, the immobilism problem, and the degradation problem.  
The adoption problem is linked to the countless obstacles which face the adoption of a power-
sharing agreements during a civil war. For Horowitz, a majoritarian group will only accept to 
share power at times when it is “momentarily weak” (2014: 8). As for centripetal regimes, 
Horowitz notes that three situations can be conducive to the adoption of such institutions. First, 
when experts recommend it, which is rare; second, when the party of the majoritarian group needs 
the votes of the minority; third, when the future is unpredictable and all groups are likely to be the 
next victims of violence (Horowitz, 2014: 9-10). The adoption problem, is linked to the 
negotiation process, and is therefore more closely related the “civil war mediation” research 
agenda than to the “institutional design” research agenda which is the focus of this thesis. 
However, this thesis might still provide some ideas for solving this problem since it has shown that 
institutional design influences the strategic calculations of actors when it comes to adoption a 
power-sharing system. At first sight, the adoption of power-sharing in Burundi might correspond 
to the first explanation of Horowitz: both the majoritarian group (Hutu) and the dominant group 
(Tutsi) were weak after years of violence. However, the analysis conducted in chapter 6 has also 
shown that the system was successfully implemented because the votes (and candidatures) of the 
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minority (Tutsi) had become valuable to the Hutu-dominated parties. This was partly due to a pre-
existing situation (the multiplicity of Hutu parties), but also to institutional design, which provided 
incentives for integrating Tutsis. Moreover, this thesis has tried to erase the “groupism” problem, 
which is still residual in Horowitz’s analysis of the adoption problem. I have argued that attention 
should be paid to the constraints and incentives affecting individual repertoires of identities. A 
carefully designed power-sharing system might provide such incentives. Individuals’ opportunistic 
behaviour might well lead them to jump across the ethnic divide. In this thesis, this reflection was 
more targeted at the survival of the power-sharing than at its adoption; however, a similar 
reflection might be fruitful in research on power-sharing negotiations. 
The second problem identified by Horowitz is immobilism, namely, the great difficulty to modify 
power-sharing agreements after their adoption. The model proposed in this thesis is arguably less 
likely to be subject to this problem. Indeed, one of the idea of this model is to set up a positive 
dynamic of depoliticization of ethnicity, from the earliest stages of its implementation (Shvetsova, 
2002). In an ideal case, where implementation would be fully successful, the power-sharing model 
would progressively become irrelevant and could even be removed. In reality, it is trickier to 
determine if and when such a system could be suppressed. As reconciliation is a long-term 
process, I doubt that this could happen in the short- or medium-term after the end of the civil 
conflict (Sluzki, 2003). More importantly, in diverse societies, the risk that ethnicity becomes 
politicized remains present even if the ethnic cleavage is not dominant. For this reason, I believe a 
combination of guarantees for representation of all ethnic categories coupled with incentives for 
mobilization of non-ethnic identities should be maintained at all time in these societies. The case 
of Switzerland demonstrates this: even if ethnicity is not a dominant political cleavage in the Swiss 
political landscape, institutional dispositions for the representation of all groups in political 
institutions are maintained and carefully applied (Linder, 1994). The case of Burundi also tends to 
demonstrate that the system must be maintained in the long run since the temptation of 
instrumentalizing ethnicity might well tempt elites in time of crisis. The regular attempts of the 
CNDD-FDD to modify dispositions of the Burundian constitution represent a threat to the survival 
of power-sharing (Vandeginste, 2011). In this case, the robustness of the agreement and the 
difficulty to modify it–in one word, its immobility–is not so much a weakness as a strength.  
The last problem is degradation: the majoritarian group which accepted a power-sharing 
agreement when it was weak might be tempted to challenge this accord if it becomes powerful 
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again (Horowitz, 2014: 10). Here too, the proposed model may arguably help us to think about 
solutions. The close attention I proposed to pay to the citizens, and the incentives that are provided 
for moderation and inter-ethnic reconciliation at the level of people might be the key. Indeed, a 
moderate people might act as a break against the potential ethnic extremism of elites. The recent 
events in Burundi provide an example of this dynamic. While the state leaders have progressively 
turned back to an ethnic discourse, the people have, in majority, not followed. Although some 
instances of ethnic violence have been reported and should be acknowledged (HWR, 2015), the 
eruption of massive ethnic violence that had been witnessed during each crisis in the post-
independence decades has not happened in 2015. Although more elements would be needed to 
prove this hypothesis, it is quite probable that the multi-ethnic political parties, clientelist networks 
and associational networks have played a key role in developing a moderate people which has not 
followed ethnic extremists leaders. Whereas consociationalism proposed that moderate elites can 
appease extremist people, it should also be acknowledged that a moderate people can alleviate 
elites’ extremism. As proposed in this thesis, further reflection is needed on the ability of formal 
institutions to induce moderation amongst the people.  
In sum, the potential practical consequences of the theoretical analysis developed in this thesis still 
need to be developed. However, the research might at least suggest new directions which could 
provide solutions to some of power-sharing’s most worrying problems, most particularly 
immobilism and degradation. Anchoring institutional conflict management in a rigorous and up-to-
date theoretical ground is not a vain exercise.  
* 
Reduced to its most simple expression, the central idea of this study is surprisingly close to the 
observation formulated by Tocqueville almost two centuries ago, and quoted at the very beginning 
this thesis: if they are to build a society in common, the “art of associating” must be developed 
amongst former belligerents in parallel to the equality of their condition. Only then can one hope 
that individuals who have engaged in the worst forms of violence against each other on the sole 
basis of their ethnic identities might one day, like Georges Bernanos in the epigraph of this 
conclusion, express compassion for their former allies and their former enemies alike. A 
compassion that can also be called reconciliation–the stone on which peace and democracy can 
find their most solid foundation.   
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